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RATIONAL-CHOICE MODELS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR VS. FUNCTIONALIST AND CONFORMIST THEORIES

By JOHN C. HARSANYI*

I. Introduction

AFTER a virtual neglect for several decades, in the last twenty years renewed interest has been shown in a general theory of social behavior. Most of this theoretical work has depended on two main postulates. One is the *functionalist* (sometimes called structural-functional) approach to the explanation of social institutions, based on the assumption that the *social institutions* of a given society can best be understood in terms of their *social functions*, that is, in terms of the contributions they make to the maintenance of social systems as a whole. For lack of an established technical term, we shall call the other postulate the *conformist* approach to the explanation of *individual behavior*: it is based on the assumption that uniformities of individual behavior in a given society can best be understood in terms of certain commonly accepted *social values*, which most members of the society tend to internalize during their socialization process.

The most elaborate and best known theoretical framework based on these two postulates is that of Talcott Parsons,[1] but the theoretical work of a number of other social scientists has also been based on similar assumptions.[2]

However, even though functionalist and conformist theories have enjoyed considerable popularity in recent years, they have also pro-

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[1] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (Glencoe, Ill. 1949); *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill. 1951); *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, Ill. 1954); *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe, Ill. 1961).

[2] See Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII, (Aug. 1956), 391-409; Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton 1952); R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York 1957); William C. Mitchell, *The American Polity* (New York 1962) and *Sociological Analysis and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1967); A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (Glencoe, Ill. 1952), etc.

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voked widespread criticism.[3] Most critics agree on the following points:

1. These theories overstate the degree of consensus and social integration found in empirical societies, and overlook the important role that conflicts of interest and disagreements over social values play in social life, and particularly in the political process as we know it.

2. These theories have an unduly static and conservative bias: at best they are static theories of social equilibrium, rather than dynamic theories of social change.

3. As Homans[4] has pointed out about Parsons' approach (but the same is true about other functionalist and conformist theories in their present form), Parsons' theory is not a "theory" at all in the sense in which this term is used in the empirical sciences, such as the natural sciences, economics, and behavioral psychology. In these sciences "theory" means a *hypothetico-deductive theory* explaining (and possibly predicting) a large number of empirical facts from a few relatively simple theoretical assumptions or axioms. From a logical point of view, such a theory is a set of propositions, all derivable from a few axioms by strict logical (and possibly mathematical) reasoning. In contrast, Parsons' theory is a set of concepts and definitions, rather than a set of propositions; and obviously it is even less a set of propositions forming a hypothetico-deductive system.

We shall discuss these and some other criticisms of functionalist and conformist theories in greater detail. But of course it is not enough to show that these theories have some important analytical and empirical deficiencies. The real question is whether there is any alternative theoretical approach not open to similar objections. Our main purpose in this paper is to show that such an alternative approach is in fact

[3] See, e.g., James S. Coleman, "Comment on 'On the Concept of Influence,'" *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII (Spring 1963), 63-92; Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (September 1958), 115-27; *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford 1959); Alvin Gouldner, "Some Observations on Systematic Theory, 1945-55," in Hans L. Zetterberg, ed., *Sociology in the United States* (Paris, 1956); "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York 1959); John C. Harsanyi, "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science," *Behavioral Science*, V (April 1960), 136-45, "A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations," *Behavioral Science* XI (September 1966), 357-69, "Individualistic versus Functionalistic Explanations in the Light of Game Theory," in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *Problems in the Philosophy of Science* (Amsterdam 1967); Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York 1959); George C. Homans, "Contemporary Theory in Sociology," in Robert E. L. Faris, ed., *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago 1964); David Lockwood, "Some Remarks on 'The Social System,'" *British Journal of Sociology* VII (June 1956), 134-46; John Rex, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory* (London 1961).

[4] *Ibid.*

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provided by theories based on the concept of rational choice (rational behavior, or rational decision-making)—borrowed from economics, but appropriately generalized for the analysis of noneconomic behavior.

Unlike functionalist theories, theories of rational behavior have a natural tendency to take a hypothetico-deductive form, and to explain a wide variety of empirical facts in terms of a small number of theoretical assumptions (such as assumptions about the actual objectives of people's behavior, about the resources and the information available to them, etc.). Again, unlike functionalist theories, rational-behavior theories can account for social stability and for social change with equal facility; and, by drawing on the resources of modern game theory, they can readily analyze both social conflict and social cooperation, and even those uneasy mixtures of the two that characterize most empirical social situations.[5]

II. The Concept of Rational Behavior

On the commonsense level the concept of rational behavior usually refers to choosing the appropriate means for achieving some given end. For example, we say that it will be rational for me to take a jet if my goal is to get from New York to London within a few hours, and that it would be irrational for me to go by ship because that way I could not achieve my goal.

Already at this commonsense level the concept of rational behavior has very considerable explanatory power. For instance, my wanting to make a trip from New York to London will explain a long sequence of actions I have undertaken in order to achieve this goal.

However, classical economics has substantially increased the explanatory power of the concept of rational behavior, by extending it from choices between alternative means to a given end, to choices between alternative ends. Under this more general concept, a person's behavior will be rational if he chooses among different goals according to a consistent scale of preferences, that is, according to the relative importance or utility he assigns to each particular goal.

Once we adopt this broader concept of rationality, we are no longer restricted to the analysis of human behavior in pursuing some fixed goals, but can extend our analysis to changes in people's goals. For instance, we can explain why a person will change his plans and will

[5] Dahrendorf, 127, has argued that we cannot use the same theoretical model to analyze social conflicts and to analyze social consensus or cooperation. In actual fact, as modern game theory has shown in analyzing games with mixed interests (where the players' interests are similar in some respects and are dissimilar in other respects), the same theoretical model can handle both conflict and cooperation without any difficulty.

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decide against a trip to London if the attraction of this trip significantly decreases, or if the attraction of alternative ways of spending his time and money significantly increases.

Significant further generalizations of the concept of rational behavior have been achieved by modern decision theory and game theory—by the former in relation to rational behavior under risk and uncertainty, and by the latter in relation to rational behavior in situations involving strategic interaction with other rational opponents.[6]

Finally, we have to mention the important developments in the theory of rational behavior associated with Herbert A. Simon's name.[7] Normative theories of rational choice, from classical economics to modern game theory, ignore the limited information-processing ability of human decision-makers, and so cannot be expected to make fully realistic predictions about the human decision-making process. In contrast, Simon's theory of *limited* rationality is a theory of rational behavior that tries to take full account of the limitations of human information-processing ability. Moreover, unlike normative theories of rationality, it is not merely a theory of rational choice among given alternatives. Rather, it is also a theory of how specific *new* decision-problems actually emerge and attract the attention of the relevant decision-makers; and it is also a theory of how *new* alternatives (new policy proposals) are invented and come to be considered in the decision-making process.

III. Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior

Of course the suggestion of using rational-choice models in the analysis of noneconomic social behavior is not a novelty. Indeed, we might very well argue that at least two important strands of thought in traditional political philosophy, viz., the interest-group theory of internal politics and the national-interest theory of international politics, are in effect imprecise and unformalized versions of some kind

[6] The von Neumann-Morgenstern approach to game theory does not yield determinate predictions for two-person non–zero-sum games and for n-person games, the two game classes most important for social science applications. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton 1944). But later work has overcome this difficulty. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, "Bargaining and Conflict Situations in the Light of a New Approach to Game Theory," *American Economic Review*, LV (May 1965), 447-57 and "A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations," *Econometrica*, XXXIV (July 1966), 613-34.

[7] See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York 1957), *Models of Man* (New York 1957), "The Executive as Decision Maker," in H. A. Simon, *The Shape of Automation* (New York 1965), "Political Research: The Decision-Making Framework," in David Easton, ed., *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966).

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of rational-choice approach. The same may be argued about Marxist theories of class interest.

To be sure, the family resemblance between these traditional "interest theories" and rational-choice theories in a modern sense should not be overstated. Precisely because of the use of ill-defined concepts and of imprecisely stated theoretical assumptions, these traditional theories have never made full use of the intellectual resources of the rational-choice approach, and have left a number of important analytical questions unanswered. For example, the very concept of "interest," so basic to these theories, has never been made sufficiently precise. In particular, there has been no real attempt to clarify the relationship between people's economic and noneconomic interests, between their short-run and long-run interests, between individual and group interests, and again between individual or group interests and more general social interests on a national or international level. There has been no theoretical analysis of the conditions leading to peaceful compromise agreements, or of those leading to social conflicts of various scopes and intensities. There has been no attempt to specify the laws governing coalition formation among different social groups, or to understand the general factors determining the relative bargaining power of various groups.[8]

However, in recent years there have also been a number of attempts, some of them in my opinion very successful, to use more rigorous and more precisely stated rational-choice models in the analysis of noneconomic social behavior, and particularly of political behavior.[9]

Yet, before rational-choice models can achieve reasonably wide use in

[8] In fairness to traditional "interest theories," before the emergence of modern game theory the analytical tools needed for answering some of these questions were simply not available.

[9] For example, Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge 1958); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor 1962); James S. Coleman, "Collective Decisions," *Sociological Inquiry*, XXXIV (Spring 1964), 166-81; John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," *Behavioral Science*, VII (January 1962), 67-80, "Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations," *Behavioral Science*, VII (January 1962), 81-91, "Models for the Analysis of the Balance of Power in Society," in the *Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science* (Stanford 1962), 442-62; Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957); Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965); William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, Conn. 1962), etc. See also Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago 1956); George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York 1961); and J. W. Thibaut and H. H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York 1959). The last three books make no explicit use of formal rational-choice models, but most of their analysis could be easily restated in these terms.

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the social sciences outside economics, we shall have to solve a number of important theoretical problems.

IV. The Choice of Motivational Assumptions

One such problem is what motivational assumptions to use in our analysis of noneconomic social behavior. In technical terms, this amounts to asking what assumptions to make about the nature of people's utility functions—about the goals they are trying to achieve, and about the relative importance they attach to each particular goal.

The explanatory power of any rational-behavior theory depends on its ability to explain a wide variety of possibly quite complex empirical facts about people's behavior in terms of a few relatively simple motivational assumptions. If we make our motivational assumptions complicated enough, we can "explain" any kind of behavior—which of course means that we are explaining absolutely nothing. To take an extreme example, we could "explain" any conceivable action of a given individual simply in terms of some desire (or preference) on his part to act in this particular way. Obviously this would be a completely useless tautological explanation.

One important reason for the remarkably great explanatory power of classical economic theory lies precisely in the extreme simplicity of its motivational assumptions, which make economic self-interest virtually the only motivating force of human behavior, at least in economic activities.[10]

Downs has proposed a theory of political behavior based on very similar motivational assumptions.[11] According to his theory, both the professional politicians and the voters are motivated by self-interest, and indeed largely by economic self-interest. The main objective of each politician is to be elected or reelected to office at the next election, whereas that of each voter is to elect a government whose policies will favor his own economic (and other) interests. As far as Downs's theory really succeeds in explaining people's actual political behavior in terms of these strikingly simple motivational assumptions, it again represents a very powerful theory of human behavior, whose explanatory power approaches that of economic theory.

[10] Modern economic theory (often called neoclassical economic theory in contrast to the classical theory) has considerably relaxed this assumption. Though economic self-interest is still regarded as the dominant motive of economic behavior, it is no longer assumed to be the only important motive.

[11] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York 1957).

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Of course, nobody denies that this one-motive theory of human motivation, which makes economic self-interest the only important objective of human behavior, represents a very drastic and unrealistic oversimplification of human motivation as we know it. It is really quite surprising—yet it is a clearly established and very important empirical fact—that a major segment of real-life economic and political behavior *can* actually be reasonably well explained in terms of this simplistic motivational assumption.

Nevertheless, in my opinion it is an equally clearly established empirical fact that many important aspects of everyday economic and political behavior *cannot* be explained in terms of this over-simple theory of human motivation. Even in economic life, many aspects of people's behavior cannot be explained without recognizing that many individuals are motivated partly by noneconomic and/or nonegoistic motives.

In political life, noneconomic and/or nonegoistic motives seem to be even more important. Self-interest cannot explain even the very basic fact that many people choose to vote at election time at the cost of some personal inconvenience, even though their chances of obtaining personal benefits, let alone economic benefits, as a result of their voting are virtually nil. Likewise, for better or worse, voluntary party workers often seem to be motivated primarily by ideological considerations rather than by self-interest (or even by their party's interest in winning the next election). Indeed, even some professional politicians do not seem to be wholly immune to the temptation of sacrificing self-interest to ideology. No less obvious is the importance of noneconomic and nonegoistic motives in social activities outside the economic and political fields.

In order to do justice to these empirical facts, in my opinion we have to replace the one-motive theory of purely egoistic economic motivation with less restrictive motivational assumptions. To be sure, this means replacing an extremely simple motivational theory by a somewhat more complicated one. But the justification of this move is that at the cost of a small amount of additional complexity in our motivational assumptions we shall obtain a theory explaining a much broader range of empirical facts about people's actual behavior. At the same time, this move will also have the result of bringing our formal assumptions about human motivation much closer to what common observation and introspection tell us about the psychological forces actually motivating human behavior.

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V. The Problem of Relative Utility Weights

Of course, as soon as we introduce several distinct motives into our theory, instead of postulating economic self-interest as the only motivating force, we are immediately faced with the question of what the relative strength will be of each of these motives in different social situations. Analytically this amounts to asking what relative utility weights people's utility functions will assign to various economic and noneconomic objectives. Conceptually this is completely analogous to asking what relative utility weights (marginal utility ratios) people's utility functions will assign to various economic commodities.

The difficulty is that for the time being we cannot predict on the basis of theoretical considerations, or can do so only to a very limited extent, what these utility weights will be. To make such predictions in a systematic manner, we would need a theory specifying the mathematical form and the basic parameters of people's utility functions for economic commodities and for noneconomic values of various sorts. Sooner or later a theory of this kind may be developed, but at this point no such theory is available. Hence, for the time being all we can do is to *infer* these utility weights from people's own observed behavior in different social situations.

Yet, one reason why many social scientists other than economists oppose the use of rational-choice models is that they find this procedure objectionable from the viewpoint of scientific methodology. They argue that if we estimate the parameters of utility functions from observed behavior, and then try to explain this behavior in terms of utility functions estimated in this way, our explanation will be circular and will have no scientific value.

In actual fact, it is very common practice in the natural sciences and in economics to estimate the parameters of a given theory from the empirical facts, and then to explain these very same facts in terms of this theory, after assigning to all parameters the numerical values obtained from the empirical data. According to the accepted standards of scientific and statistical methodology, this procedure is perfectly sound and does not involve a vicious circle, so long as the number of theoretical parameters estimated from the empirical facts is significantly smaller than the number of independent empirical facts that the theory can explain.[12]

[12] If the number of adjustable parameters of a given theory is as large as (or is even larger than) the number of independent observations available to us, then the fact that the theory is consistent with these observations does not provide a real confirmation for it, because such a theory can *always* be made consistent with our

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To sum up, we have tried to show that it is perfectly legitimate to explain people's behavior in terms of utility functions involving several distinct motives (several distinct objectives possessing positive utility)—provided that the number of distinct motives postulated by our theory is kept reasonably small. This is true even though the actual utility weights that people assign to different motives (to different objectives) usually will have to be inferred from their own behavior, instead of being predicted on the basis of more general theoretical considerations.

At the same time, our analysis also shows that we must definitely resist the temptation of postulating more than a very few basic motives in our theory, whether for the sake of "greater realism" or for any other reason. This is so because a theory involving a *large* number of distinct motives, and therefore involving a *large* number of parameters to be estimated from the empirical facts, cannot be used to explain these empirical facts without inadmissible circularity. This is of course just another way of saying that if our theory is to have any real explanatory power then our motivational assumptions must be kept at a very low level of complexity—even if they do not have to be made quite as simple as to postulate economic self-interest as the *only* important motive of human behavior.

VI. Four Motivational Postulates

It seems to me that the simplest motivational theory accommodating noneconomic and nonegoistic motives must involve at least the following four postulates.

1. *Postulate of "low-cost" impartiality and public spirit.* People tend to follow their own personal interests (or the interest of other persons, social groups, or organizations they are closely attached to) in situations where these interests are strongly affected by their behavior. But in situations where these interests are involved only weakly or not at all, people are quite able and willing to let their behavior be governed by impartial criteria and by more general social considerations. (In other words, people tend to be impartial and public-spirited when it *costs little* to be impartial or to be public-spirited.)

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observations if we choose appropriate numerical values for its parameters. Even if the number of adjustable parameters of the theory is smaller than the number of independent observations, but is only just a little smaller, we cannot ascribe much significance to an agreement between our observations and the theory, because this agreement can easily be a matter of chance. Only if the number of adjustable parameters is *much* smaller than the number of our observations does an agreement between these observations and our theory represent a true confirmation for the latter, and only in this case can we say that our theory provides an explanation for the observed facts.

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For example, we have conflict-of-interest laws because we do not trust the impartiality of judges and public officials in social situations where their own personal interests or those of their closest relatives and associates are significantly affected. But in other cases we do expect them to act with a reasonable degree of impartiality. If this expectation were often grossly disappointed, our judicial and governmental institutions could hardly survive.

2. *Postulate of interest-aggregation by impartial sympathetic third parties.* In a conflict situation each party involved will tend to judge all issues from its own one-sided point of view. But, according to Postulate 1, third parties whose interests are not directly affected will find it natural to assess the situation in terms of more general impartial criteria. Formally, the behavior of such third parties will often amount to trying to maximize some "social-welfare function" representing some sort of "fair compromise" among the interests of the parties directly involved—or even among the interests of all members of the society.

This model can be used to explain the emergence of interest-aggregation concepts of various sorts, such as the notions of "group interest" and of "social interest" (or "public interest"). Indeed, the concept of morality itself can be explained in a similar way. Conceptually, the moral point of view is the point of view of an impartial observer, sympathetic to all human interests involved in the situation but free of biases favoring any one of them in particular.[13] Once people get used to applying moral criteria to various issues, or to judging them by such standards as group interest or social interest, they may come to use moral criteria or interest-aggregation concepts—that is, they may choose to take the point of view of an outside observer—even in situations where their own interests are directly involved. But analytically we can best understand the concepts of morality or group interest and social interest as originally representing the point of view of third parties with no personal interests in the situation.

If we leave the purely philosophical importance of these concepts on one side, we see that from a social-science viewpoint the importance of these concepts is that the outcome of social conflicts is often decided largely by the stand taken by disinterested third parties; and in many cases the latter's behavior will be governed principally by their notions

[13] See John C. Harsanyi, "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXI (October 1953), 434-35; "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXIII (August 1955), 309-21; "Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives, *Mind*, XLVII (July 1958), 305-16.

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of morality, or by their definitions of "group interest" or of "social interest."

3. *Postulate of acquiring personal commitments by rational choice.* At any given moment, the area in which people are free to follow their rational choice and to select the course of action yielding the highest utility to them is restricted by personal commitments to their family, their close friends, and certain social organizations or non-organized social groups they are attached to. These commitments will often require them to act in a more altruistic manner than they would choose to do in the absence of these commitments.

How do people acquire such commitments in the first place? It seems reasonable to assume that normally such commitments are acquired by *rational choice*, by comparing the advantages and the disadvantages associated with any commitment (including advantages and disadvantages of a purely subjective psychological nature). For instance, people will normally decide in terms of their own (and their family's) interests, both economic and noneconomic, whether they should take on a given job and should in this way commit themselves to serving the interests of a particular employer in certain specified ways. Again, in deciding whether to adopt a child and thus commit themselves to look after him, they will weigh the satisfaction they derive from close association with children against the costs and the inconvenience involved, etc. Of course, once a person has entered into such a commitment he will be under social pressure to abide by it, and his own feelings of obligation will act in the same direction. On the basis of these considerations we state our Postulate 3 as follows: at any given moment people's free rational choice is *restricted* by personal commitments undertaken at earlier periods. But undertaking such a commitment tends to be itself a matter of rational choice.

4. *Postulate of economic and social-acceptance motivation.* Our first three postulates have dealt with the relationship between selfish and unselfish motivation. Our last postulate will deal with the goal-objects people want to obtain for themselves (and presumably also for those other individuals whose interests they are concerned with). One way to formulate this postulate would be to say that people's behavior can be largely explained in terms of two dominant interests: economic gain and social status. But in another paper we have argued that the desire for social status is to a large extent a desire for social acceptance, for easier social access to other people as potential friends, partners in private social intercourse, business associates, marriage partners, etc.[14] Thus we

[14] See Harsanyi, "A Bargaining Model for Social Status."

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now propose to formulate the postulate as follows: People's behavior can be largely explained in terms of two dominant interests: economic gain and social acceptance. (Of course, economic gain is usually not desired for its own sake but rather as a means to other goals, and the same may also be true, to a much smaller extent, of social acceptance. But for our present purposes it is not necessary to explain these two interests in terms of more fundamental psychological motivations.)

The purpose of these four postulates is to describe the main motivational variables we propose to use and to indicate in general terms the role that each of these variables is assumed to play in motivating human behavior. But, for reasons already stated (in section V), our postulates make no attempt to offer very specific predictions about the relative importance that people's utility functions will assign to the various motives under different conditions.

For example, Postulate 1 makes only the prediction that people usually can resist weak temptations, but cannot resist strong temptations, to put personal and sectional interests above general social interests. Yet the postulate does not try to specify where the dividing line has to be drawn between "weak" and "strong" temptations in different social situations. Where this line has to be drawn in each particular field (e.g., in the field of voting behavior) must be inferred in each case from the relevant empirical facts.

Likewise, Postulate 4 merely asserts that economic gain and social status (or social acceptance) are the two main goal-objects of human behavior, but does not try to specify their relative importance as motivating forces of human actions in different fields. This again must be inferred from the empirical data.

It is not unreasonable to expect that, as we learn more about human motivation and go on experimenting with alternative motivational assumptions, we shall be able to replace these motivational postulates by postulates making more specific predictions. Our four postulates surely do not represent the last word in the search for appropriate motivational assumptions. But we do feel that even in their present form they are a significant improvement over the economic self-interest theory of human motivation.

VII. "Irrational" Behavior

A major challenge for any rational-choice theory of social behavior is the question of how to interpret what is, or at least appears to be, "irrational behavior." Actually the term "irrational behavior" is rather misleading because it seems to prejudge the issue of whether or not such

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behavior serves any useful purpose. A more appropriate descriptive term is *symbolic* or *expressive* behavior.

Psychologists of different schools do not agree on the specific psychological mechanisms involved, but two psychological facts are reasonably clear:

1. If people attach strong positive or negative emotions to a given person or object, they will often extend the same positive or negative emotions to persons and objects associated with the former by similarity or by contiguity in space or time.

2. People often derive considerable psychological satisfaction from symbolic actions, i.e., actions directed towards these secondary targets of their emotions.

Given these two facts, there is *per se* nothing "irrational" in performing such symbolic actions. What does however require further explanation is that people sometimes indulge in such symbolic actions at very significant costs to themselves, which seem to be quite out of proportion to the psychological satisfactions they can possibly obtain this way. In many cases such behavior may be merely a result of neurotic or psychotic conditions. But in other cases this does not seem to be the explanation, or at least does not seem to be the whole explanation.

Sometimes, what appears to be excessive preoccupation with symbolic actions is a way of making social commitments. For example, opposition parties may organize a protest demonstration against government policies even though they do not expect it to have any effect on the government's actions—because it will give an opportunity for the participants to commit themselves to support the anti-government camp. (Such a commitment will be particularly effective if the names of the demonstrators are likely to become publicly known, making it very hard for them to rejoin the ranks of government supporters.)

In other cases, preoccupation with symbolic actions can be explained essentially as an act of desperation: it may simply mean that people have given up all hope of achieving their goals by reality-oriented instrumental activities, and so feel they have nothing to lose by turning to magic, ritual, ideology, and other forms of symbolic behavior. Such attitudes seem to underlie a wide variety of social movements, from some messianistic cults to some extremist political groups.

However, it may be noted that "irrational" social policies—if by this we mean highly inefficient and self-defeating policies—do not necessarily result from "irrational" behavior on the part of the individual participants. For example, some countries have been known to combine a tough foreign policy, amounting to continual provocation of their

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adversaries, with a defense policy involving very low expenditures on armaments, for reasons of economy. From a national point of view this clearly involves choosing the worst of all possible worlds. But from the point of view of the political leaders responsible for this policy it may have represented the politically most convenient compromise between the supporters of a tough foreign policy line (who presumably favored high defense expenditures) and the supporters of budget economies (who presumably would have been willing to follow a less provocative foreign policy).

VIII. Dynamic Explanations

Using this basic theoretical framework, we now propose to discuss the theoretical status of the concept of social values, and of the whole conformist model of social behavior.

The concept of social values has obvious utility at a descriptive level, as a shorthand reference to certain uniformities of social behavior in a particular society. But if our aim is to *explain* social behavior rather than merely to describe it, then statements about the social values of a given society will merely pose problems of explanation for us, instead of providing solutions to such problems. For example, the statement that Americans tend to attach very high value to success in business activities (perhaps more than do people in most other societies) is a useful summary of a certain class of empirical facts about people's behavior (including their verbal behavior) in the United States. But it does not "explain" these facts, except in a very trivial and almost tautological sense. On the other hand, this statement does refer to an important feature of American society that is itself very much in need of explanation.

In contrast, the conformist model of social behavior treats social values as basic explanatory variables (independent variables) themselves apparently not requiring further explanation. Or at any rate the proponents of this model have never really faced up to the question of how to explain the social values of various societies—though in my opinion this is one of the most important and most interesting theoretical questions we must answer about social behavior.

At this point we must introduce an important distinction between two types of theoretical explanation. We shall speak of *static explanation* if a given social variable is explained wholly in terms of variables belonging to the same period. In contrast, we shall speak of *dynamic explanation* when at least some of the explanatory variables we use belong to an earlier period than the variable to be explained.

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As we have tried to show in an earlier paper,[15] most social variables require a dynamic explanation because of a certain "inertia" associated with them. Social values are certainly variables belonging to this category. When the social conditions change, value attitudes do not fully adjust to these new conditions at once. Even if these new conditions were to persist forever without any further change, it would presumably take a long time before the value attitudes reached a new equilibrium with full adjustment.

Thus, in a changing society the existing social conditions can never explain people's social values without reference to the social values of an earlier period. What the existing social conditions as such can explain are only the *changes* in these social values from one period to the next. For example, to understand the high value that present-day Americans ascribe to business as compared with nonbusiness occupations we must know that one or two generations ago business ranked at least as high as it does today, and probably even higher. Hence what really requires explanation are the changes that have taken place in American values, notably the increased prestige now associated with certain nonbusiness occupations, such as scientist, writer, academician, artist, politician, union leader, etc.

To put it differently, since social values require a dynamic explanation it follows that explaining social values really amounts to explaining changes in these values over time. It really amounts to specifying the basic incentives for people to change their own values, and to encourage or to discourage changes in the values of others.

IX. The Cognitive-Utilitarian Model of Social Values

We speak of social values when we find certain uniformities of behavior in a given society or social group. Thus social values change basically for the same reasons that human behavior in general does: they change because there is a shift, real or apparent, in the balance of the advantages and the disadvantages associated with alternative forms of behavior. Social values change because people find that they will be better off by not conforming to the old social values than they would be by conforming to them. For example, social values favoring large families will tend to change when urbanization decreases the economic benefits associated with large families and increases the costs and the inconvenience associated with them; and of course the de-

[15] Harsanyi, "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics," 136-37.

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creased costs and easier availability of contraceptives will work in the same direction.

In technical terms, such changes in social values can be explained by means of a rational-choice model. That is, we need not postulate any changes in people's basic *utility functions* (or in their preference scales underlying these utility functions). Rather, our explanation can be based completely on changes in the objective consequences of alternative courses of action (and on changes in people's information about these consequences). Thus, the economic and social consequences of opting for a large family (or for a small family) will be different under modern conditions from what they used to be before. But we need not postulate any changes in the utility values as such that people assign to any given set of economic and social consequences. For example, one element of our explanation is that under modern conditions the objective economic costs of education are much higher than they used to be. But we need not assume that the subjective disutility that people now assign to a given educational expenditure (as measured, e.g., in units of constant purchasing power) is necessarily different from what it was before.

To be sure, changes in the objective conditions will induce changes in people's behavior only when people become *aware* of these changes, which may occur only after some time lag.

More important is that when people choose between persisting in their customary behavior and adopting a new way of doing things, they will usually have a reasonably good idea of the advantages and disadvantages associated with the former, but may have only the vaguest notions of those associated with the latter. Any innovation, however desirable in itself, involves the possibility of unanticipated side effects—many of them undesirable—on the natural environment and on society itself. But very often these dangers are greatly overrated by the people opposing a proposed change. The history of social reforms is full of cases in which the earlier opponents had to admit after implementation of these reforms that few or none of the dire consequences they had predicted for themselves or for society as a whole have materialized.

Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that a very considerable part of the social values of most societies is based on *sheer ignorance*. People regard their existing customs as superior to alternative patterns of behavior because they have little reliable information about what it really would be like to live with any of these alternatives. In most

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cases we simply cannot tell which pattern of behavior they would choose if they actually had this missing information.

One of the reasons why the example of others is so important in encouraging changes in people's values and behavior is that it tends to dispel some groundless fears about the dismal consequences that such changes might entail. Another reason is of course that people can more easily face the possible hostility of the supporters of the old values if they are not alone in making the change.

X. The Conformist Model of Social Values

In the last section we have argued that the basic incentives to changes in social values are shifts in the real or assumed benefits and costs associated with the existing social practices and with their possible alternatives. Now we have to consider the main disincentives to changes in social values.

Obviously an important disincentive is expected opposition, and possibly even actual sanctions, from some other members of the society. But it is essential to recognize that in most cases different members of the society will display very unequal degrees of active opposition to any proposed change. Usually the main opposition will come from individuals whose personal interests would suffer from a shift to new values and new patterns of behavior; from individuals whose social roles give them personal responsibility for maintaining the old values of the society; and more generally from people whose background and experience have made them especially aware of the social benefits connected with the old values, and who perhaps are also especially insensitive to the social benefits likely to result from the new values.

Often the very same group of individuals will belong to all of these categories. For example, the members of any profession will tend to fight changes in social values that would reduce the importance society attaches to their work. By opposing such changes they will protect their own economic interests and their own social status, but they will also feel they are discharging a social obligation in protecting the social interests served by their profession; and their opposition will be reinforced by their extensive specialized knowledge of the various benefits that society derives from their professional activities, which will enable them to defend the interest of their profession in good faith.

Another possible obstacle to changes in social values is that in many cases people will be unable to take full advantage of these changes

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unless certain further conditions are met. If this is not the case, their incentives to undertake these changes will be greatly reduced.

One of these conditions may be possession of certain skills. Consider a society where cooperation and friendship are traditionally restricted to the members of the same kinship group, or at least to people who have known each other intimately since early childhood. Now suppose that certain economic changes take place that would make it desirable for this society to adopt somewhat more universalistic value-attitudes and to establish friendly business relationships with people outside these narrow social groups. Clearly this will not be easy to accomplish. One problem may be that people will simply lack the social skills needed to establish friendly relationships with strangers they have known for only a fairly short period.

Conversely, people not used to living in large extended families may be unwilling to join such a family group, in spite of possible strong economic incentives, because they will usually lack the social skills required to get along with so many relatives at close quarters.

Again, in many cases a crucial condition will be whether a sufficient number of other people in the society are simultaneously changing their own values and their own behavior in a similar manner. For example, in a society where particularistic value-attitudes are widespread, even employers whose own value-attitudes are universalistic may be unwilling to fill positions of trust with persons having no kinship (or tribal or religious, etc.) ties with them, because they will feel that in the absence of such particularistic ties they cannot expect loyal and reliable service. Thus a change-over to more universalistic attitudes will be extremely slow until people become convinced that a sizable proportion of their society has already made the change.

XI. Concluding Remarks on the Explanation of Social Values

To sum up our discussion of the last three sections, the theory of social values we have arrived at may be described as a combination of two different models. One model corresponds to the assumption that the main incentive to entertain a given set of social values lies in the belief that under existing conditions conformity to these values will serve their own interests, whether selfish or unselfish, more effectively than would conformity to any alternative set of values. We may call this a *cognitive* model because it explains the common acceptance of certain social values by a uniformity of cognitive beliefs—beliefs concerning the consequences of the existing patterns of social behavior as compared with the likely consequences of alternative patterns.

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Alternatively, this model could also be called a *utilitarian* model of social values because it assumes that people will choose among different patterns of social behavior in terms of their presumed utility for achieving personal goals (both selfish and unselfish). Thus, under this model, people's motives for following a particular set of social values are basically similar to their motives for following a particular technology. (This similarity can be further increased if we extend this model to incorporate the fact that successful implementation of a particular set of social values—like successful implementation of a given technology—often depends on the possession of certain special skills that cannot be easily acquired in societies where the existing social practices do not require these skills.)

The other model we have used as a basic ingredient of our theory can be regarded as a modified version of what we have called the *conformist* model of social values. It corresponds to the assumption that people's main incentive to entertain a given set of social values lies not so much in the real or assumed intrinsic advantages of conformity with these values, but rather lies simply in the fact that most other people in their social environment support these values and are likely to disapprove of and resist any significant deviation from them.

We have argued that this model in itself cannot provide a satisfactory theory of social values because it cannot explain changes in them. But it does contain an important element of truth since the pressure for conformity it assumes is no doubt present to varying degrees in all known societies and so is an essential ingredient of any satisfactory theory. On the other hand, no realistic account can overlook the fact—disregarded by the conformist model in its usual form—that active opposition to any given form of deviant behavior or to any proposed change in social values is in most cases very unequally distributed over society, and tends to come primarily from individuals whose active concern is motivated by personal interests, special social responsibilities, or special background and experience.

However, if we incorporate this fact into the conformist model, and then combine it with the cognitive-utilitarian model, we shall obtain a theory of social values that can explain social stability and social change with equal ease. Formally we can combine the two models into one by making use of the fact that technically the conformist model is a special case of the cognitive-utilitarian model. This is so because possible social sanction against nonconformity is simply one of the many elements a rational individual will have to include in his cost-and-benefit

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calculus when he is choosing between acceptance of some new values and loyalty to the old.

XII. Social Functions: The Collectivistic Interpretation

Most of the points we have made about the problem of explaining social values also apply to the problem of explaining social institutions. Like the former, the latter also require a dynamic explanation because we cannot expect that they will instantaneously achieve full adjustment to changing conditions. Consequently, explaining social institutions essentially amounts to explaining *changes* in these institutions. On the other hand, these changes themselves must be ultimately explained in terms of personal incentives for some people to change their behavior. They must be explained by the fact that, as a result of certain changes in the society or in its natural environment or in its relations with its external social environment, some people have decided that their interests would be better served by a new type of institutional arrangement. (Of course, different individuals and different social groups will tend to have different interests in relation to institutional changes. Thus the outcome will be a result of conflicting social pressures and can be fully explained only in game-theoretical terms.)

If we define the term "social function" broadly enough, we may say that this theory explains social institutions in terms of their "social functions." But then the "social function" of an institution must be defined as all the benefits that various individual members of society derive from its operation.[16] This may be called the individualistic concept of social function. For example, the social function of the shoe industry in this sense is to produce shoes for consumers—as well as to provide jobs and wages for its employees, dividends for its shareholders, a market for its suppliers, etc. Similarly, the social function of educational institutions is to provide education for their students, to provide help for parents in discharging their educational responsibilities to their children, to provide educated potential employees for prospective employers, to provide jobs and salaries for teachers and other employees, etc.

In contrast, functionalists usually define the social function of a given institution in terms of its contribution to the maintenance of the social system *as a whole*. This may be called the collectivistic concept of social function.

Little argument is required to show that the individualistic concept of social function has incomparably greater explanatory power than

[16] I owe this point to Nelson Polsby.

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has the collectivistic concept. First of all, the very concept of social function in a collectivistic sense gives rise to insoluble problems of definition and of empirical identification.

A. We cannot define what is meant by "the maintenance of the social system as a whole" without making quite arbitrary distinctions between those characteristics of a social system that are and are not essential for maintaining its identity as "the same social system." For example, how are we to decide how large are the changes that could be made in the political or economic institutions of American society without turning it into a "different social system" altogether?

B. Even if we could agree on some such definition, in many cases we simply do not know enough about the empirical laws governing the operation of social systems to be able to tell whether an institution does or does not make any significant contribution to maintaining these "essential characteristics" of the relevant social system, as specified by our definition. In other words, we just cannot tell how seriously these essential characteristics of the society would be endangered by complete elimination or substantial impairment of the social institution in question.

For example, suppose we decide that political democracy (in some precisely stated sense of this term) is an "essential characteristic" of the American social system. Then the question will arise how seriously the survival of democracy would be endangered, say, by elimination of private ownership of all television stations. It seems to me that on the basis of our present knowledge we simply cannot answer a question like this with any real assurance.

Second, even if we assume that these problems could be solved in some way, the collectivistic concept of social functions could at best explain only the very grossest features of the society's institutional framework. All it could explain would be the mere existence[17] of the most important social institutions, but not anything more specific about the structure and operation of these institutions; and it could not explain even the mere existence of any minor social institution.

This is so because in all probability a social system could not survive the destruction of any of its major institutions; but presumably it could survive many structural and operational changes in these institutions, and even a complete destruction of minor social institutions, without losing its "essential characteristics" under any reasonable definition of the latter. Thus the very existence of its major institutions may admit

[17] By explaining the "existence" of an institution I mean explaining its emergence at some point of time and its survival ever since.

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of explanation in terms of the contributions they make to the survival of the society; but many of their structural and operational properties do not admit of such explanation, nor does the existence of minor social institutions.

For example, the very existence of the American school system may conceivably admit of explanation in terms of its important contributions to the maintenance of American society, but many of its specific properties cannot be explained in these terms. In the case of the American shoe industry even its existence cannot be explained in this way because its disappearance would hardly endanger the survival of American society or of its essential characteristics.

Finally, if it can be shown that a social institution makes a significant contribution to the survival of the social system as a whole, this fact can "explain" the existence of the institution only in a very limited sense—unless the advocates of such "collectivistic" functional explanations can specify the *causal mechanisms* by which the survival needs of the society are translated into individual behavior ensuring the existence of the required institutions. In fact, the advocates of such explanations have made no serious attempt to specify the nature of these causal mechanisms.

XIII. Social Functions: An Individualistic Interpretation

In contrast, the individualistic concept of social functions does not raise any major problem of definition and empirical identification. For example, it is not hard to ascertain the benefits that various social groups (e.g., consumers, employees, shareholders, etc.—or again, students, parents, teachers, etc.) derive from the operation of the American shoe industry or from the operation of various American educational institutions.

The benefits accruing to different social groups from the operation of various institutions not only explain the mere existence of the few major institutions, but also explain the structure and operation of all institutions, both major and minor, in considerable detail. More particularly, *changes* in social institutions can be explained as resulting from interaction among various social groups trying to maximize the net benefits they expect to obtain from the operation of these institutions. (Of course, as the social groups in question will tend to have different interests, full understanding of this interaction can be achieved only in game-theoretical terms.)

For example, if we use this approach we can explain not only the

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mere existence of the American school system, but can also explain many specific details in its structure and operation—such as the highly decentralized nature of education in this country, the rather high school-leaving age, the emphasis on mass education rather than elite education, etc. Both the original adoption of these institutional arrangements and their persistence ever since (as well as the changes they have undergone over time) must surely admit of explanation in terms of the balance of power among the various social groups pressing for the arrangements most favorable to their own interests (including their possible altruistic interests). At least this is the type of explanation that any social historian or social scientist would look for in his empirical research.

Finally, if we use the benefits that people obtain or expect to obtain as our basic explanatory variables, then the question of how these variables are getting translated into individual behavior does not arise—because the assumption that they are motivated by their desire to maximize these benefits is in itself a sufficient explanation of their behavior.

XIV. A Dynamic Theory of Social Institutions

As our discussion in sections XII and XIII shows, one of the reasons for the difficulties of functionalist theories is their undue concentration on the needs of the social system as a whole, at the expense of the interests of the individual members of the society. This leads to difficulties because explaining social facts always comes down to explaining the behavior of the individuals involved, who are always motivated by their individual interests (which by our definition may include all sorts of altruistic considerations). It also leads to an inability to understand the importance of conflicts of interest among individuals and social groups.

Another important reason for the difficulties of functionalist theories is their preoccupation with the factors contributing to the *maintenance* of the existing social system, at the expense of the factors responsible for *social change*. We have argued that the basic theoretical problem of the social sciences is to explain social change resulting from the dynamic nature of most social variables.[18] We may add that for policy-making purposes their basic problem is again to predict the social changes likely to result from alternative policies available to us, including the policy of doing nothing. (Social change of course includes the constancy of certain social variables as a special case, corresponding to social change at a rate close to zero. Thus any theory of social change

[18] See section VIII; cf. also Harsanyi, "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics."

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automatically includes the theory of social constancy as a part. The basic objection to functionalism is the fact that the converse is not true at all: if our purpose is to explain social change then a static theory of social constancy will be normally of very little help.)

Consequently, the preoccupation of functionalist theories with the *maintenance* of the social system in its present form means adopting precisely the wrong emphasis, both for theoretical and for policy-making purposes. So it is not surprising if it leads, as we have tried to show, to asking the wrong questions again and again.

XV. Rational-Choice Models and Human Values

In recent years many social scientists and social philosophers have complained about what they have felt to be an increasing elimination of human values and of the humanistic point of view from the social sciences. This complaint has often been combined with the assertion that this "dehumanization" of the social sciences is connected with the increasing use of more rigorous "scientific" techniques borrowed from the natural sciences, ranging from more carefully controlled methods of empirical observation and of statistical evaluation to the use of mathematical models in theoretical analysis.

Whatever the justification of this complaint and of the implied contrast between the humanistic and the scientific approaches may have been in the past, one of the important advantages of rational-choice theories is that they combine a "scientific" emphasis on rigorous analytical (and possibly mathematical) models with a strong theoretical focus on human values.

First of all, rational-choice theories use human values—in the form of human preferences, interests, and objectives—as the basic explanatory and predictive variables of human behavior. In this they differ from many psychological theories of "scientific" inspiration and from related social-science theories, which use stimulus-response or quasi-physiological terminology in describing their explanatory variables of human behavior.

On the other hand, unlike other "scientific" theories in the social sciences, rational-choice models not only have explanatory-predictive interpretations, but also have normative interpretations. For example, the rational-choice models of economic theory can be interpreted as models of "positive economics" but also as models of normative "welfare economics." The former try to explain and predict real-life economic behavior, whereas the latter try to define economic behavior possessing certain desirable normative criteria, such as Pareto-optimality

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or social-welfare maximization. Rational-choice models referring to noneconomic (e.g., political) behavior can likewise have both explanatory-predictive and normative interpretations. For example, an analytical model of a democratic political system may be meant to represent some real-life democracy with all its imperfections, or it may be meant to represent various kinds of "ideal" democracies possessing various properties desirable from a normative point of view.

Such rigorous normative models can be just as important for the purpose of clarifying our normative political, economic, and social values as rigorous explanatory-predictive theories are for the purpose of clarifying our causal theories of society. These normative theories demonstrate the fact—if it still requires demonstration—that there is no incompatibility of any kind between clear and precise thinking in the best traditions of the mathematical sciences on the one hand, and a deep concern for human values in the best traditions of the humanities and of classical political philosophy on the other hand.

Perhaps the most important single contribution that normative rational-choice models can make to clearer thinking is their emphasis on the fact that in most situations we cannot realize all our social values at the same time so that a *choice* among different values is necessary. For example, economists know that we usually cannot decrease unemployment without increasing inflation and conversely; thus we have to choose between a little more employment and a little more price stability, as we can have one only at the expense of the other.

Similar choices seem to be necessary in other fields. If we give greater political participation to the electorate in political decisions (e.g., by popular initiative, referendum, etc.) then we probably decrease the protection given to minority rights or to the right of dissent. Thus one democratic value (popular participation) can be increased only at the expense of other democratic values (minority rights or the right of dissent). Again, we may have to choose.

It can of course also happen that we have to choose between political values and economic values. For example, an underdeveloped country may be able to increase its rate of economic growth only at the expense of some decrease in democratic freedoms, etc.

Such choices are never pleasant to make, but no intelligent policy decisions are possible without recognizing that such choices have to be made whenever the situation requires them.

However, the traditional attitude among social scientists in general has not been very favorable to recognizing this. Rather, the implicit assumption usually has been that "all good things come together," all

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desirable factors have positive correlation with one another. Greater popular participation can only make the political system "more democratic" in all respects; greater democracy can only increase the rate of economic development; more freedom and more permissiveness for the child can only improve his academic progress, etc.

We shall call this implicit assumption the Positive Correlation Fallacy. It has been one of the main obstacles to clear thinking among social scientists, and is probably responsible for a high proportion of the bad policy recommendations we have made. Extensive use of rational-choice models in analyzing our own values and in making policy recommendations is no doubt the surest way of avoiding this fallacy.

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THE FRENCH LEFT AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1968

By FRANK L. WILSON

IN early spring of 1968, French political observers found the most lively issue of debate in the question of whether or not the nation was bored as a result of the political and economic stability insured by the Gaullist regime. One noted French political scientist in contributing to this debate wrote: "What is certain is that the France of 1968 does not seem able to give itself the luxury of a political scene as passionate as that of Czechoslovakia, as dramatic as that of the United States, or as glorious as that of Vietnam. Neither the agitation of a minority of the students of a few universities, nor certain workers' demonstrations, nor the discontent which reigns in Brittany affects seriously our political life."[1] In a few weeks student riots and a general strike provoked the most serious political crisis in the years of the Fifth Republic and brought France to the brink of civil war.

The political crisis was resolved by the overwhelming victory of the supporters of President Charles de Gaulle in the legislative elections of June, 1968. The resolution of the national crisis has provoked a new crisis on the French left. Since the presidential elections of 1965, the French Communist and non-Communist parties of the left had been moving towards closer cooperation and unity of action. During the same time, the several small parties of the non-Communist left had made considerable progress toward the creation of a single party. The Radical-Socialist Party, the French Socialist Party (*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*, SFIO), and several smaller political clubs formed the *Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste* (FGDS) in September, 1965. While both of these attempts to unify the left confronted difficult obstacles, they had achieved considerable success. The problems of the legislative elections of June, 1968, and the resulting defeat of the left have brought into question much of this progress.

The immediate causes of the electoral defeat of the left were the events of May and June. It is more difficult to explain the reasons for the decline of support for the French left that has characterized the entire period since the end of the Second World War. As demonstrated by Chart I, the most significant change took place in 1958 with the advent of the Fifth Republic. The left (Radicals, Socialists, Commu-

[1] Georges Lavau, "La déclaration du parti communiste et de la Fédération: Une promesse," *Esprit*, XXXVI (May 1968), 920-29.

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

VOTES OF THE FRENCH LEFT
1945-1968

nists) during the Fourth Republic had received more than 50 percent of the votes in all elections for the National Assembly. Since 1958 the left has held between 40 and 44 percent of the votes cast.

Before analyzing the results of the recent elections, it would be useful to examine some of the factors responsible for the long-term decline of the left. While a full discussion of the complex problems of the left is beyond the scope of this article, we shall mention several factors. First, an important part of the former supporters of the left vote for the Gaullists. Some of these are marginal voters who rallied

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to De Gaulle as an attractive political leader. Others are "men of the left" who remember the important reforms that De Gaulle promoted after the Liberation.[2] Second, since many of these former voters of the left have simply followed De Gaulle, the leaders of the left expect them to return to their old voting patterns once De Gaulle leaves the political scene. The expectation that there will soon be a return to "normal" politics discourages radical changes. In spite of the problems and defeats the left has suffered since 1958, the political parties have the same leaders they had under the Fourth Republic. The efforts to create new approaches to politics, such as the Federation of the Left, are provided with escapes so that they can be abandoned once "normal'" politics return.

Third, the left has been unable to convince the public of its ability to form a stable government. It continues to appear as the defender of the old system of the Fourth Republic. Public opinion has not been persuaded that the Communist Party (*Parti Communiste Française*, PCF) and the FGDS could form a stable government coalition. Even the leaders of the Federation admit that a government of the left, including both Communists and non-Communists, would be unable to survive a serious international crisis. The position taken by the PCF against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was encouraging to the non-Communist leaders but was regarded as only a beginning in removing the obstacles that foreign policy would present to a government of the left. The inability of the left to cooperate during the crisis of May and June is recent evidence of the difficulties the left would have in confronting even a domestic crisis.

Fourth, the decline of the left is due in part to the effect on the political system of far-reaching changes in French society. The full significance of the rapidly changing society for the political system has not yet been carefully analyzed. It does appear that many of the changes have been to the disadvantage of the left. For example, the nationalization of French social and political life, largely accomplished by television, has reduced the importance of local politics and local notables. No longer is the small-town schoolteacher, who was often Socialist or Radical, an important authority on politics, since even in the smallest village the interested citizen can watch national political

[2] François Goguel estimates that *at least* 2,700,000 voters who supported the left in 1956 did not vote for the left's candidate for president in 1965. François Goguel, "Combien y-a-t-il eu d'électeurs de gauche parmi ceux qui ont voté le 5 décembre 1965 pour le général de Gaulle?" *Revue française de science politique*, XVII (February 1967), 65-69. See also Maurice Duverger and François Goguel, *Permanence et changement dans le système de partis français* (Paris 1967), 18.

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leaders discuss public issues. Since 1962 the legislative elections have demonstrated the decline of local notables, as *parachutés*, candidates assigned to run in districts where they have no local ties, have defeated well-entrenched local figures.[3] The Radical and Socialist parties, both of which have strong positions in local politics, have particularly suffered as a result of this nationalization of politics.

The Communists have felt the effects of a decline in working-class solidarity created by the changing society. Improved working conditions, higher salaries and social-security benefits, and longer paid vacations, coupled with gradual changes in the attitudes of the *patronat* or management, have removed many of the causes of workers' discontent. A public-opinion poll taken in 1967 asked the respondents to class themselves as to the degree of their satisfaction with their present circumstances. Only 19 percent of the workers polled said they were unhappy; 43 percent said they were generally satisfied; 38 percent were frankly satisfied.[4] Needless to say, there is still discontent among the working class, as was demonstrated by the events of May, 1968. But it is also incontestable that discontent is declining and that this has effects on the political behavior of the French working class.

As a result of the changing society, a new political consensus seems to be developing on many issues that in the past divided France and distinguished the left from the rest of the political spectrum. For example, a recent poll asked whether or not the respondent agreed with the following statement: "There are certain institutions like inheritance and property which must not be touched without the threat of economic catastrophe." The overall sample showed that 81 percent completely agreed with the statement, a further 13 percent were more or less in agreement; only 2 percent disagreed. Among those respondents who classed themselves as belonging on the far left, 75 percent completely agreed, 14 percent more or less agreed and, only 7 percent disagreed.[5] Another poll indicates the appearance of a new consensus

[3] In the 1968 elections, "parachuting" was not as important as in 1962 and 1967. This was because the shortness of the campaign led most parties simply to renominate the candidates of 1967. Furthermore, the Gaullists tried to form a large anti-Communist coalition and endorsed many candidates with strong local ties whom they had opposed in the past.

[4] *Société Française d'Enquete par Sondage* (SOFRES), *Étude sur les attitudes politiques des français* (Paris 1967), 20-26. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale from 0 to 10 that would indicate the extent of their satisfaction with their present circumstances. Those who placed themselves below five were considered to be frankly unhappy; those at five were considered to be generally happy; and those above five were classed as frankly happy. The figures for the sample as a whole were 18% unhappy, 39% generally happy, and 43% frankly happy.

[5] *Ibid.*, 39.

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on the religious school issue, which has long divided Frenchmen. Taken in March, 1968, the poll showed that 68 percent of those polled favored the retention or the increase of present state subsidies to church schools.[6] An earlier study of political attitudes indicated that not only were traditional lines of cleavage disappearing but new issues were not creating serious divisions.[7] With the decline of old cleavages and the absence of new ones, the left finds itself well equipped with ideologies that provide answers to problems that no longer exist or that no longer stir the public interest.

Another aspect of the changing society that affects the political position of the left is the emerging in France of a cult of youth. Business and industry are increasingly turning to the young people, not only to sell them something but to recruit their services. In politics this trend has been carried out by the search for young new candidates for public office. The Gaullists have been especially successful in bringing into politics large numbers of new men and helping them win election to national as well as local positions. The left has difficulty meeting this challenge, and neither the Communist Party nor the FGDS has had success with its youth organizations. The ability to attract young men to political careers with the left is further diminished by the rigid hierarchies of the Communist Party and the SFIO, which tend to award candidacies on the basis of long and faithful service in the hierarchy. The Federation has tried to break away from this pattern but has had only mixed success. In both 1967 and 1968 the election results showed the ability of the Federation's younger candidates to attract new votes for the left.[8] However, the young candidates usually found themselves contending for marginal seats or seats in districts where the FGDS had little chance to win, the better districts going to established politicians. As a result, in 1968 most of the Federation's new deputies elected in 1967 were defeated.

A final reason for the decline of the left under the Fifth Republic might be suggested. This is that the left no longer represents the most dynamic forces of French society. Under the Third Republic and perhaps under the Fourth Republic it was accurate to speak of the left, as François Goguel did, as being the "party of movement" in contrast to the right, which was the "party of the established order."[9] Since 1958

[6] *Le Monde*, April 30, 1968 (an IFOP poll).

[7] Emeric Deutsch, Denis Lindon, Pierre Weill, *Les familles politiques aujourd'hui en France* (Paris 1966).

[8] See the analysis of Maurice Duverger in *Le Monde*, June 28, 1968.

[9] François Goguel, *La politique des partis sous la IIIe Republique*, Third Edition (Paris 1958).

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it appears that the left has become the "party of the established order" and the Gaullists have become the "party of movement." The left has come to represent the past on the political scene, and to vote for it, in the minds of many Frenchmen, is to vote for a return to the politics of the Fourth Republic. This defense of the politics of the past is mirrored by the left's tendency to defend the present economic and social order against the reforms of the Gaullists. In some cases this defense of the present is due to the need to defend the interests of its traditional supporters. For example, the left has opposed the closing of uneconomic mines and industries or the modernization of industries because these reforms would lead to the unemployment or forced relocation of their supporters. There are cases where the left has opposed progress that might upset the existing political balance in a particular area. For example, Communist mayors have often opposed new housing projects that threaten to bring new middle-class voters into their communities. In other instances Radical and Socialist mayors have opposed new industrial developments in their communities that might bring in new Communist voters.

The left's opposition to progress is sometimes motivated by humanitarian concerns. Thus the left has attacked the failure of technocrats to take human values into account. In still other cases the left has acted as the defender of the status quo in the name of aesthetic values; for instance, it has become the staunchest defender of old Paris against the incursions of superhighways, skyscrapers, and modern buildings. There is no doubt that much of the left's opposition to the often high-handed Gaullist reforms is justified. But the key point is that continued opposition to change has created the impression that the left is against modernization and in favor of the status quo and the France of the past. The danger is, as Maurice Duverger and others have pointed out, that a new Poujadism of the left will emerge.

In contrast, the Gaullists have been able to portray themselves as the innovators in French politics. They justifiably claim credit for the political stability of the Fifth Republic. The successive labels they have used during the elections (Union for the New Republic, 1958, 1962; Union of Democrats for the Fifth Republic, 1967; Union for the Defense of the Republic, 1968) have conveyed to the voters the argument that they are the founders, promoters, and defenders of the political stability of the past decade. In the field of economics, the Gaullists can claim credit for the amazing economic growth and development that has characterized the same period, although this progress had its origin in the Fourth Republic. Finally, even in the field of social legis-

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lation the Gaullists appear as innovators and reformers, not so much because of the scale of their reforms but rather because of their ability to reform. While the parties of the left merely talked of reform the Gaullists have actually been able to carry out reforms.

The left has proposed its own program of reforms, many of which are worthy of consideration. But most of them are based on ideologies or are couched in ideological terms that no longer attract public interest or support. They are proposed as promoting, or as being part of, a new socialist society, and for many Frenchmen they seem unattainable without a radical change in society. Such a change is usually thought neither possible nor desirable. Thus the answers that the left offers to new problems, and the reforms it suggests as replacements for Gaullist reforms, are not credible.

Bearing in mind these causes of the long-term decline of the French left, we turn now to an analysis of the left's problems during the crisis of May and the legislative elections of June, 1968.

I

Neither the Communist Party nor the Federation played a significant role in the outbreak of the crisis of May, 1968. The immediate cause of the student demonstrations was the closing of the University of Paris at Narbonne and of the Sorbonne, as the result of fighting between extremist groups of the right and left.[10] The violence of the police in dealing with the students prompted the unions to call a general strike for May 13, the tenth anniversary of the coup in Algeria that led to the return of General de Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. In Paris on May 13 a procession of 600,000 workers, students, teachers, and other sympathizers marched through the Latin Quarter. The purpose of the demonstration was to show support and sympathy for the students, but it was clear from the placards carried by the workers that the unions were using the occasion to make their own demands. In the next week, spontaneous strikes broke out and were followed by occupation of the factories. Eventually between eight and ten million took part in the strikes. At the same time, university students, and often high-school students, occupied their campuses. These strikes were spontaneous and the result of the workers' sense of neglect of their problems by the Gaullist regime. With the exception of the one-day general strike called for May 13, the national unions did not call for these strikes. Although the central unions gave full support

[10] The ultimate causes of the student discontent were much more complex. See the special issue of *Esprit*, XXXVI (June-July 1968).

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to the strikers, the decision to strike was left to the local unions. The Communist union and the non-Communist unions attempted to keep the strikers' claims on an economic level rather than actively politicizing the strikes. In spite of their efforts, the strikes rapidly assumed a political tone at the grass roots. Thus, when union leaders presented to the strikers the agreement they had reached with government and management, the strikers rejected it. Their rejection was based not on further economic demands but on political demands for the resignation of De Gaulle and his prime minister, Georges Pompidou.

The parties of the traditional left, the PCF and the FGDS, were bypassed by the students and a portion of the strikers who rejected a parliamentary solution to their problems and the crisis as a whole. The Communist Party made no effort to take advantage of the revolutionary situation but attempted to keep the workers' movement separate from the student disorders and demonstrations. The crisis placed the PCF in a difficult position. The Party recognized the need for far-reaching reforms in the university and was sympathetic with the student demands. But it was disturbed by the predominance of the ideas of anarchism, Maoism, and Trotskyism among the student leaders. The Communist leaders and the Party's union leaders feared the spread of these ideas to the labor movement and denounced the extremist leaders and movements, urging their members and supporters to avoid participation in demonstrations and meetings planned by them. Thus, one cause of the division between the Communists and the students was the fear by the PCF that it would be outflanked on the left by the student movements and the fear of the effects that this might have on its traditional supporters and on internal party unity. A more fundamental reason for the split between the student movement and the Communist Party was the recognition by the students and a number of young workers that the PCF was no longer a revolutionary party. The students and young workers, sensing that the general strike and student uprising was a revolutionary situation, and realizing that the PCF would not be willing to take advantage of this opportunity, ignored the Communist Party along with the democratic parties of the left. They were correct in the assessment of the PCF. The PCF throughout the crisis sought to find a solution in a democratic and parliamentary way.

The FGDS also found itself on the sidelines of the crisis of May, 1968, as it had an even less significant voice in the general strike than did the PCF. The Federation has little real influence with the labor unions or with the student movements. It was not as reluctant

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as the PCF to support the student movement, but its efforts to increase its popularity and following among the students were unsuccessful. While some students were attracted to the FGDS by the activities of its political clubs, the major part of the student movement considered it as ineffective as the PCF. The Federation played its most significant role during the crisis in the National Assembly, where it led the battle on a censure vote against the economic, social, and educational policy of the government. Such parliamentary action was not revolutionary enough to enlist the interest of the students. The censure motion, sponsored by the FGDS and the PCF, failed, gaining only 233 votes, eleven less than necessary to overthrow the government.[11]

As the crisis entered into the third week, the FGDS made an attempt to grasp the political leadership of the rebellion of the students and workers. After the workers had rejected the proposed settlement, the strikers became increasingly politicized. With a few exceptions, negotiations between labor and management were broken off. The government's inability to deal with the student disorders was dramatized by the return to France of the student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit in spite of the government's determination to prevent his coming back from a conference in West Germany. De Gaulle's proposal of a referendum on "participation" had failed to calm the situation or to rally his supporters, and, in short, it appeared that De Gaulle and his government were unable to resolve the crisis. At this point François Mitterrand, president of the FGDS and the left's candidate for the presidency in 1965, held a news conference. Predicting the defeat of the referendum at the polls, De Gaulle's resignation, and the "disappearance" of the Pompidou cabinet, Mitterrand proposed that a caretaker government be formed. This provisional government would be formed without "exclusion or dosage" and would include Communist and centrist ministers as well as FGDS ministers.[12] Mitterrand suggested that either he or someone else—such as Pierre Mendès-France, the former premier under the Fourth Republic—might head this government. At the same time, Mitterrand announced his candidacy for the presidency, which he expected to be vacated after the defeat of the referendum.

[11] In spite of the defection of one Gaullist deputy, the censure motion gained fewer votes than a censure motion in April, 1968, on the government's radio and television policy (236 votes) and than a censure motion on the government's request for special powers to issue economic and social decrees in May, 1967 (237 votes).

[12] Mitterrand did not intend to include leaders of the center parties such as Jean Lecanuet of the *Centre Democrate* or Jacques Duhamel of *Progrès et Démocratie Moderne*. Instead he planned to include personalities from the center. He had asked Cornut-Gentille, a deputy not inscribed in any parliamentary group but with ties to the center, to join the provisional government and had received a tentative acceptance.

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There were several motives for his proposal. The most important was the desire to demonstrate that the left was prepared to assume its responsibilities. When there appeared to be a power vacuum, Mitterrand announced the willingness of the left to fill this gap, should the need be clearly established. A secondary goal was to put the FGDS back into the center of the political scene by giving political leadership to the strike and student movements. Many strikers and students were calling for a government of the left,[13] and Mitterrand hoped to give their demands more precision by offering himself as leader of a new government, or alternatively Mendès-France, who alone among French politicians enjoyed popularity with the students.

The initial reaction to the press conference was positive. Mitterrand had explained his proposals in advance to his partners in the Federation and they had given their approval. After the press conference the leading politicians of the center, Jean Lecanuet and Jacques Duhamel, expressed acceptance of the idea of a broadly based provisional government. Mendès-France announced his willingness to serve in such a cabinet. After the news of De Gaulle's mysterious departure from Paris and amid rumors that he would resign, even some Gaullist deputies approached their Federation colleagues to ask for details on the caretaker government.

The Communist Party did not respond positively to Mitterrand's proposals. He had personally informed the leader of the PCF, Waldeck Rochet, of the basic outline of his proposals, the night before the press conference, but he did not tell the Communist leader all the details of his proposals. Notably, he did not mention that he intended to name Pierre Mendès-France as a participant and possible head of the caretaker government. For the Communists, Mendès-France was highly suspect. Along with his party, the *Parti Socialiste Unifié* (PSU), he had given full backing to the students and the night before the press conference, he had attended a student rally that had been condemned by the PCF. Although he did not address the rally, Mendès-France was present when the student leaders denounced the Communist Party and called for the resignation of the head of the Communist union. For the Communists, who feared losing their position on the far left and who were confronting serious internal dissension as a result of their position during the crisis, such behavior and apparent support for their ideological enemies were unacceptable. Thus, after Mitterrand

[13] While the students sought a government of the left they rejected a government led by Mitterrand. There were a number of posters put up by the students that read: "*Non à de Gaulle! Non à Mitterrand! Oui au pouvoir populaire!*"

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referred to Mendès-France in his proposals, the PCF Politburo issued a statement that avoided replying to or endorsing the provisional government. Instead the statement warned against looking for a miracle-man, and the Communist newspaper, *L'Humanité*, rejected any turning to a new "*homme providentiel*." The Communists reminded their allies that the left could not form a government without the participation of the PCF and warned against returning to a "third force" alliance with the center. A second reason for the PCF's lack of enthusiasm for the proposals was that it recognized more clearly than did Mitterrand the danger of civil war should the left take power in the midst of the crisis. While the actual situation was temporarily out of control, the Communists were aware of the Gaullists' ability to rally support in defense against the threat to the status quo that would be posed by the emergence from the crisis of a government of the left. This does not imply that Mitterrand and his supporters were willing to risk civil war by installing a government of the left. According to some of his closest advisers, Mitterrand did not consider the possibility of a civil war. The PCF was simply more sensitive to the danger than were the men around Mitterrand, and it had no desire to risk civil war.

It is possible that if the PCF had had more time to consider the proposals it would eventually have endorsed them. Mitterrand was the first politician since 1947 to invite the Communists to participate in a government. However, the fact that the Communists did not immediately accept contributed to the failure of the proposal. The delays of the PCF gave De Gaulle the assurance that his reassertion of power would not provoke violence or civil war.

Whatever the initial reception to Mitterrand's proposals, the idea of a caretaker government was made invalid within forty-eight hours by the actions of General de Gaulle. The day after the press conference, De Gaulle left Paris for his home in Colombey-les-Deux Eglises, creating speculation that he would retire. After receiving assurance from his military leaders of the army's fidelity, he returned to Paris the following day and in an address to the nation he announced his decision to stay, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the calling of new legislative elections. Within a few minutes, a massive demonstration in support of De Gaulle filled the Champs Elysées. It was immediately apparent that he and his government had regained control of the situation and that the proposals of Mitterrand no longer had any validity.

But the press conference was not forgotten. During the elections the Gaullists were to point to it as evidence of the left's intention to take

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power illegally. They pointed out that the constitution provides that in case of a vacancy in the presidency, the prime minister and his cabinet continue to exercise their normal functions. It explicitly prohibits the overthrow of the cabinet by a vote of censure in the National Assembly during a vacancy in the presidency (Article 8). Even if De Gaulle had resigned after a defeat in a referendum, the cabinet of Georges Pompidou would still be in power. Thus there would be no need for a caretaker government. It is true that Mitterrand was not clear in his statements explaining how the Pompidou government would disappear, but the assumption was that without De Gaulle it would be insupportable and would resign of its own volition. While there is little cause to think that Mitterrand was planning to take power illegally, the press conference did provide the Gaullists with what they needed as evidence of a threatened coup during the crisis.

The hesitancy of the PCF over Mitterrand's proposed cabinet was not the only division of the left during the crisis of May. Prior to the crisis the Communists and the Federation had made considerable progress toward uniting their actions. The Communists had campaigned for Mitterrand during the presidential election of 1965, and the FGDS and the PCF had united behind a single candidate in each electoral district for the second ballot of the 1967 legislative elections. In February, 1968, the two parties issued a lengthy "Joint Declaration" that was a straightforward presentation of common goals and programs. Where differences remained between the two parties, the declaration presented the views of both sides. It marked an important step forward in the effort to formulate a joint program of the left, although important differences remained in the area of foreign policy. Both the FGDS and the PCF considered it to be an unfinished document and planned further consultations in order to complete it.

The problems of May strained the efforts to formulate a joint program. At the beginning of the crisis the Communist Party suggested to the FGDS that they meet together to complete the joint declaration and to coordinate policies toward the crisis. The FGDS displayed little enthusiasm for undertaking further ties with the PCF during the crisis. It was not until after the legislative elections were scheduled that the PCF and the FGDS rapidly agreed upon an "Emergency Plan of Economic Development and Social Progress." This agreement was described as a "clarification" of the joint declaration, but in fact it simply brought the earlier agreement up to date by removing or modifying pledges that had been fulfilled by the strike settlements. It contained few new agreements on social and economic policies. The significant

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point is that during the crisis the two parties were unable to demonstrate unity of action or to present joint solutions to the problems at hand. It was only when confronted with elections that they were able to come to an agreement on very limited progress toward completing a joint program.

The student rebellion and general strikes of May, 1968, gave new evidence of the difficulties of uniting the political parties of the French left. These parties had their own approaches to dealing with a crisis created by young people, who in large part shared their ideologies but rejected their methods and leaders. Except in the National Assembly, coordination among the parties of the left was negligible, and they were now confronted with new legislative elections. Fifteen months earlier they had achieved their greatest electoral victories under the Fifth Republic through their unified electoral policies, but these electoral gains were now to be challenged by the need to heal the divisions caused by the recent crisis.

II

The theme of the elections of June, 1968, was set by President de Gaulle's address of May 30. After announcing the dissolution of the National Assembly, he said: "France in effect is threatened by dictatorship. There are those who want to force France to resign herself to a power that will impose itself in the national despair, to a power that obviously would be essentially that of a conqueror, that is, that of totalitarian Communism."[14] Until this point there had been no attempt by government spokesmen to blame the student riots or strikes on any party or responsible group. But, henceforth, the official position was that the disorder had been caused by Communists and that the PCF and its supporters had tried to seize control of the government illegally.

The Gaullists' concentration on the Communists as their chief rivals, in addition to its obvious advantage for the Gaullists, had advantages for the Communists. The Gaullists claimed the only choice was between them and the Communists. Thereby identified as the chief enemies of De Gaulle, the Communists could expect to gain support among non-Communist voters opposed to De Gaulle. Furthermore, the Gaullist attempts to blame the disorders on the PCF enabled the Communists to claim a greater role in the general strikes and student movement than in fact was theirs.[15] At the same time the PCF could claim that

[14] *Le Monde*, June 1, 1968.

[15] The strikes continued to receive considerable public support even after they had started the third week. A poll taken after De Gaulle's second address to the nation

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the violence was caused not by the Communists but rather by extremists, anarchists, and adventurers. Indeed, the government helped the Communists by pointing out the causes of the violence when it banned several student extremist groups. While the other parties of the left denounced this action, there was no criticism from the Communist Party or its newspapers.

The theme of a Gaullist-Communist electoral confrontation was not helpful to the cause of the Federation. The Federation owed part of its success in rallying the non-Communist parties of the left to its ability to act as the axis of the opposition to the Gaullist government. Mitterrand had carefully groomed himself as the leader of the opposition, patterning the role on the British institution, and the Federation had formed a "counter-government" that was copied from the British shadow cabinet. Mitterrand claimed the right to speak for the left in replying to De Gaulle's press conferences and speeches. By ignoring the FGDS and focusing their attacks on the PCF, De Gaulle and his supporters refused to accept the FGDS as the leading force in the opposition and instead branded it as a Communist tool that would be dropped once the Communists took power. The government's relegation of the Federation to the role of subordinate allies or dupes of Communism created problems for the Federation both in the elections and in maintaining internal unity. In the elections, the FGDS was forced to demonstrate its existence and its distinctness from the Communists. Within the FGDS, the continued refusal of the government to accept it as the leading force of the opposition raised doubts as to the ability of the FGDS to fulfill this task and still remain independent of the Communists. This challenge to one of the primary motives for uniting caused serious questioning of the value of the Federation, particularly by the Radicals and some Socialists.

The first problem for the left in meeting De Gaulle's electoral challenge was the designation of candidates, and with only three weeks until the elections, a rapid selection was necessary. The first step was taken by the Federation when it called for a single candidate to represent the left in each district from the first ballot.[16] In doing so, the

revealed that only 27% of Parisians polled felt that work should resume immediately in all cases; 57% said that work should resume where agreements had been reached; 14% were against any return to work. *International Herald Tribune*, June 4, 1968.

[16] The present electoral arrangement is a two-ballot majority system. If no candidate wins a majority of the votes cast on the first ballot, a second ballot is held one week later. In the run-off, the candidate receiving the most votes is elected. Between ballots, candidates with less than 10% on the first ballot are eliminated. Other candidates may withdraw, but no new candidates are permitted.

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Federation invoked the image of republican unity that had brought the defeat of the supporters of President MacMahon in 1877. Such a tactic, according to the Federation, would give the voters new evidence of the ability of the Communist and non-Communist left to act together and would also give new momentum to the efforts to unite the left. Finally, it would provide the best chance to defeat the Gaullists on the first ballot, when they were divided between the "pure" Gaullists and the Republican Independents of Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing.

The Communist Party rejected the suggestion of a single candidate of the left from the first ballot. The public reason was the absence of a common legislative program of the left. The leader of the PCF, Waldeck Rochet, also gave a "democratic" explanation for the refusal. He argued that "party leaders do not have the right to prejudge the opinion of the electorate and divide the seats among themselves."[17] However, there were more pragmatic reasons than these public explanations. First, the bipolarization of the elections urged by the Gaullists was recognized to be advantageous to the Party since the Communists expected to surpass the other leftist candidates in several districts where they had been outvoted by the Federation in the first balloting of the 1967 elections. Second, the Party leaders wanted to measure the effects of the May crisis on their electorate. Third, the Party was concerned about its internal unity. There was considerable discontent within the PCF over the responsible attitude of the Party during May and its refusal to exploit the revolutionary situation[18] and a single candidacy from the first ballot with the Federation would increase the risk of further internal dissension. Furthermore, it would involve the danger of being outflanked on the left by the PSU or the extremist groups. Such a threat is a serious concern for the PCF, since in France loyalty to the party the furthest to the left is often more important than loyalty to any particular party. Finally, the Federation was ready to give some of the single candidacies to center deputies who had voted the censure motions. While the Federation referred

[17] *Le Figaro*, June 10, 1968.

[18] During May there was strong criticism of Political Bureau member Georges Marchais by several leading Central Committee members as a result of his public attack on student leaders as false revolutionaries. André Barjonet resigned from his position in the PCF and from his post as economic expert in the Communist union as a result of his opposition to the party's failure to support the students and militant workers. He subsequently joined the PSU. Later in the month two more Party leaders were expelled from the PCF because of their disagreement with the Party's efforts to keep the strikes on an economic basis. Furthermore, a large number of the Party's intellectuals were disturbed by the failure to support the student movement. *Le Nouvel Observateur*, June 12, 1968.

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to these centrists as "progressive republicans," the PCF called them reactionaries and refused to support them.

Instead of the Federation's proposal of an alliance from the first ballot, the PCF insisted on the renewal of the same electoral agreement reached with the Federation in December, 1966, for the elections of 1967. A meeting between the leaders of the two parties on June 1, 1968, reinstated this agreement, whose terms called for each party to present its own candidates for the first ballot. Following the first ballot, the two parties would meet to agree on reciprocal withdrawals in favor of the "best-placed candidate of the left." In other words, whichever candidates had the largest number of the votes on the first ballot would represent all parties of the left on the second ballot. The agreement recognized that there might be special cases where the number of votes alone would not be the determining factor. In 1967 there had been thirteen of these special cases in which Communist candidates withdrew in favor of the Federation, in spite of leading the left on the first ballot. The agreement was exclusive, barring Federation withdrawals in favor of other parties in districts where a candidate of the left had a chance to win. However, it did leave the possibility for the Federation to support "progressive republicans" where no candidate of the left was present or where the left could not win.

While the Federation and the Communist Party were renewing the electoral arrangements of 1967, the PSU was embarking on a new electoral policy. In 1967 the PSU had formed electoral agreements identical to those between the PCF and FGDS with both of these parties. In addition, the PSU and the FGDS, as the result of a tacit alliance, had avoided running candidates in the same districts, particularly in those districts where leading personalities of one party were already candidates. While there were some frictions as a result of the informal alliance, it was successful and benefited both parties.[19] This was not the case fifteen months later. In line with its efforts to gather support among the students and militant workers the PSU wanted to present "a 'clean' image without compromises." The PSU rejected all agreements with other parties of the left and went into the campaign alone.[20] It intended to present or support a candidate in every district, and in

[19] The good feeling between the two parties was carried to the point that the FGDS gave the PSU part of its time on the state-controlled radio and television.

[20] Not all PSU members agreed with this policy. Gilles Martinet, former head of the party, withdrew his candidacy after the national PSU directors rejected an agreement that the PSU in Drôme had negotiated with the FGDS. See *Le Nouvel Observateur*, June 12, 1968. Pierre Mendès-France resigned from the party as a result of his disagreement with the PSU's electoral policies, although his resignation was not made public until after the elections.

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fact presented 325 candidates compared to only 120 in 1967. The official party policy on second-ballot withdrawals made clear the desire of the PSU to separate itself from the rest of the left: "The PSU will withdraw on the second ballot for the best placed candidate of the left in order to beat Gaullism and to express opposition to the regime. This attitude does not imply an agreement with the political orientation of the candidate's party as demonstrated in the course of the recent crisis."[21]

The attempt of the FGDS to provide the left with the "republican discipline" of 1877 that had defeated MacMahon was a failure. The suggestion of a single candidate of the opposition for each district from the first ballot was turned down by its partners of the left. In fact, the number of candidates of the left for the 470 seats in metropolitan France rose from 1002 in 1967 to 1226 in 1968, rising from an average of 2.1 candidates of the left for each seat to 2.6.[22]

The designation of candidates created little difficulty for the PCF with its centralized and disciplined party apparatus. The PSU, a small and poorly organized party, had more difficulties in trying to find candidates for all districts in the short time before the elections.[23] As a result, the majority of its candidates had no previous experience in conducting a political campaign, and many were asked to be candidates only hours before the deadline for filing candidacies. It was the Federation, however, that faced the greatest problems in naming its candidates. The FGDS had not achieved the fusion of its participating groups and therefore it had to balance its selection of candidates among three competing groups: the SFIO, the Radicals, and the political clubs.

The Federation's difficulty was accentuated by the inequality of the groups involved. In the dissolved assembly the FGDS group was composed of 76 SFIO, 24 Radicals, and 16 members of the *Convention des Institutions Républicaines* (CIR), an organization grouping most of the political clubs affiliated with the Federation. This problem was complicated by a lack of agreement on the basis for measuring the size of each family in the FGDS. Furthermore, each family had its own various tendencies that had to be satisfied with the distribution of electoral districts. In 1967 the Federation had been able to spread its internal

[21] *Le Monde*, June 6, 1968.

[22] The PSU had 120 candidates in the 1967 elections and 325 in 1968. The PCF ran 470 candidates in both elections. The FGDS had 412 candidates in 1967 and 431 in 1968.

[23] The PSU did succeed in making a dent in the traditional syndicalist attitude of the French labor unions. In a break with the tradition of the separation of politics and union affairs, several leaders of one of the non-Communist unions ran as PSU candidates or replacements. (The electoral code requires each candidate to name a *suppléant* or eventual replacement.)

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discussion of nominations over nearly a year, but it had only days to resolve these difficulties before the elections of 1968.

To confront these problems, the Federation used the same basic rules for nomination as it had in 1967. All incumbent deputies were automatically renominated, accounting for one-fourth of the nominations.[24] For the rest of the districts, candidates were proposed by the Federation's organization at the level of the department. In most cases the shortness of time led to renomination of the candidates who had run in 1967. Any dispute that could not be resolved at the department level was referred to the Federation's National Committee of Arbitration. This process worked smoothly, eliminating most public disputes over candidates among the Federation families. The only serious problem was in the department of Hauts-de-Seine in the suburbs of Paris, where five districts each had more than one candidate claiming the FGDS label. This department was the only one in France that lacked an FGDS organization at the department level[25] and as a result, each of the families felt free to present its own candidates. By election day all but two of these multiple Federation candidacies were removed.

III

For the political parties of the left, the electoral campaign of June, 1968, was a defensive one. De Gaulle had set the theme for the elections in his speech dissolving the National Assembly. While the Gaullists were ready to concede the need of far-reaching reforms, they argued that the riots and disorders of May had been caused by Communism and were part of an attempt to seize power illegally. The left faced the problem of defending activities over which it had had no control and in which it had played a minimal role. Above all, the left had the task of overcoming the fear of revolution and Communist dictatorship that the Gaullists sought to exploit.

The Gaullist electoral appeal threatened to reverse a trend toward greater popular acceptance of the Communist Party.[26] Since the begin-

[24] In 1967 this policy came under severe criticism from CIR members and from young Socialists and Radicals. They protested giving the Federation label to men such as Félix Gaillard, Maurice Faure, Georges Bonnet, and Max Lejeune because of their past records of anti-Communism or their advocacy of *Algérie Française*. The pressure of time made this policy more acceptable in 1968.

[25] Organization of a departmental Federation in Hauts-de-Seine had been prevented by the inability of the CIR and the SFIO to agree on the the leader of the FGDS there and on the size of each other's representation in the directing organs.

[26] De Gaulle had contributed in several important ways to the integration of the Communists into the French political system. First, his foreign policy, by emphasizing the end of the Cold War and by building trade and friendly relations with Communist-bloc states, had helped to reduce the fear of Communism in internal politics.

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ning of the decade French public opinion toward the PCF had been undergoing a gradual shift, and the hostility and distrust of the 1950's was being replaced by growing acceptance of the Communists in politics. A public opinion survey taken in 1967 showed that 51 percent of those polled felt that the PCF had fulfilled a "very useful" or "rather useful" role in French politics since 1945. Only 21 percent felt that the Communists had acted in a detrimental manner during this period.[27] Another poll showed the speed of the evolution in attitudes. In April, 1967, 44 percent of those polled said that their attitude toward the PCF was hostile or very hostile. The same question in February, 1968, showed that the hostile and very hostile respondents had fallen to 34 percent.[28] The percentage of those favorable to Communist participation in a cabinet went from 31 in 1964 to 38 in 1966[29] and to 48 in February, 1968.[30] Only 20 percent were opposed to Communists in a cabinet, according to the 1968 poll.

In spite of the favorable evolution of opinion, the crisis of May and the government's accusations put the left on the defensive. For the Communists, this meant an attempt to convince the voters that it was a responsible democratic party. The PCF at its meetings carefully balanced red flags and French Tricolors on the speakers' podiums, and Communist speakers repeated that it was the PCF that had brought the working class to accept the Tricolor and the "Marseillaise." It defended its behavior during the crisis as that of a democratic and responsible party. This defense of the role of the Party during the crisis was coupled with an attack on adventurers, anarchists, and extremists—all allegedly led or encouraged by the PSU—who were held responsible for the violence and disorder during the crisis. The goals of the strikers and the student movement were upheld, while the student leaders, the PSU, and the extremists were attacked. Another major theme of the Communist campaign was the unity of the left. The PCF emphasized its integration into the left and its role in building the united left, and

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Second, many French were coming to believe that De Gaulle's rejection of ideologies as an ephemeral aspect of foreign policy was also valid in domestic politics. Finally, the effort by De Gaulle and his supporters to polarize French politics between the majority and the opposition furthered the integration of the Communists into the opposition and also into the political system as a whole.

[27] These statistics are from a poll taken by the *Institut Français d'Opinion Publique* (IFOP) reported in *Cahiers du Communisme*, XLIV (January 1968), 22-50.

[28] SOFRÈS, *Attitudes des français à l'égard du Parti communiste* (Paris 1968), 6. (This is an unpublished manuscript. A summary of the findings is reported in *L'Express*, March 28, 1968.)

[29] IFOP polls reported in *Sondages*, XXVIII (1966), 66.

[30] SOFRÈS, *Attitude à l'égard du Parti communiste*, 41.

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although it did avoid direct attacks on its Federation opponents, it urged the voters to vote Communist from the first ballot. It stressed the importance of a united left, free from the "reactionary" center parties, and warned repeatedly against the temptation for some parts of the Federation to renew the "third way" politics of a left and center alliance. The Communists continually reminded their partners that the Federation was unable to gain a legislative majority or to form a government of the left without their help.

The campaign themes of the Federation were more varied than those of the PCF. The most vital task was to define its relationship with the Communists, and as the campaign opened, the SFIO sought to give some independence from the PCF to the Federation's campaign by proposing a "legislative contract" and calling for the "general mobilization and joint action of all republicans." The legislative program, approved a few days later by the Political Bureau of the FGDS, gave the Federation of the Left a campaign platform distinct from the PCF-FGDS joint declaration of February, 1968.

The attitudes that FGDS candidates adopted toward the PCF varied with the individual candidate's beliefs and electoral situation. In general, FGDS candidates belonging to the CIR were most willing to defend the alliance with the PCF and to urge further cooperation with the Communists. The CIR had consistently supported an alliance with the PCF since the organization of the FGDS in 1965. Furthermore, all but two CIR deputies elected in 1967 owed their elections to the support of Communist voters, and several of them had benefited from the withdrawal of PCF candidates who had outdistanced them on the first ballot. The majority of the SFIO supported the Federation's alliance with the PCF but did so with less enthusiasm than did the CIR members. Most Socialists were convinced of the need and possibility of a rapprochement with the Communists. But an important part of the SFIO and most of the Radicals were noticeably uncomfortable about the ties with the Communists. These Socialists and Radicals were ready to accept the necessity of the ties for electoral purposes, but felt that the movement toward the PCF should be balanced with gestures toward the center. There were few cases of open hostility between candidates of the FGDS and PCF. This restraint was due more to the realization that the candidates would need each other's support and voters on the second ballot than to sympathy with the other's programs or candidates or with the notion of unity of the left.

There were several attempts to present the contention that the Federation offered an alternative to both Communism and Gaullism. In

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the first week of the campaign, Mitterrand said that the Federation was the only political formation offering a "third way" between capitalism and Communism. This provoked one of the rare public attacks by the PCF on the Federation's leader, and *L'Humanité* expressed astonishment that Mitterrand would consider the Federation as a "third way," reminding him of the failure of earlier attempts to build a "third way" by excluding Communists.[31] Mitterrand himself never returned to this theme. Other Federation leaders—including Gaston Defferre, the Socialist leader of the FGDS parliamentary group, and Maurice Faure and Félix Gaillard, both former presidents of the Radical-Socialist Party—talked of a "third way" that would involve "progressive republicans" or anti-Gaullist centrists. Many expressed sympathy for a return to the attempt that Defferre had made in 1965 to create a Democratic-Socialist Federation that was to have included the center. While these proposals aroused the interest of some leaders of the center, they provoked bitter attacks within the Federation from the CIR and some Socialists, as well as from the PCF. Thus the most imperative task of the FGDS, to define its relationship to the Communist Party, was made virtually impossible by the diversity of opinions in the Federation and by the desire to avoid alienating PCF voters who would be needed on the second ballot.

For the PSU the main theme of the campaign was to indicate its solidarity with the student movement and militant workers and to demonstrate its independence from the other parties of the left. It held electoral meetings combined with the student movements, some of which had been banned by the government. The PSU directed most of its criticism at its former partners, the FGDS and the PCF, being particularly bitter in its attacks on the Communist Party, which it accused of choosing "to contribute deliberately to the maintenance in power of the Gaullist regime."[32]

IV

In order to compare the results of the 1968 elections, it is useful to examine the legislative elections of March, 1967.[33] The 1967 elections were regarded by leaders of the left as a great victory. The PCF increased its representation in the National Assembly from 41 seats in the assembly elected in 1962 to 73 seats after the elections of 1967. The

[31] *L'Humanité*, June 10, 1968.
[32] *Le Monde*, June 20, 1968.
[33] For a detailed analysis of the 1967 elections, see François Goguel, "Les élections législatives des 5 et 12 mars 1967," *Revue française de science politique*, XVII (June 1967), 429-467.

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Socialists and Radicals increased from 105 seats in the old assembly, including some deputies who by 1967 had left the Radicals for the center or the Gaullists, to 121 seats. However, these gains were not the result of a massive swing of voters to the left, for the left's share of the electorate remained virtually stable compared to 1962.[34] In all legislative elections from 1924 until 1958 the left had exceeded the totals of 1967. What made the stabilization of its vote remarkable was that the 1967 elections were the first legislative elections to take place under normal conditions since World War II, that is, without France's being involved in a war or in terminating a war. While the victories of the supporters of General de Gaulle in 1958 and 1962 might be explained as due to the voter's dependence on De Gaulle to solve the Algerian crisis, in 1967 there was no international or domestic crisis to demand his presence.

The success of the left in 1967 was due not to a growth in its electoral support but rather to its unification behind single candidates on the second ballot and to the willingness of the voters to support these candidates. In most cases the left's candidates in the second ballot were able not only to maintain all the votes that the parties of the left had gained separately in the first ballot but to attract center and other anti-Gaullist votes. Over 55 percent of the Communist candidates had a larger percentage of the total vote on the second ballot than the total percentage of all the left parties in the first ballot in these same districts. The candidates of the FGDS were even more successful in increasing the left's percentages of the vote, between the two ballots.[35]

The results of the first ballot in the election of 1968 showed a new decline in the strength of the left. The PCF fell to 20.03 percent, a drop of 2.48 percent, compared to 1967; the FGDS fell 2.46 percent to 16.50 percent; the PSU increased from 2.21 percent to 3.94 percent as a result of its increased number of candidates. While the left lost nearly everywhere, its losses were most noticeable in certain areas.[36]

[34] The PCF increased its share of the first ballot vote from 21.7% in 1962 to 22.5% in 1967, a gain of only 0.8%. The FGDS declined from 20.1% obtained by its Radical and Socialist precursors in 1962 to 18.9% in 1967. This drop of 1.2% is accounted for by the inclusion in the 1962 figure of the votes of candidates who by 1967 were running as centrists or Gaullists. The PSU declined from 2.4% in 1962 to 2.2% in 1967.

[35] See Raymond Barrillon, *La gauche française en mouvement* (Paris 1967).

[36] Out of a total of 95 departments, the parties of the left obtained the majority on the first ballot in only 19 departments. They were unable to keep this majority on the second and decisive ballot in 7 of these 19 departments. See François Goguel, "Les élections législatives des 23 et 30 juin 1968," *Revue française de science politique*, XVIII (October 1968), 837-858.

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The PCF share of the vote in Paris fell from 22.31 percent in 1967 to 18.83 percent in 1968. The FGDS, which had strengthened its position in the capital in 1967, dropped from 11.36 percent to 7.64 percent. The PSU increased its share of the vote from 4.70 percent in 1967 to 7.39 percent in 1968. The result was that the three parties of the left had 33.86 percent of the votes compared to 38.37 percent the year before. The left suffered similar setbacks in the region around the capital.

Another area that has traditionally voted for the left is the industrial and mining region of the north, and here too the left suffered considerable losses. In 1967 the Gaullists had a first-ballot majority in only two of the 42 electoral districts in the departments of Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and Somme; in 1968 they won 12 seats on the first ballot. A comparison of percentages shows the extent of the defeat of the left.

	1967	*1968*	*gain or loss*
Nord			
PCF	26.0%	24.3%	— 1.7%
FGDS	26.5%	22.7%	— 3.8%
Gaullists	36.8%	44.5%	+ 7.7%
Pas-de-Calais			
PCF	28.5%	26.5%	— 2.0%
FGDS	32.0%	28.0%	— 4.0%
Gaullists	33.4%	45.2%	+11.8%
Somme			
PCF	32.1%	28.9%	— 3.2%
FGDS	20.9%	15.2%	— 5.7%
Gaullists	38.1%	43.1%	+ 5.1%

The FGDS suffered heavier losses than did the PCF, losing ground in Pas-de-Calais, falling behind the PCF in Nord for the first time, and falling even farther behind in Somme. In a like manner, the left lost ground to the Gaullists in the southern industrial zone in the department of Bouches-du-Rhône.

	1967	*1968*	*gain or loss*
Bouches-du-Rhône			
PCF	32.0%	29.7%	— 2.3%
FGDS	27.2%	22.1%	— 5.1%
Gaullists	23.4%	35.3%	+11.9%

Again, the Federation's losses were considerably greater than those of the Communist Party.

The gains of the supporters of President de Gaulle were heaviest in the most rural districts because it was here that old fears of the

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"revolutionaries" provided the largest Gaullist surge. While the national-average increase in Gaullist votes was 14.37 percent compared to their 1967 figure, in the 200 most rural districts the average progression of the Gaullists was 22.04 percent. In these districts 79 Gaullists were elected on the first ballot, compared to only 37 on the first ballot in 1967. In the 22 most rural districts, where 40 percent or more of the active population was involved in farming, the Gaullist vote grew by 25.8 percent compared to 1967 votes.[37] While some of these Gaullist gains came from new voters or former supporters of the center parties, much of the gain came from those who had voted for the left in 1967.

The leaders of the Federation and the Communist Party met after the voting on June 23 to designate the candidates who would represent the united left on the second ballot. The electoral agreement was carried out as agreed upon earlier. The best-placed candidate was the one who gained the most votes on the first ballot, with three exceptions where the PCF withdrew although it had gained more votes than the Federation and where it felt that the Federation candidate would be better able to gain the marginal votes needed to defeat the Gaullists. This was a tactic used by the left in 1967 with great success. Of 13 such "special cases" 10 led to victories of the FGDS candidates.[38] The discipline of the Federation and PCF in complying with their electoral agreement was virtually perfect. While in a few instances the defeated candidates delayed unnecessarily in withdrawing and giving support to their ally of the left, there was no case of open violation of the electoral agreement. This was an improvement on the already good discipline of 1967, when there were eight cases of indiscipline.[39]

The second-ballot contests accentuated the battle between the Gaullist majority and the left opposition. Out of a total of 316 districts involving run-off contests, there were 240 two-way races with a candidate of the left confronting a Gaullist. The left was represented in 297 districts

[37] See the analysis of F. H. de Virieu in *Le Monde*, June 30/July 1, 1968. (Note that these percentages refer to increases in 1968 compared to the 1967 Gaullist votes and not to increases in the percentage of the total votes cast.

[38] The decline in the number of these "gifts" did not reflect a cooling in the PCF's electoral arrangement with the FGDS. All but two of the Federation candidates who received "gifts" from the PCF in 1967 outdistanced their Communist rivals on the first ballot in 1968. In 1967 the FGDS asked for 25 exceptions and received 13; in 1968 it asked for five or six and got three.

[39] In 1967 there were eight refusals to withdraw in favor of the best-placed candidate of the left in 398 contests, or only 2.01%. In 1939, under the Popular Front electoral agreements, there were 59 refusals to abide by the decisions to withdraw out of 480 contests, or 13.91% of indiscipline. Barrillon, 72-73.

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and in no case were there two candidates from the left contending for the same seat. The PCF led the left's battle into 160 districts; the Federation represented the left in 134 districts, and the PSU had three districts. Between ballots the two groups of the left cooperated in an effort to recreate the unity of 1967. The extent of cooperation varied considerably from district to district. In some areas the former rivals campaigned for the candidate designated to run for the whole left, and the defeated candidate often demonstrated his support by appearing in public with his former rival to give him his endorsement, or by posters calling for his voters to support the candidate of the left, and even by putting his campaign organization to work on behalf of the new unity candidate. In other cases hostility between the candidates or their workers, or traditional bitter rivalries, limited cooperation to a simple statement of withdrawal coupled with an allusion to the need to promote the unity of the left.

The parties of the left were successful in carrying out the electoral strategy for the second ballot. However, their voters did not follow their lead. In 1967 the unity of the left had created a dynamic force that enabled the left to unite the votes it had gained separately on the first ballot behind a single candidate of the left on the second ballot. In 65.3 percent of the contests in 1967 involving a single candidate of the left, the candidates had been able not only to retain the first-ballot votes of all parties of the left but to win votes that in the first ballot had gone to candidates of the center or right. In 1967 the sense of unity of the left had inspired confidence in the voters and produced a relative electoral victory. In 1968 this same unity produced fears and hesitancy among the voters. Thus, in 1968 the left was able to retain or better its first-ballot strength in only 40.7 percent of the contests.

The hostility of the electorate to the course of unity being followed by the left was demonstrated by the electoral returns. The losses between the two ballotings were not due to a growth in abstentions or blank ballots. Instead it was clear that in many cases voters who had voted for the PCF, FGDS, or PSU on June 23 voted for the Gaullist candidate the following week rather than for another candidate of the left. Table I shows the ability of candidates from the various parties to increase the left's percentage of the voters from one ballot to the next. All groups of the left were less able to attract center votes or maintain the votes of the left than they had been in 1967. The Communist candidates were least likely to improve the position of the left in the second ballot, since a substantial part of the voters who supported the FGDS in the first ballot voted for the Gaullists rather than support

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a Communist in the second ballot. The decline of the attraction of the Socialist and Radical Federation candidates is particularly noteworthy.

The left lost a good proportion of its voters between ballots. Occasionally this failure of the unity of the left was due to the refusal of Communist voters to follow their leaders' directions to vote for Federation candidates with a history of anti-Communism. Thus Defferre failed to gain all the PCF votes and barely defeated his Gaullist opponent. Robert Lacoste, with a strong anti-Communist past, lost his seat when the Gaullist gained nearly 5000 votes that on the first ballot had gone to the PCF or PSU. In other cases there appeared to be switches of Communist voters to Gaullist candidates, even where the Federation candidates did not have an anti-Communist past. Pierre Mendès-France lost his seat as a result of a shift of votes to the Gaullist candidate in solidly Communist communities. In Avignon, the FGDS deputy was defeated when several thousand voters switched from the PCF on the first ballot to the Gaullist candidate on the second ballot. Similar shifts of important numbers of Communist voters to the Gaullist candidates took place in Limoges, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, and Tulle.[40] The Federation's electorate was even less well disciplined. Only a minority of the Communist candidates were able to keep all the votes of the left on the second ballot, and large numbers of voters who had supported the FGDS on the first ballot refused to vote for the Communist in the run-off. This was particularly true when a center candidate was opposing the Communist, but Federation voters often supported the Gaullist candidate rather than vote Communist.

While some cases of the decline of the left between ballots are explained by special circumstances, the trend was widespread. In the 317 districts with second-ballot contests, the left lost 564,000 votes compared to the separate results of the parties of the left in the first ballot in these districts. This contrasts with a net gain of 71,000 votes between the two ballots in 1967. The left in 1968 had a net loss of 2.22 percent of the votes cast in the second ballot compared to a gain of 8.30 percent by the Gaullists. The inability of the left to rally on the second ballot is illustrated by the record of the leftist strongholds in the North. In Nord and Pas-de-Calais, there were 27 failures to retain the full vote of the left from one ballot to the next in 1968, compared to 15 such failures in 1967: in Nord the 1968 average loss between ballots was 4.7 percent

[40] The shift of Communist voters to Gaullist candidates on the second ballot might indicate that the Communist electorate is less monolithic and less ideologically committed than is usually thought.

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PERCENTAGE OF CANDIDATES INCREASING THE VOTE OF THE LEFT BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND BALLOTS

	MARCH, 1967			JUNE, 1968			
	Number of Candidates in Run-off Elections	*Percent of All Leftist Candidates in Run-off*	*Percent of Candidates Progressing Between Ballots*	*Number of Candidates in Run-off Elections*	*Percent of All Leftist Candidates in Run-off*	*Percent of Candidates Progressing Between Ballots*	*Comparison of Progress, 1967 to 1968*
Federation-SFIO	103	28.14%	72.81%	81	27.27%	38.57%	−34.54%
Federation-Radical	37	10.11%	78.37%	27	9.09%	55.57%	−22.80%
Federation-CIR	34	9.29%	79.41%	22	7.40%	68.16%	−11.25%
Federation*	5	1.37%	60.00%	4	1.34%	100.00%	+40.00%
PSU	7	1.91%	71.42%	3	1.01%	66.67%	− 4.75%
PCF	180	49.18%	55.55%	160	53.87%	33.75%	−21.80%
Totals	366	100.00%	65.30%	297	99.09%	40.74%	

* Candidates running under the Federation label, without specifying any of the three families.

SOURCE: The chart and figures for the elections of 1967 are adapted from Raymond Barrillon, *La gauche française en mouvement* (Paris 1967), 107. The figures for the 1968 elections are taken from Barrillon's analysis of the elections in *Le Monde*, July 6, 1968.

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compared to 0.7 percent in 1967; in Pas-de-Calais the 1968 loss was 6.1 percent compared to 0.7 percent in 1967.

As a result of the breakdown in the unity of the left, the elections of 1968 resulted in a sharp decline in the left's representation in the National Assembly. In the outgoing assembly the left had 194 deputies out of a total of 484 (73 Communists, 118 Federation, and 3 PSU). The newly elected assembly included 34 PCF, 57 FGDS and no PSU—a total of 91, less than half the size of the delegation elected only fifteen months earlier. In some areas the left's loss of seats was particularly important. After the 1967 elections the left had eight of the 31 legislative seats in the city of Paris (7 PCF and 1 FGDS). In 1968 the left lost all of these seats. In the 47 districts in the suburbs of Paris the left kept only 15 seats (14 PCF and 1 FGDS) out of a pre-election delegation of 24 deputies. In the department of Isère, which includes Grenoble (one of the fastest growing areas in France and a model city for new economic development), the left lost all five of the seats it had won in 1967. In the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais the left after 1967 held 27 of the 37 seats (16 FGDS and 11 PCF). As a result of the 1968 elections the left kept only 15 seats (8 FGDS and 7 PCF).

The left was best able to resist the Gaullist sweep in the South of France. Yet even in this traditional stronghold, it suffered at the polls. In several departments where the left had always in the past led on the first ballot, Gaullist candidates took over the first-round lead. Where the left did manage to retain its seats, it was usually by a much smaller margin than in 1967. Furthermore, the Gaullists did make important gains in the South. In Dordogne, a Radical stronghold, the left lost all three of its seats (all FGDS). In Bouches-du-Rhône, the left in the 1967 elections had won all eleven seats (6 FGDS and 5 PCF). In 1968 it lost four seats to the Gaullists, re-electing only seven deputies (4 PCF and 3 FGDS). In the department of Hérault, a strong point of the rural left where the left had all five seats before the elections (3 FGDS and 2 PCF), the Gaullists won all but one. In another rural department with a long history of voting for the non-Communist left, Haute-Garonne, the FGDS kept only two of the five seats it held before the elections.

V

It is clear that the defeat of the French left in the elections of 1968 was due to *la grande peur*—the big fear. The reaction of the voters against the events of May provides the most reliable explanation. The Gaullists increased their percentage of the vote on the first

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ballot in nearly every department. Areas that had been in economic decline and had reflected their discontent by voting for the left in 1962, 1965, and 1967 voted for the Gaullists in 1968. Such was the case in Nord and Pas-de-Calais, where the closing of uneconomic mines and textile industries had created much unemployment. Underdeveloped areas, such as Brittany, which had been unhappy about their rate of growth or their failure to participate in the national economic growth, forgot their grievances and voted for the government of General de Gaulle.[41]

The climate of fear had two different aspects. In the first place, *la peur* was a result of the typical reaction to threatened revolution and violence. It was the characteristic turn of the rural and small-town voters away from the threatened revolution of Paris. An example of the effect of *la peur* can be seen in the election results of the predominantly rural department of Dordogne. During the campaign the Gaullist candidates, aided by the prefect, spread the rumor that the Communist-dominated FTP (*Franc-tireurs et partisans*), a wartime resistance group, had secretly reassembled. (During World War II the FTP in Dordogne had committed atrocities against their political enemies whom they labeled collaborators.) By spreading this unfounded rumor the Gaullists succeeded in spectacularly reversing the political representation of Dordogne. In 1967 the left received 58.1 percent of the votes on the first ballot and improved their record on the second ballot with 58.6 percent, winning three of the four legislative seats. In 1968 the left had 54.3 percent on the first ballot, but the following week their percentage was down to 48.0 percent, and all four seats were won by Gaullists.[42]

The second aspect of *la peur* was the fear of instability. Many of those who did not accept the government's propaganda blaming the PCF and FGDS for the violence and strikes of May were convinced that only the Gaullists could provide stable government. The choice, according to the Gaullists, was between the peace, order, and stability of the present government on the one hand, and the violence, disorder, and instability of the left. While the left had unquestionably made progress toward unity, it had failed to prove to the French public that

[41] There were a few isolated cases where local economic grievances led to a growth in support for the left. For example, in the third district of Aisne, discontent among the dairymen had produced demonstrations and the invasion of the local prefecture. The discontent was reflected in the electoral results when the FGDS deputy gained 1200 votes and reinforced his position after a narrow victory over a Gaullist deputy in 1967.

[42] The drop between ballots was 9% since in the three districts with run-off contests the left had 57.0% of the first ballot votes.

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such unity was durable. In a poll taken in February, 1968, 35 percent of those polled felt that if the PCF and FGDS were to form a government coalition the Communists would fail to be loyal to the agreement. Only 24 percent felt that the PCF would be loyal; 41 percent did not respond or had no opinion.[43] In the same poll only 25 percent felt that such a government coalition would be stable or lasting; 37 percent felt that it would not be long-lasting (including 21 percent of those who would vote for the PCF and 30 percent of those who would vote for the FGDS); 38 percent had no opinion on the matter.[44] Thus the unification of the French left had failed to convince the majority of the public of the left's ability to form a stable government. The divisions during the crisis of May and in preparation for the elections confirmed for much of the electorate the inability of the left to act together, particularly in the event of a crisis. To vote for the left seemed to many French voters to be the same as voting for a return to the confusion and instability of the politics of the Fourth Republic.

Not all of the decline of the left in the 1968 elections can be attributed directly to the events of May. There are signs that the decline had already started before May. One opinion poll taken during March revealed the following shifts from November, 1967, to March, 1968, in voting preferences for a possible legislative election:[45]

	March 1968	*November 1967*
Left (Federation and PCF)	40%	44%
Gaullists	45%	41%
Center and various right	15%	15%

This poll was taken a few weeks after the announcement of the agreement on the "joint declaration" of February, 1968, between the PCF and FGDS. It appeared to indicate a voter-reaction against this new step toward the unity of the left, as there had been no other major political event to explain the shift in voters' preferences.[46]

The Federation lost some voters in 1968 as a result of its inability to distinguish itself from the PCF. The continued efforts by the FGDS

[43] SOFRES, *Attitude à l'égard du Parti communiste*, 49-50.

[44] *Ibid.*, 54-55.

[45] *Le Monde*, April 2, 1968 (a SOFRES poll).

[46] This evidence from public-opinion polls, while indicative of a possible trend, needs to be regarded with caution since the only legislative by-election between the February declaration and the May crisis did not show any signs of voter rejection of the FGDS-PCF cooperation. To the contrary, the by-election held in April, 1968, in Corsica showed a growth of the left compared to March, 1967. In 1967 the left had received 43.1% on the first ballot and 49.5% on the second. After the annulment of the election, the left received 52.3% on the first ballot in April, 1968, and 52.8% on the second ballot.

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and the PCF to act together and the publicity that their cooperation received in the press led many to accept easily the Gaullist propaganda equating the FGDS and the PCF. Some Federation candidates complained after the elections that they had found during the campaign that many voters thought the PCF was a member of the Federation.

One further explanation of the defeat of the left was the decline in the personal popularity of the leader of the Federation and the tacit leader of the left, François Mitterrand. This decline was primarily a reaction against his press conference during the crisis. Even those voters who did not accept the Gaullist claims that the press conference was part of a leftist coup felt that Mitterrand and his followers were opportunists. One FGDS leader, in a post-election examination of the results, said: "It is absolutely certain that at that moment we looked like men who wanted to profit from a revolution that we didn't want to make and that the Communists didn't want either."[47] The result of Mitterrand's fall in popularity can be seen in his own district. In 1967 Mitterrand had gained 20,392 votes (56.27 percent of the votes cast) and had been elected on the first ballot. In 1968 he lost almost five thousand votes, getting only 15,791 or 42.08 percent of the vote, and was forced into a run-off election against a Gaullist who held a narrow lead in the first ballot. Mitterrand retained his seat but the Gaullist, a man without any local ties to the constituency, increased the Gaullist 1967 votes by 5300.

VI

The shock of the electoral defeat provoked a serious reevaluation of policies, strategies, and structures for the two major political forces of the French left. For the Communist Party, the election losses were minor concerns compared to the serious threats to internal unity caused by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Until the invasion the PCF had avoided condemning or endorsing the democratization and reform programs of the Czechoslovak party. The PCF leader, Waldeck Rochet, went to Moscow in an attempt to persuade the Soviet leaders to avoid the use of force. When the invasion did occur, the PCF promptly condemned it—an act of major importance, since the PCF had always been one of the most loyal allies of the Kremlin in matters of foreign policy. However, after the "agreement" was forced on Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its allies with the threat of a partition of the country, the PCF judged this accord as "positive." Fur-

[47] *Bulletin d'information radical-socialiste*, No. 73 (July 1968), 17.

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thermore, the party leaders and press spoke of "anti-Socialist" forces in Czechoslovakia but insisted that the Czechoslovak authorities should have been permitted to counter these subversive forces by themselves.

Such a halfway position pleased no one. Important sections of the PCF, led by Jeannette Vermeersch-Thorez, widow of Maurice Thorez, were displeased with any breach in the links with the Soviet Union. Those who opposed the break with the Soviet Party were aided by brochures defending the invasion of Czechoslovakia mailed to French Party members from East Germany. Other members of the PCF felt that the condemnation of the invasion was insufficient and should have been coupled with an endorsement of the Czechoslovak Party's reforms and democratization. Several of those favoring greater support for Czechoslovakia were not content to express their opinions only in party channels. Louis Aragon, a leading Communist intellectual, and Roger Garaudy, member of the Political Bureau, made public statements in support of the Czechoslovak reforms. Both of these leaders were condemned in *L'Humanité* and Garaudy's position in the Political Bureau was called into question by what one Central Committee member called his failure to observe Leninist discipline.[48]

Confronted with three serious threats to its internal unity—the rise of a new left, the division on the university crisis, and the problems caused by the Czechoslovak crisis—the French Communist Party turned to its internal problems. After three years of efforts to promote the unity of the left and to come out of its political ghetto, the PCF was forced to abandon these hopes in order to rebuild its own unity.

In the aftermath of the election, the Federation of the Left confronted serious internal problems that led to its dissolution. The crisis in the FGDS had three aspects. First, the electoral defeat brought strong criticism of François Mitterrand. Mitterrand's press conference during the crisis and his policy of a privileged alliance with the PCF were seen by many Radicals and Socialists as the causes of the Federation's electoral losses. For three years Mitterrand had pushed his more or less reluctant Socialist and Radical partners into acceptance of his leadership and of a privileged alliance with the Communists. He was able to do this because of his relative success in the 1965 presidential elections

[48] The PCF does not appear to have lost any of its electoral appeal as a result of the impact of the Czechoslovak affair. A by-election held in December 1968 in the Paris suburbs showed the strengthening of the position of the Communist candidate. He increased his votes by over 1000, going from 34.8% of the first ballot vote in June to 47.8% in December. The Soviet invasion of Hungary had a similar lack of effect on the French Party's electoral appeal. See Roy C. Macridis, "The Immobility of the French Communist Party," *Journal of Politics*, XX (November 1958), 613-34.

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and of the legislative victory of 1967. The defeat of 1968 and his unpopularity due to the press conference left him vulnerable. The criticism of the press conference was only a pretext for the deeper discontent caused by three years of pushing his partners along paths they were not convinced they should follow.

Second, the CIR and the more hesitant SFIO felt that the crisis of May and the elections showed the inadequacy of the existing Federation and called for the creation of a new unitary political party. The Radicals argued for the maintenance of the structures of the FGDS and for a loose confederation of parties, and they refused to participate in the negotiations for the new party. At the time of this writing the negotiations are still under way between the SFIO, the CIR, and several smaller clubs. The prospects for success in creating a new Socialist party do not appear to be good. The CIR, fearful of being lost in a party where it would be outnumbered by four to one by ex-SFIO members, is insisting on provisions that would minimize this domination. The SFIO, ready to accept those willing to join it in the creation of a new party that it would dominate, insists on the retention of its own provisions for internal democracy, which have worked so well that Guy Mollet remained as secretary general for 23 years despite the continued decline of the party.

Third, the electoral defeat called into question the privileged alliance of the FGDS with the Communist Party. The Radicals and many Socialists demanded an end of the alliance and advocated an opening to the center. The CIR and other Socialists maintained that the policy of unity of the left must be continued. The Federation was further divided on this issue as a result of the Czechoslovak crisis. The Radicals urged that all ties with the PCF be cut, in spite of the condemnation of the Soviet action by the French Communists. The CIR argued that the PCF's break with Moscow was confirmation of its evolution and urged the continuation of a close alliance with the Communists. The SFIO recognized the value of the break with Moscow but favored a wait-and-see attitude on the question of the Federation's alliance with the PCF.

The divisions on the Communist-alliance issue were typical of the problems which led to the demise of the FGDS. There had been serious differences within the FGDS before May, 1968, but all parties were willing to compromise in order to preserve their union. After June the desire to avoid the destruction of the Federation no longer operated as an incentive to compromise. While the FGDS continued to exist

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formally until the end of the year, in fact it had ceased to function in July, 1968.

Only the PSU emerged from the crisis assured of the correctness of its policies. In the view of its leaders, the elections were a victory. Alone among the parties of the left the PSU increased its number of votes compared to 1967. While opinion was divided on whether the rise was due to the increased number of candidates, the PSU interpreted the results as a ratification of its unqualified support for the student revolutionaries. The inability of the Federation to function during the crisis and its dissolution were new evidence for the PSU leaders of the wisdom of the party's refusal to join the FGDS. The PSU intended to continue its policy of support to the militant student movements and to broaden its activities at the base in an effort to attract workers and intellectuals disaffected by the "conservatism" of the PCF. However, its isolation from the other parties of the left and the continuation of several opposing internal factions make it unlikely that the PSU will be an important or an effective part of the political scene in the near future. Furthermore, as a result of its attempt to "out-left" the Communist Party, it is unlikely that the PSU can be counted on to play a constructive role in the non-Communist left.

While the elections of 1968 demonstrated a decline of both the PCF and the Federation, it was the democratic left that came out the worst. First, the FGDS fell from 18.96 percent on the first ballot in 1967 to 16.50 percent in 1968, a drop of 2.46 percent; the PCF fell 2.47 percent, from 22.51 percent to 20.03 percent. Second, the internal unity of the PCF was preserved in spite of serious menaces, while the Federation collapsed and the non-Communist left divided. This makes the possibility of a government of the left even more remote. Even those leaders of the non-Communist left who are most in favor of the unity of all the left recognize that the two parts of the left could form a government together only if the non-Communist left were undivided and electorally stronger than the Communists. This is thought necessary in order to counter the PCF's ability to draw support from its massive membership as well as from its labor union. It is a reflection of the fear even among the partisans of a government of the left that the PCF might take advantage of its role in government unless clearly dominated by the non-Communist left. The democratic left appears unlikely to be able to achieve the unity and electoral strength its leaders feel are prerequisites for a government with the PCF. Chart II shows the comparative strength of the two lefts in France since 1945. If the votes of the PSU are deducted from the non-Communist figures, the

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Communists have received more votes than the democratic left in every election since 1958. And the recent attitudes of the PSU make it unlikely that the non-Communist left can count on the PSU as a counterweight to the PCF.

The left's losses in the elections of 1968 are not the causes of its crisis. They are simply the latest demonstration of the left's continuing de-



PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST
FOR COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST LEFT
1945-1968

——— NON-COMMUNIST LEFT (FGDS AND ITS ANTECEDENTS, AND THE PSU)
– – – – – PCF

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cline as a result of its inability to adapt to a changing society. Without an in-depth revision of its structures and doctrines the French left, both Communist and non-Communist, has little hope of winning back the voters it lost ten years ago to Gaullism. The ability of the Gaullists to bring new people into politics, to appear as the party of movement, and to assure political stability contrasts markedly with the left's stagnation and fragmentation. Furthermore, the Gaullists have had more success in maintaining and expanding the Communist–anti-Communist division of the electorate than the left has had in creating a Gaullist–anti-Gaullist cleavage. The inclination to await the return of "normal" politics after De Gaulle is dangerous in that the left, barring a dramatic change, will not have much influence in shaping any institutional changes that may be made after De Gaulle's departure. In the meantime, the Gaullists are able to continue to strengthen their hold on national and local politics while the left is waiting.

The shock of defeat might have had a beneficial effect on the parties of the left. It might have provoked them into an examination of the long-term causes of their continued decline. Instead, the left is once again considering its latest defeat as the product of unusual events and circumstances and the result of unfair campaign practices by the Gaullists. It appears ready to acknowledge the need to reform its ideologies and structures, but beyond the verbal recognition of this need, it is unable to reform itself in fact. The sentimental fidelity of the parties of the left to their traditions and ideologies prevents the far-reaching reforms necessary to confront the profound causes of their decline. This sentimental attachment to the heroes and doctrines of the past is evidenced by the reactions of the parties of the left to their present problems. The PCF has turned to the task of strengthening its internal unity. The non-Communist left is trying to create a new Socialist party that will be "tough and pure" in doctrine and organization. Rather than meet the needs of a changing society and the demands of a changing electorate, the left appears content to await the return of normal politics. If the French left continues to refuse to adapt, it may well follow the example of the French right in the years after the establishment of the Third Republic and become new *exilés de l'intérieur*.

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STATE-CHURCH RELATIONS IN POLAND

An Examination of Power Configuration in a Noncompetitive Political System

By STANISLAW STARON*

UNTIL recently it has been taken more or less for granted by many students of the subject that totalitarian polities will not in the long run tolerate any form of pluralism in their power structure. Lucid and convincing arguments have been constructed to support this contention, in studies of the several historical manifestations of totalitarianism.[1] Implicit in these speculations was the more general view that it is in the very nature of power, and especially political power, that it will not gladly suffer any rivals. In the West the very virtues of democracy have been defended precisely on the grounds that democracy tends through its procedural commitments to diffuse power, to counteract, as it were, the inherent tendency of power toward infinite self-aggrandizement.

The domain of state-church relations has offered at times an important illustration of power tension in society. Historically, in the West, political power has existed side by side with that of the churches. And although the *modus vivendi* between the two was usually that of mutual accommodation of one kind or another—the churches typically aligning themselves and cooperating with the temporal powers—occasionally, when the conditions were propitious, an open and even dramatic conflict flared up between the two. This conflict, whatever its outward manifestations, has tended to revolve around jurisdictional disputes about the proper spheres of control, with the churches rarely denying the legitimacy of political authority as such and the governments rarely claiming jurisdiction over the religious consciences of their subjects. With the advent of modern democratic states the foundations were laid for more harmonious state-church coexistence. On the one hand, there came about an explicit political recognition of religious

* The writer would like to acknowledge his debt to the University of Vermont for a research grant that took him to Poland and to the Russian Research Center of Harvard University for a 1968-69 associateship during the term of which this paper was completed.

[1] See, for instance, Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York 1951).

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freedom; on the other, the churches—even the Catholic Church—gradually if grudgingly gave up most of their claim to the right to interfere directly in political affairs, consoling themselves with the role of leaders only in matters strictly religious, and of counselors in the social and moral sphere. The recent pronouncement on religious freedom by the Second Vatican Council may well be the last important step in the amicable settlement, in the democracies of the West, of what was essentially a jurisdictional dispute in state-church relations. Be it noted, however, that this development took place in a climate of essentially pragmatic political cultures and of pluralistic political systems.

An entirely different set of conditions underlying the state-church configuration of power came into being in the emergent totalitarian societies. Their ideologies, imbued with the grandiose vision of a better future, tend to impel their adherents to take drastic and Draconian steps for its implementation. The substantive commitment of these new "true believers" is indeed total, leaving no room for any extraneous sources of inspiration, ideas, or ideals. "Thou shalt have no other masters before me" should become for them the first principle of all social action. Communist ideology, moreover, denigrates religion as at best a figment of human imagination and at worst a tool of the exploiters to keep the toiling masses in an abject condition. Pushed to its logical conclusion, Communist ideology would seem to spell doom for the future of religion in any form.

The assertion that a totalitarian polity will not tolerate any pluralism in its power structure is, of course, a definitional statement and a tautology, and it tells us nothing about actual political behavior, unless it is supported by empirical evidence. Whatever the logical and psychological implications of totalitarian ideology, we, as social scientists, are more interested in the facts of political life in actual states, some of which we think of as "totalitarian." So far as the Communist states are concerned, the recent polycentric developments in their ideologies and policies make it even more imperative for a student of politics to rid himself of the methodological strait jacket of preconceived notions rooted in deductive habits of mind.[2]

A much less methodologically restrictive starting point for our examination of Communist regimes is the commonsense contention that the Communist totalitarian elites, not unlike the capitalist democratic elites, operate within a given social environment, which may

[2] For a pioneering criticism of the use of the totalitarian model as an ideal type, see H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 435-51.

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offer powerful and sometimes effective challenges to their policies. This contention, epitomized in the old adage, "politics is the art of the possible," precisely because of its general and open-ended character, shifts the inquiry from ideology to the facts of political behavior. It is in this frame of mind that this paper examines state-church relations in Poland.[3]

We shall begin with a summary examination of the political system and political culture of Communist Poland, stressing those aspects especially relevant to state-church relations. Next we shall describe the structure of the Catholic Church in Poland and analyze the religious attitudes of the population. Throughout this exposition we shall try not to disregard the historical, developmental dimension of the problem. We shall then embark on a scrutiny of some of the most crucial issues in the state-church confrontation, concluding our paper with a cautious evaluation. We say cautious evaluation because of the difficulty —nay, the impossibility—of obtaining and/or generating all the required data on this politically sensitive subject in Poland.

Poland's political system is in the main patterned on the Soviet model. The formal structure of government and Party, their relationship, the scope of governmental controls, the official ideology—all of these and more resemble, with minor exceptions, their counterparts in the Soviet Union. Such exceptions as the fact that Poland has a unitary government, a unicameral legislature, and three political parties are of only limited significance as differentiating factors, because the Soviet federalism is, after all, ridden with centralist tendencies, and their two houses of the Supreme Soviet always speak with one voice, and because the two smaller political parties in Poland appear to be merely appendages of the Polish Communist Party, existing at the pleasure of their powerful master. More fundamental differences between the Soviet and Polish political systems are to be found in a host of factors underlying Poland's political structure and especially in her divergent political culture and distinct political style.

Poland's Communist Party (or the Polish United Workers' Party, as it is officially called) numbered, as of the end of 1967, 1,931,345 members and candidate members. Of these, 766,470, or 39.7 percent, are classified as workers; 222,382, or 11.5 percent as farmers; 873,147 or 45.2 percent, as working intelligentsia; and 69,346 or 3.6 percent as others. The total membership represents about 6 percent of a population

[3] The methodological framework of this paper owes much to G. A. Almond and G. B. Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966). See especially 271-80.

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of just over 32 million. This percentage is similar to that found in the Soviet Union and is considerably below that of Czechoslovakia. It is interesting to note that the occupational composition of party membership is almost exactly like that of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, with the plurality of intelligentsia members, and a similar minority of people employed in agriculture.[4]

The intelligentsia-component of party membership, be it noted, consists mostly of people directly employed by the state, with the highest participation among middle- and higher-level personnel in the civil service proper and in economic enterprises, and among public-school teachers. About 35 percent of all teachers belong to the Party. Much lower participation of the intelligentsia is to be found among the members of "free" professions such as doctors (19 percent), and among the members of the university and scientific communities (25 percent).[5]

Of special relevance to this inquiry is the phenomenon of the low degree of penetration of the countryside by the Party. Poland's population is now equally divided between its urban and rural components, with the vast majority of rural dwellers engaged in farming. The Party is organized in the countryside in 37,200 primary party units based on villages. One-fourth of the villages have no party organization at all. Moreover, the political and propaganda effectiveness of the rural party apparatus has been subjected to occasional criticism by party leaders and their spokesmen.[6]

Assisting the party in its political and other activities, and also serving as a breeding ground for its future members, are the Communist youth movements, reorganized after 1956 into the Union of Socialist Youth

[4] *Rocznik statystyczny 1968.* [Polish Statistical Almanac 1968] (Warszawa 1968), 18. The recent changes in size and composition of the Party were as follows:

	1960	*1965*	*1967*
Total membership	1,154,672	1,775,049	1,931,345
Workers	40.3%	40.1%	39.7%
Peasants	11.8%	11.7%	11.5%
Others	47.9%	48.2%	48.8%

By June 30, 1968, the Party membership stood at 2,030,000. For the social composition of the C.P. of the Soviet Union see T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1957* (Princeton 1968), 323.

[5] *Ibid.*, compiled data from pp. 28, 421, 422, 490.

[6] More recently, for instance, in A. Anholcer *et al.*, "Uwagi o polityczno-propagandowej dzialalnosci organizacji i instancji partyjnych" [Some Remarks on Political Education in Party Units], *Nowe Drogi* (March 1967), 23-40. It might also be of interest to note that in a November, 1966, study of the social attitudes of county apparatus activists (including members of the United Peasants and Democratic Parties) the question as to whose interests activists should serve was answered as follows: national interest 57%, party interest 33%, and local interest 10%. *Nowe Drogi* (January 1967), 62. What may be significant here is not only the results of the poll, but also the reasons for posing the questions in this manner.

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and the Union of Rural Youth. These auxiliaries of the Polish United Workers' Party embrace the youth of both sexes from the age of fifteen to twenty-eight and from fifteen to twenty-one respectively. The combined membership of these organizations was 1,900,000 at the end of 1966, or about one-third of the population in the age-groups involved.[7] Between July, 1964 and January, 1967, 104,000 members of the USY and URY under twenty-five years of age became candidate members of the party. The corresponding figure for hitherto unaffiliated individuals was 61,000.[8]

Apart from the Communist Party, two other political groupings operate in Poland, namely, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party. These basically non-Marxist organizations are formally recognized as political parties and enjoy some of the advantages usually associated with that status. At the end of 1966, the United Peasant Party had over 360,000 members, and the Democratic Party over 75,000 members. Both parties have a record of fairly steady growth since 1957. In the last three Diets (1957-60, 1961-64, 1965———), the United Peasant Party held a generous quota of 25 percent, or 117 (in the 1957-60 Diet 118) seats, and the Democratic Party 8.5 percent, or 39 seats, to the Communist Party's 52, 56 and 55 percents and 234, 256 and 255 seats respectively.[9] Moreover, these two parties were similarly represented in the other organs of national government and in all levels of local government. We might conclude on the basis of these figures that the non-Communist parties could play a not insignificant role in Poland's political arena, perhaps not quite the role of the opposition in the Western sense, but at least that of a sympathetic critic voicing publicly the true sentiments of its supporters. Yet even a cursory examination of the record of these minority parties will clearly suggest that their contribution to the political process as an independent force has been negligible. This record demonstrates that, with the exception of a brief period in the wake of the October, 1956, transformations, the non-Communist parties acted merely as faithful, and always obedient, vassals of the Communist Party and not as political parties proper, articulating and promoting the interests of their followers. At times, they even supported Communist policies that were widely known to be against the wishes of the large majority of their supporters, as in the

[7] In January, 1968, the Union of Socialist Youth had 1,056,000 members divided as follows: school youth—490,500, working youth—441,500, university students—62,000 (out of the total of 289,000 students). *Polityka* (January 13, 1968).

[8] *Nowe Drogi* (March 1967), 16; *Nowe Drogi* (April 1967), 14 and 92.

[9] *Rocznik statystyczny 1968* [Polish Statistical Almanac 1968] (Warszawa 1968), 12. The remaining 49 seats are held by nonparty deputies.

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cases of the removal of religious instruction from schools and of the restrictions imposed on small-scale producers.[10]

Thus, it would appear that the minority parties have reconciled themselves to the subordinate position assigned them by the Communist Party. This could hardly be otherwise, for a number of reasons. First, the Communist regime was imposed by, and continues to operate with the backing and under the aegis of, Poland's powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, even under present circumstances of polycentric developments in the Communist bloc, is unlikely to tolerate the evolution of a multiparty system in her largest ally. Second, the ruling elite in Poland, like any other ruling elite, is unlikely to give up any of its prerogatives of power unless it is forced to do so by circumstances beyond its control. To eliminate, for instance, the remote possibility that the minority parties might obtain a majority of seats in the Diet, the administrative fiat guarantees the CP a parliamentary majority, whatever the sentiments of the voters. Third, the very notion of a multiparty system is utterly alien to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the vanguard of the proletariat. The assertion that it is in the very nature of social processes that the Communist Party is the only true spokesman for the proletariat is, indeed, not only the cornerstone of Communist ideology, but also a *sine qua non* postulate for the scheme of its effective realization. The Polish Communist ideologues, one might add parenthetically, find little difficulty in reconciling their *de jure* multiparty situation with the requirements of the doctrine of the vanguard of the proletariat by recourse to the dialectical stratagem of assigning to the Communist Party a "leading" or "foremost" status.[11]

In addition to political parties, there exist in Poland three small official organizations of lay Catholics: the Pax Society, the Znak Group, and the Christian Social Association. Of these, Pax is the largest (about 3,000 members) and Znak the most influential in Catholic circles. All of these groupings receive financial backing from the government,[12]

[10] Adam Bromke, *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1967), 211.

[11] See, for instance, W. Skrzydlo, "System partyjny Polskiej Republiki Ludowej i jego wyraz w ustroju politycznym panstwa" [The Party System in the Polish People's Republic and Its Significance in the Political System], *Panstwo i Prawo* (July 1959), 11-27.

[12] This backing, however, is not in the form of a direct subsidy. Under a special arrangement these organizations derive their own revenues through operation of economic (mainly publishing) enterprises allocated to them by the state. Such revenues are subject to taxation and other limitations. The Pax Society's budget, for instance, was restricted in 1964 to 50 million zlotys (or 2 million dollars) annually, *Frères du Monde*, No. 39 (1965).

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have a token representation in the Diet,[13] and are permitted, subject to censorship and newsprint-allocations, to engage in public debate through their publishing activities. Their organizational network is mainly restricted to the capital and a few larger cities, and their appeal is primarily directed to the Catholic intelligentsia. Though their ideological commitments vary, they all subscribe to the view that Catholics must actively participate in the political processes of Socialist Poland.

The Pax Society, referred to by an insightful observer as "the strangest product of political Catholicism in the world,"[14] is, indeed, a most unusual organization. Its founder-leader, Boleslaw Piasecki, once an extreme right-wing politician and resistance leader, was captured by the Russians in February, 1945, and reportedly condemned to death, only to emerge soon afterwards as an officially sponsored spokesman for close cooperation by Catholics with the regime. His argument for such cooperation is twofold.[15] On the one hand, he holds that the present socioeconomic system in Poland is irreversible. To socialism belongs the future. And because of Poland's geopolitical situation, her own interest further requires the closest ties with the Soviet Union, the leader of socialism. Political realism, therefore, makes it imperative for all patriotic Poles, Communists and non-Communists, believers and nonbelievers, to take an active and willing part in the task of building a Socialist society. On the other hand, Piasecki continues, there is nothing in the program of Socialist construction that is objectionable to a Catholic. Quite the contrary, the socioeconomic objectives of socialism are ethically good and thus perfectly compatible with the demands of Christian conscience. They mean amelioration of the human condition through a more efficient system of production and promotion of social justice through a more egalitarian system of distribution. All men of good will must therefore join in the task of building socialism. To the contention that Marxism is a materialistic and atheistic doctrine incompatible with Catholicism, Piasecki replies that doctrinal differences should not stop men from cooperating for the common good.[16]

[13] In the present (1965-1968) Diet, the Pax Society and the Znak Group have five deputies each.

[14] Hansjakob Stehle, *The Independent Satellite: Society and Politics in Poland Since 1945* (New York 1965), 108.

[15] Boleslaw Piasecki, *Zagadnienia istotne* [The Essential Issues] (Warsaw 1945), *Patriotyzm polski* [Polish Patriotism] (Warsaw 1958). Both these books are collections of articles previously published in Pax periodicals. For a more recent statement of Pax's ideological position see: "Wytyczne ideowo-polityczne stowarzyszenia Pax," *Dokumenty: Schizmy* [The Ideological Guidelines of Pax Society] (Paris 1966), 13-41.

[16] This position has subsequently received the official blessings of Pope John XXIII in *Pacem in Terris* in 1963, and of the Second Vatican Council in 1965. To wit, "While rejecting atheism, root and branch, the Church sincerely professes that all men, be-

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Thus far this ideological position could be correctly summed up under the label of Catholic socialism. Stated in this general manner, it does not offend the religious sensibilities of believers. The Pax Society, however, went far beyond these general formulations. Most important, its version of Socialist construction is indistinguishable from the program of the Communist Party. For two decades now the Pax Catholics have spared no efforts to support uncritically not only all the basic socioeconomic objectives of the regime, but also the methods of their implementation.[17] This policy, pursued with much determination and consistency, created the widely held impression that its real aim was not so much the social betterment of Poland as it was that of convincing the ruling elite of the Pax Society's unwavering loyalty to the regime. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the broader context of Polish politics the Pax Society failed utterly in gaining popular support. Instead, its members were repeatedly accused of opportunism, servility to the Communist Party and to the Soviet Union, and worse.[18] The Catholic intelligentsia came to regard the Pax program as a blatant betrayal of religious principles, and even the Communists felt uncomfortable about, and contemptuous of, this hybrid offspring of religion and Marxism.

In the light of these considerations a question may be posed as to the Communists' own rationale for the continued existence of this organization. As a matter of record, its activities and finances have been somewhat curtailed on previous occasions.[19] Why tolerate it at all? The usual explanation of the Pax Society's longevity offered by the Catholic in Poland is to attribute to the regime the policy of "divide and rule." Thus the Communist reason for its toleration of the Society is said to be to divide the Catholic Church and so render it impotent.[20] Be this as it may, other factors could be at work, such as the force of inertia in the bureaucratic apparatus, or the consideration of the Society's possible usefulness in the future, or the concern with Poland's

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lievers and unbelievers alike, ought to work for the rightful betterment of this world in which all alike live." Walter M. Abbott, S.J., ed., *The Documents of Vatican II* (New York 1966), 219.

[17] It must be noted, however, that on rare occasions, when governmental policy was *prima facie* in contradiction to the teaching of the Church and the issue only marginally political, the Pax Society registered its disapproval. Thus, for instance, when a bill to legalize abortion was introduced in 1956, the three Pax deputies voted against it "in the name of Catholic moral doctrine." Stehle, 110.

[18] There have even been circulating in Poland persistent rumors that the Pax Society collaborates with the Polish and/or Russian security organs. The author failed to find any substantiation of these claims.

[19] In 1956 and again in 1961.

[20] Bromke, 215.

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image abroad (especially in view of the Pax Society's ideological and other ties with progressivist Catholic movements in France and elsewhere).

The Znak Group, a true child of the 1956 climate of hope, represents an entirely different kind of political realism from that of its older and less successful rival for the political consciences of Polish Catholics. Though it recognizes the need for some cooperation between Catholics and Communists, the Znak Group does so largely on pragmatic grounds. Its ideological stance is decidedly Catholic and non-Marxian (although understandably not anti-Marxian), and its members are by and large out of sympathy with the Communist political and economic system."[21] Of all the groupings in the Diet, only the minute group of five Znak deputies has a record that stamps it as a spokesman for a considerable segment of lay Catholic intelligentsia and as an occasional critic of governmental policies. This criticism, it must be pointed out, is rare, cautious, marginal, and often indirect. Yet, in the broader context of a Communist political system, the Znak Society's record warrants its being regarded as a sort of counterpart of the opposition in democratic systems. As one of its deputies succinctly stated it: "I am in opposition. . . . It is quite clear that Poland, because of its geographical position, leans toward the Soviet Union. For that reason only Marxist-Socialist governments are now possible in this country. My opposition is therefore loyal and minimal."[22]

Substantively, the Znak Group is committed to a program of "democratization" of Poland's political life. The term "democratization," significantly enough, was first widely used in the immediate aftermath of the October, 1956, events by the (non-Stalinist) Communists themselves as a rallying cry to unite the Polish masses behind the new leadership. In the minds of the citizenry the term almost immediately assumed all the connotations of de-Stalinization, of breaking away with the hated past. And it is also true that for a while it appeared that the reconstructed Party leadership was sincerely com-

[21] Stehle, 102.

[22] *Ibid.*, 105. Perhaps the most dramatic act of opposition occurred recently when the five Znak deputies submitted an interpellation concerning the March, 1968, student demonstrations. Couched in less than cautious language, the interpellation requested the government to establish the responsibility for police brutality in suppressing the demonstrations and to clarify its policy on civil liberties. On April 10th, in the Diet, the interpellation was sharply criticized and its signers castigated as reactionaries, first by the premier and then by no fewer than 27 prominent deputies. In the face of this mighty and concerted onslaught three Znak deputies rose to speak in defense of their position. One of them, Jerzy Zawieyski, subsequently submitted his resignation as a member of the State Council. *Zycie Literackie*, No. 847 (1968) and *Tygodnik Powszechny* (April 28, 1968).

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mitted to a measure of democratic reform. When two or three years later the process of democratization was arrested, it fell to the Znak Society to carry the banner, in spite of overwhelming odds. More specifically, the Znak Society's program of "democratization" includes the objectives of continuing the predominance of private ownership in agriculture (now over 85 percent of cultivated land), expansion and encouragement of the independent-craftsmen sector of the economy, decentralization and workers' (rather than party and bureaucratic) control of publicly owned industry, decentralization of the governmental apparatus, and lessening of the tensions in state-church relations.[23]

The Christian Social Association, the smallest (slightly over 100 members) of the three organizations of Catholic laymen, came into being in 1957 as a result of a split in the leadership of the Pax Society. It is a motley group of individuals with different ideological commitments. Its political record of close collaboration with the powers that be approximates that of the Pax Society. Its impact on lay Catholics is limited to a minute portion of the intelligentsia and a few craftsmen. While the attitude of the Catholic hierarchy toward the Pax Society has been marked by open hostility and *ex cathedra* condemnations, and to the Znak Society by vacillation between sympathy and occasional aloofness, its attitude toward the Christian Social Association has been largely that of cold and contemptuous indifference.[24]

Side by side with these organizations of lay Catholics there operates in Poland the Association of Atheists and Freethinkers. In 1967 it numbered 35,338 members.[25] A direct-membership comparison of this organization with Pax, Znak, and the Christian Social Association would be entirely misleading, since the membership of these societies consists largely of the full-time cadres, while the number of full-time officials in the Association of Atheists and Freethinkers is less than that of the Christian Social Association. As could be expected, the Association of Atheists and Freethinkers addresses itself mainly to the intelligentsia sector of Polish society. Its influence, as far as we can ascertain, is negligible. It appears that even the Communist Party has serious doubts about its usefulness, as evidenced by the relatively small

[23] Bromke, 247-48.

[24] Apart from these three politically oriented organizations of lay Catholics, there exists in Poland a charitable Catholic organization, The Caritas Society. Since 1950 it has been under direct governmental control. While the Caritas Society serves as a home base for some "progressivist" pro-government members of the clergy, its activities have not been ostensibly political.

[25] *Rocznik statystyczny 1968* [Polish Statistical Almanac 1968] (Warszawa 1968), 17.

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quota of newsprint allocated for its periodicals.[26] Moreover, the Party ideologues have repeatedly exhorted the Association to give up the frontal attack on religion in favor of more subtle and indirect techniques of undermining the religious conviction of the believers. As stated by Leszek Kolakowski (in 1961, long before his own expulsion from the Party), "This vulgar propaganda put out by the atheists serves primarily only their own ends. . . . The effectiveness of lay influences depends, however, entirely on the ability to appeal to believers. . . . It is a sign of astonishing stupidity when one attempts to impress a Catholic reader with atheistic propaganda by trying to convince him that the basic elements of his belief are contemptible."[27]

Let us turn now to a brief examination of the religious profile of contemporary Poland. In 1945, as a result of border and population shifts, Poland became remarkably homogeneous in its ethnic and religious composition. Thus, 98 percent of the inhabitants are now ethnically Polish. The estimates of the number of Catholics vary, the Church-related sources claiming more than 90 percent, or the "overwhelming" majority, and the government sources conceding the otherwise unspecified majority. These general claims call for a further explanation since Polish Catholicism as a social phenomenon is rather untypical and, especially, since it tends to admit of degrees in a manner highly confusing to the uninitiated observer. Thus, be it noted, both of these appraisals rest on the most inclusive notion of "Catholicity" based on baptism and self-identification alone. Applying the Church's own operational criterion of "regular" practices would require some scaling down.[28]

While the sociological data on religion in Poland are few and fragmentary they do throw some light on the nature of the religious involvement of the population. These findings, whatever their methodological import, point out that, while Poland is still basically a Catholic society, the extent of religious commitment varies substantially with such factors as education, occupation, and place of residence (the least

[26] Their combined circulation is 42,000, far below the circulation of the combined Catholic press of about 500,000. Mikolaj Kozakiewics, *O tolerancji i swobodzie sumienia* [On Toleration and Freedom of Conscience] (Warszawa 1963), 83.

[27] *Argumenty*, No. 19 (1961), quoted in Stehle, 75. Kolakowski's own *Rozmowy z diablem* [Conversations with the Devil] (Warszawa 1965) is a good case in point of more subtle atheistic propaganda. This literate satirical tract, addressed to sophisticates, offers a powerful challenge to the Christian explanation of the problem of evil.

[28] The typical categories of "believers" used by the sociologists in Poland are: (1) deeply religious and practicing regularly; (2) religious and practicing regularly; (3) religious and practicing irregularly; (4) religious and non-practicing. The responses tend to cluster around the first and second categories for the peasants and around the second and third categories for the intelligentsia and second-generation or more workers.

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well-educated group of rural dwellers being the most religious) and that this commitment may be on the decline among the better-educated urban dwellers.

To illustrate these general contentions we propose to spotlight, as it were, some of the more typical data on the respective patterns of (1) self-identification with religion, (2) church attendance, and (3) general religious attitudes. Thus, in 1961, the Public Opinion Institute of the Polish Radio in a survey of 3,000 urban dwellers found that 60.2 percent of respondents with higher education, 66 percent of "all intelligentsia" in the sample, 75 percent of skilled workers, and 82 percent of unskilled workers declared themselves as believers. A similar trend was evidenced in a 1961 study of 504 teachers in Lodz. While 60 percent of all respondents declared themselves as "practicing believers," as many as 77.4 percent of respondents with only secondary education did so. It might also be of interest to note that a comparative (1958 and 1961) study of religious identification of students at the Warsaw Institute of Technology revealed a decline of 8 percent in the number of respondents declaring themselves as believers (1958—73 percent; 1961—65 percent).[29]

Another and perhaps better index of the religious involvement of the population is to be found in church attendance. Here the findings are conflicting, the Church and Church-related sources proffering higher figures of attendance than those from governmental sources. One of the latter, the Polish Academy of Sciences, reveals that during 1964, the Sunday mass attendance in an (unspecified) number of churches ranged from 28 percent to 40 percent in the "old" urban areas inhabited by the long-established workers, from 40 percent to 55 percent in the "new" urban areas where the majority of workers is of recent peasant origin, and from 60 percent to 84 percent in the "randomly selected" rural areas. The corresponding Church data, while showing similar environmental differential tend to be 10 to 15 percent higher. The writer's own, rather impressionistic estimate, based largely on a series of spotchecks, during July and August of 1966, tends to support the Church findings for the countryside and the government figures for the large cities.[30]

The differences between the social groups in the degree of identification with Catholicism and of church attendance are paralleled in Poland by the differences in kind in religious attitudes. The few atti-

[29] See Tadeusz Jaroszewski, "Dynamika praktyk religijnych i postaw swiatopogladowych w Polsce w swietle badan socjologicznych" [The Dynamics of Religious Practices and Attitudes in Poland in the Light of Sociological Studies], *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo* (March 1966), 133-49.

[30] *Ibid.*, 138.

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tudinal studies of religious beliefs undertaken to date are unfortunately so narrow in scope and fraught with so many methodological weaknesses that they can hardly be used as a basis for our generalizations.[31] Falling back, then, on more traditional nonquantitative materials, what are the salient characteristics of these group-bound sets of attitudes toward religion and the institutions of the Church?

The social groups in question are three: the intelligentsia, the industrial workers, and the peasants. The typical believer of the intelligentsia group is surprisingly independent in his beliefs. To quote one source: "[He] is likely to be much less conformist in his religious practices than a peasant. He may be skeptical about the authority of the priests. His participation in parish life is limited; frequently he may not know to which parish he belongs. He feels free to interpret religious dogma in his own way and does not worry whether or not his way conforms to the teachings of the Church. He considers himself, however, a good Catholic."[32]

This thoroughly individualistic and anti-authoritarian posture of the intelligentsia stands in sharp contrast to the rigidly compliant and orthodox stance of the peasantry. The Polish peasant is signally religious, but religious in a special way. His faith is simple and spontaneous. Not for him are the religious speculations of his better-educated brethren. He views the priests as truly possessed of superior knowledge in matters religious (and, on occasions, not only religious), as the divinely authorized and inspired ministrants to his salvation. While not prone to meditation he rejoices in observances. His private and public religious practices form an integral part of his daily existence. At the same time, preoccupied with the ritual, with the external, the concrete aspects of worship, the Polish peasant tends to be much less concerned with the substance of his creed. Not impervious to superstition, he is more generally apt to adhere to clearly incompatible values. Thus his conduct often manifests a striking dichotomy between his strictly religious and other acts. Last but not least, he appears to be almost totally immune to antireligious influences.[33]

It would be more difficult to perceive a dominant mold of religious attitudes among the industrial workers. More diversified as a social group than the peasantry, the Polish industrial proletariat is, above all,

[31] For a discussion of the methodological aspects of the sociological study of religion see Wladyslaw Jacher, "Przemiany religijne i refleksje socjologiczne" [Religious Transformations and Sociological Reflections], *Znak* (December 1967), 1591-1601.

[32] Clifford Barnett and others, *Poland: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New York 1958), 64-65.

[33] See, for instance, S. Grygiel and J. Tischner, "Szkic o religijnosci wsi wspolczesnej" [An Essay on Religiousness of the Rural Dwellers], *Znak* (December 1966), 1455-73.

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fragmented by the distance in time from its peasant origins. It is patently clear that in a rapidly industrializing society, where workers of recent peasant origin predominate, the Marxist postulate of integrated proletarian consciousness is especially difficult of realization. This fundamental heterogeneity of the Polish industrial working class manifests itself in the diversity of the religious patterns of its members. Thus, the "old," second- or third-generation workers, while not disposed to intellectual questioning of the dogma, tend to approximate the intelligentsia in their manner of religious practices and in their attitudes to the hierarchy. The "newer" workers, on the other hand, tend to display in their religious involvement a greater or lesser (depending on the length of their new status) degree of similarity with the peasantry.

The operations of the Catholic Church in Poland are sustained by a large, tightly knit, and highly disciplined organization. Territorially the country is divided into 25 bishoprics (more exactly: 5 archdioceses, 17 dioceses, and 3 diocesan curiae) and 6,334 parishes. The Church disposes of 13,273 places of worship. The hierarchy, led by the Primate of Poland (since late 1948 Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski), consists of over 60 bishops (including 2 cardinals) and 17,986 priests. Assisting the activities of the hierarchy are 3,275 lay brothers and 27,975 nuns. The training for the priesthood is given in 70 seminaries with over 4,000 students. In addition, there are the Advanced Theological School in Warsaw and the Catholic University in Lublin.[34]

It should be noted that the above figures compare favorably with the corresponding data for prewar, non-Communist Poland. Thus, for instance, between 1937 and 1967, the number of parishes had increased by 1,164, the number of churches and chapels by 6,022, the number of priests by 6,638, and the number of nuns by 11,234. Somewhat less impressive increases occurred in the number of seminaries and their students.[35] This growth in the structure of the Church has often been

[34] Adapted from *Rocznik statystyczny 1968*, 21, and Jozef Siemek, *Czy to sa sprawy religii* [Are These Matters of Religion?] (Warszawa 1962), 6-7.

[35] A table below illustrates these changes further:

	*1937**	*1965***	*1966***	*1967***
Parishes	5,170	6,327	6,330	6,334
Priests	11,348	17,333	17,797	17,986
Lay brothers	2,426	3,522	3,281	3,275
Nuns	16,820	28,190	28,054	27,975
Churches and chapels	7,251	13,263	13,267	13,273

* *Maly rocznik statystyczny 1939* [Polish Statistical Almanac 1939] (Warszawa 1968), 354.

** *Rocznik statystyczny 1968* [Polish Statistical Almanac 1968] (Warszawa 1968), 21. (Prior to 1967 the Polish People's Republic official statistical yearbooks did not include any data on religion.)

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cited by government sources as evidence of fair treatment accorded to the Church by the regime. What is sometimes omitted from these assertions is the mention of the growth of the (nominally) Catholic population (from 24 million to perhaps 30 million) and of the fact that several thousands of the added churches were not built since the war, but were merely taken over from the expelled Protestant German population in the Western Territories. Moreover, the official data for churches and chapels are themselves subject to suspicion. For instance, the more recent government sources give considerably higher figures for the same period than do the earlier sources, suggesting at best that the more inclusive statistical basis has now been adopted.[36] Most importantly, it is rarely mentioned in this context that by far the largest increase in the number of places of worship came about in the first few years immediately after the war, and that new church construction has been almost at a standstill since 1965. Yet even allowing for these qualifications, the fact remains that the Catholic Church in Poland disposes under the People's Republic of a much larger organizational structure than it did in the days of the non-Communist regime.

The manifold activities of the Church are financed almost entirely out of voluntary contributions of the parishioners. In addition, a limited income is derived from the smallholdings of agricultural land of the parishes and religious orders. The law limits these holdings to a maximum of 125 acres in case of the parishes and to 12.5 acres in case of the monasteries and convents. The average holding, however, is only about 10 acres, and all the holdings came to about 82,000 acres in 1964.[37] Government spokesmen estimate the total annual revenue of

[36] Compare, for instance, the following discrepancies:

	Churches and Chapels		
	1965	*1966*	*1967*
Rocznik statystyczny 1967, 20.	12,595	12,595	
Rocznik statystyczny 1968, 21.	13,263	13,267	13,273

Yet another semi-official source states that, between 1937 and 1962, the number of churches and chapels increased (only) by 2,937 (Siemiak, 7). Since, by all accounts, very few churches have been erected since 1962, the contrast with even the lower 1965 figure is striking.

[37] Stanislaw Markiewicz, *Panstwo i Kosciol w okresie dwudziestolecia Polski Ludowej* [State and Church in the Twenty Years of the Polish People's Republic] (Warszawa 1965), 48. It is interesting and paradoxical that until 1950 the Church enjoyed a privileged position in land-ownership. It alone was allowed to own larger tracts than the maximum of 125 acres permitted under the general land nationalization law. One writer justifies the 1950 change as follows: "The exclusion of Church estates from land reform has not been properly appreciated by the Polish episcopate. The majority of Church estates became bases of antigovernment operations, center of exploitation of the workers and examples of the worst kind of economic management. The intentions of the government were utterly thwarted. The episcopate not only failed to make the slightest effort to cooperate with the government, but used the generous

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the Church to be in excess of 2 billion zlotys (about 85 million dollars at the official rate of exchange).[38] The state grants the Church, together with other nonprofit religious, educational, charitable, cultural, and athletic organizations, tax-exempt status, except—and this is a very important qualification—for that part of its income used to support the clergy.[39] In practice, these tax demands have placed a considerable burden on Church finances and have often been subject to selective increases on the pretext that the parishes in question were underreporting their revenues. Since the matter of the assessment of taxable revenue has been in the hands of the local officials, wide divergencies in the economic status of comparable parishes can be observed. Furthermore, there exists some evidence that fiscal measures were frequently used as political weapons against the more recalcitrant priests.[40] If any generalizations are at all possible, it seems that the urban parishes bear the brunt of this treatment. Yet the power to tax has not been used, on the whole, as the power to destroy. The Church, while not opulent, appears to possess the minimum of economic resources necessary to carry out its work and to enable its clergy to enjoy a relatively comfortable standard of living.[41] The fact that some churches remain in state of disrepair and that hardly any new churches are being built is due not to the lack of financing but to the difficulties in obtaining the required permits for materials and construction.

One of the most crucial factors in the process of religious socialization is the formal instruction of the youth by the clergy. While it is true that the early religious attitudes are acquired by children at home and through family participation in public religious observances, the importance of formal instruction in the fundamentals of the faith by specialists to the development of an adult religious perspective hardly needs to be argued. And, not surprisingly, the matter of religious in-

gift to finance its antigovernment activities." Jan Sikora, *Watykan czy Polska* [Vatican or Poland] (Warszawa 1950), 94-95.

[38] *Zycie Literackie*, No. 31 (1961). Quoted in Stehle, 72. By comparison, in 1967 Poland's gross national product was 593.8 billion zlotys, total expenditures on education and culture 32 billion zlotys, and defense expenditures 26 billion zlotys. *Rocznik statystyczny 1968*, 82, 558.

[39] *Trybuna Ludu* (November 31, 1967).

[40] In a rare published statement the Pax-associated priests pleaded thus: "In taxation the financial burden ought to be levied in relation to the actual situation and with the complete elimination of the painful cases of applying tax regulations as a form of administrative pressure." *Kierunki* (August 11, 1968).

[41] Stehle's unsubstantiated assertion that "the income of the average priest is more than that of a minister of state" (72), contrasts sharply with the present writer's own observations.

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struction has been the salient point at issue throughout more than two decades of Church-state confrontation in Communist Poland.

To start with, in the immediate aftermath of the war religious instruction continued to be offered in schools in a manner not very different from the prewar practices except that now opting out was allowed. Soon afterwards, however, in 1948, with the onset of the Stalinist style in Polish politics, the so-called policy of laicization was set in motion in earnest. As a result of diverse administrative pressures, religion began to disappear gradually from the school curricula. This process continued even after the explicit government commitment in the State-Church Accord of 1950 "not to reduce the [present] volume of religious instruction in the schools," culminating in the decree of 1955 abolishing catechism classes in all schools. Before the decree could be fully implemented, however, came the events of October, 1956. In the now radically changed climate of opinion, formal religious instruction was restored, but only for those pupils whose parents expressly so desired (a written declaration was required). As it happened, the overwhelming majority of the parents responded positively and religious instruction was soon being given in both elementary and secondary schools throughout the country to perhaps more than 90 percent of the children attending.[42] But not for long. Beginning in 1958 the regime reverted to the policy of secularization of education. Once again religious instruction came under attack and subsequently was removed from many schools. In the beginning of the school year 1959-1960 religion was still being taught in 21,500 schools (out of a total of 28,000), but at the end of the 1960-1961 school year in only 6,500 schools. Then in July, 1961, the matter was settled by a statute relegating all religious instruction to catechism centers outside school property. This measure was hailed by the officialdom as a final implementation of the constitutional principle of the separation of church and state.[43]

The law was followed by executive regulation of the catechism centers themselves. These regulations included provisions for registration of the centers and for occasional inspections of the religious classes by the officials of the Ministry of Education.[44] The episcopate's response to these measures was as negative as it was prompt. The lower clergy, instructed by the hierarchy not to comply with the requirement for

[42] Stehle, 90-91.

[43] Markiewicz, 51.

[44] *Trybuna Ludu* (Oct. 31, 1967). These regulations also limited religious instruction in the centers to two hours a week and required the priests in charge to furnish an annual report. In addition, there were some inducements in the form of a small salary (1,000 zlotys) and the (not inconsiderable) benefits under the social security system for the priests in charge.

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registration, found itself in the unenviable position of having to choose between disobeying its superiors or enduring the wrath of the state officials. The predicament of the clergy was further complicated because "the regime has not exerted uniform and consistent pressure on all priests throughout the country, letting many go unpunished but selecting some individuals as the object of pressures."[45] Over a period of time, many priests—according to government sources a large but unspecified majority—complied with the regulations, but many others persisted in their refusal. What is most significant in this confrontation of the Catholic Church and the state is that unregistered (and presumably uninspected) catechism centers are allowed to operate at all! We were unable to discover any official figures of student enrollment in these centers. The informal estimates stress the nearly total participation of rural schoolchildren and majority participation of urban pupils.

It may be appropriate to examine now the Communist posture toward religion and the institutions of the Church, and its corollaries. In a manner characteristic of all Marxist argument the substance and *raison d'être* of this posture is explained in Poland in terms of ideology. The specific policies toward the Church, on the other hand, are presented as tactical moves, informed by ideology but also influenced by pragmatic considerations of time and place. The Marxists, it is argued, know on the basis of their correct appreciation of the historical processes that religion is a transitory phenomenon peculiar to the earlier phases of economic development. In advanced industrialized societies religion, as both a social and a psychological phenomenon, is doomed to extinction as naturally and inevitably as is the rest of the capitalist superstructure. Religion is on the decline, it is added, even in those scientifically and technologically advanced societies where the capitalist system persists and in spite of the frantic efforts of the ruling class to the contrary. The Socialist polity, forearmed with this knowledge, can easily afford to tolerate the surviving religious cults. Since the sensibilities of believers are not offended, social tension is minimized and the gargantuan task of Socialist construction is made easier of realization. The inclusion of the above position in the uncompromisingly atheistic doctrine of Marx was already initiated by Lenin in his well-known dictum "religion is a private matter of the citizens." In contemporary Poland the view found its institutional expression in the

[45] *Reuter* (Warsaw, Oct. 29, 1967). "A letter from the Episcopate read in Polish churches on Oct. 29, 1967, complained that some clergymen have been arrested and others have suffered other penalties for disobeying 'unjust' regulations issued by Polish civilian authorities regarding religious instruction and inventories of church property. The letter asked the faithful to respect and if necessary to support the priests."

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constitutional principles of the separation of church and state and of religious freedom (and, incidentally and consistently, of freedom of antireligious propaganda).[46]

Attractive in its simplicity and generous in intent as it may appear to an uninvolved observer, this formula for harmonious state-church coexistence failed to work. And not surprisingly. Not unlike the New Testament prescriptive dichotomy of the domains of Caesar and God and the similar medieval Doctrine of the Two Swords, it failed to take notice of the very roots of the real clash of interests. For verbal distinctions, even when embodied in constitutional principles, do little in themselves to resolve conflicts in society, other than providing arguments for endless rationalizations of antagonistic actions. The recognition that religion is a private activity and its corollaries, the doctrine of the separation of church and state and the principle of religious freedom, all of these notions are indeterminate categories which receive their flesh—as it were—only in the specific context of all manner of social conditions. The crux of the matter thus lies in Poland in the fundamental conflict of interest between the regime and the Church hierarchy; a conflict springing from radically opposing ideologies—which their respective proponents believe to be true and valid philosophies—but a conflict the course of which is largely determined by the objective conditions underlying the confrontation. Assuming then, as we must, the basic rationality of the collective *dramatis personae*, we will view this confrontation not so much as a clash of ideas (which it always has been) but as a series of tests of real strength of the antagonists.

Governmental policies toward the Catholic Church since 1944 have followed, in the main, the major overall changes in party line. Thus it is possible to distinguish four phases in state-church relations so far: the "transitional" phase, from 1944 through 1947, when the Church was left relatively unhindered; the "Stalinist" phase, from 1948 through 1955, during which it was subjected to severe administrative pressures—culminating in the arrest and detention of the primate himself; the "liberal" phase, from 1956 through 1958, when some of its freedoms were restored; and the current "hard-line" phase, which has seen the renewal of pressures but on a much smaller scale than before. Yet, in spite of these differences, it is possible to discern certain common features in all of the four phases.

What are these salient and enduring characteristics of governmental policy toward the Church? Heading the list must be the generalization

[46] *The Constitution of the Polish People's Republic*, Article 70.

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that the decision-makers have always taken great pains to avoid even the appearance of direct attack on religion and the institutions of the Church.[47] Thus, many facets of the confrontation, especially those occurring at the grass-roots level, were not allowed to be publicized. The introduction of the new restrictive regulations, which had to be published, was accompanied by the repeated official avowals in the press of the commitment to respect the religious sentiments of the population. When a direct challenge of some Church policy was deemed necessary, the government made sure that a minority segment, not the whole Church, was the target of the attack, often adding gratuitously that the majority of the believers was beyond reproach and continued to enjoy the confidence of the state.[48] In this manner the episcopate was pitted against the lower clergy and the laity, the "minority" of the clergy against the "majority" of the clergy, one segment of the believers against another segment of the believers, and so on. To allay further the suspicion of anti-Christian intent, much use was made of the "jurisdictional" argument. Thus, each anti-Church propaganda campaign copiously pointed out that the Church policy under attack was in fact political and not religious in its content and so an usurpation by the Church of the government's jurisdiction.

Yet another important characteristic of governmental policy toward the Church was the obvious absence of a master plan for realization of long-range ideological objectives. The official policies, even in times of the greatest intensification of pressures, appear to have lacked cohesion, coordination, and above all comprehensiveness. It almost seems as if the government had resolved to play it by ear, responding to pressure here, taking advantage of weakness there, but certainly not putting into operation a grand strategy well prepared in advance. At the same time certain broad tactical principles were clearly in evidence. As mentioned above, most of the offensive was carried out *sub rosa*, through administrative action and without any publicity whatsoever. The censors saw to it that not a word about these actions appeared in print. The only method left to the Church hierarchy to make their grievances known was by word of mouth, from the pulpit. Moreover it must be

[47] The extent of this concern is illustrated by the legal exemption from government inspection of those catechism centers that are located in churches and chapels. *Trybuna Ludu* (Oct. 31, 1967).

[48] As in the case of the press campaign against the "Polish Bishops' Letter to the German Episcopate" in late 1965 and early 1966. For a representative sample of the official pronouncements and press articles in this connection see: K. Grzybowski and others, *Poprawka z historii* [Rewriting History] (Warszawa 1966), and anon., *Materialy dokumenty: Oredzie biskupow polskich do biskupow niemieckich* [Documents: The Letter of the Polish Bishops to the German Episcopate] (Warszawa 1966).

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emphasized that these government tactics were employed selectively. Thus, more pressure was exerted against the urban than the rural parishes. Among the urban parishes, those located in the new industrial areas bore the brunt of this treatment. Then, within these categories themselves, the application of pressures was again not uniform. Quite frequently, even in matters of enforcing compliance with government regulations, some priests were selected for punishment, others were left relatively unhindered in their defiance.

From time to time a national campaign was launched against a specific Church policy. The official pronouncements would be recurrently publicized in all the mass media. University professors, the better known men of letters, as well as journalists, would be mobilized to present the government case. The campaign would last for weeks, even months. In fact, no one could know when the saturation point of the public would be reached since all these efforts were one-sided.[49] For it was essentially a downward communication, as very few responses were permitted to reach print that were not adulatory. Occasionally the zeal of the official image-makers led to serious tactical errors—as was the case with the subsequently well-known "Bishops' Letter to the German Episcopate."[50]

This description of the government's posture toward the Church may be concluded by listing the typical methods used to implement the

[49] The reactions from the pulpit were presumably reported to the policy-makers, but they could hardly be considered representative of the mass audience to which the campaign in question was addressed.

[50] This letter, sent on November 18, 1965, from Rome, by the 36 Polish bishops attending the last session of the Vatican Council II, to the German bishops, invited them to attend the forthcoming Church celebrations of the millennium of Christianity in Poland. The rather lengthy document devoted much space to the review of past Polish-German relations and ended—invoking the spirit of the Gospels—by offering forgiveness and asking to be forgiven for the wrongs mutually inflicted. The Polish government utilized this occasion to accuse the episcopate of meddling in political affairs as well as of distorting history to promote its anti-Socialist policies. Within a week or so a massive campaign against the letter was mounted in the Polish mass media. For several days vehement and detailed attacks appeared in newspapers throughout the land without the text of the letter ever having been published. Once the mistake was noticed, the letter was published but with several distortions, one of them crucial to the argument. These discrepancies were in turn corrected in the new printings when they were pointed out by the foreign press and radio; the official explanation attributed the errors to faulty translation. In January, 1966, the government refused Cardinal Wyszynski permission to travel abroad, citing the bishops' letter and the attitudes it expressed as a basis for the decision. The "anti-letter" campaign continued for a few months afterwards. M. Czerski and A. Walicki, eds., *Dialog episkopatow Polski i Niemiec* [The Dialogue Between the Polish and German Episcopates], (London 1966), 5-7. The ban on Cardinal Wyszynski's foreign travel was lifted in October, 1968. *New York Times* (October 31, 1968). Throughout 1966 and 1967 members of the episcopate generally refrained from applying for passports out of solidarity with the Cardinal. Several bishops travelled abroad in the first half of 1968. *Hejnal Mariacki* (July 1968).

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official policy. These were: (1) normal processes of law enforcement, (2) fiscal pressures, (3) petty bureaucratic interference with some activities of the Church, (4) withholding permits for church construction, (5) control over religious instruction and over the training of priests (admittedly minimal), (6) withholding of passports from the clergy, (7) mass-media propaganda campaigns against certain Church policies, and (8) parallel and continuous efforts—not ostensibly directed against the Church (except for the marginal activity of the Atheists' and Freethinkers' Association)—to reeducate the society in the spirit of secularization.

To complete this sketch of state-church relations it will be necessary to characterize in turn Church policy toward the government. The position of the episcopate can be summed up by citing its own pronouncement: "The episcopate takes a public stand only in the indispensable defense of religious life, Catholic education, Catholic culture, and the right of the Catholic institutions to develop to meet the demands of the believers."[51] In the light of previous discussion it should be possible to give more precise meaning to these general principles by discussing them in terms of the concrete guidelines and specific policies. First, the Church insists on the complete freedom of all religious observances. Although government policy in this respect has been decisively permissive, there were occasions, as we indicated earlier, when mass religious observances met with the obstructive tactics of the police.[52] Whenever this happened the Church hierarchy protested most vocally from the pulpit and remonstrated in the strongest terms in formal complaints, always pointing out the blatant discrepancy between the theory and practice of the government's religious policy, and generally not in vain.

The second aspect of religious freedom considered by the Church hierarchy as most crucial in the confrontation with the state was religious education. Here, once religious education was relegated from the schools to catechism centers, Church policy has been to resist by any

[51] *Slowo Powszechne* (January 11, 1968).

[52] In A.D. 966 the Polish King Mieszko I was baptized. The same date is also considered to mark the historical beginning of the Polish state. Thus in 1966, both the Church and the state had solemn reasons to prepare large-scale millennial celebrations. Not unnaturally this was done in the spirit of competition, both organizers doing their utmost to attract mass participation in their respective festivities. It was in 1966 that state-church relations reached their lowest ebb since the Stalinist period. It is in connection with these millennial celebrations that the state resorted to all kinds of disruptive tactics to hinder the success of the Church observances. These tactics varied from petty administrative interference with religious processions to provision of diversionary attractions scheduled at the time of the Church celebrations (such as popular sports events, popular television programs, and the like). See Alexander Bregman, "Gomulka's Long Hot Spring," *East Europe*, 15 (August 1966), 2-14.

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and all means the government's attempts to establish controls over these centers—even to the point of open defiance of law. It is as remarkable as it is significant that the decree regulating catechism centers, which has been in force for seven years, continues to be defied in many parishes. Thus, future developments in this sector of state-church relations warrant the closest attention.

It will be more difficult to pin down specific Church policies in the area of what the episcopate refers to as Catholic culture. It must be remembered that the word culture as used in this context is akin to the word civilization and it has no material connotations. To the Polish ear it also brings back all kinds of associations with a thousand years of Catholic past, not the least important of these being the widely accepted notion that the Polish state acted for centuries as the "bulwark" of Christianity, defending Europe against the onslaughts of Islam. Thus in Poland the phrase "Catholic culture" is not devoid of a certain provocativeness: in addition to evoking the sentimental recollection of Poland's historic mission as the Defender of the Faith, its very use seems to challenge the basic tenets of Marxist sociology, which must have been considerably less than palatable to the Communist ruling elite. The Church's pronouncements in this connection tended to be vague and cautious, its spokesmen apparently being fully aware that a direct challenge to the ruling ideology would meet with immediate and drastic repression. Thus the hierarchy, while consistently proclaiming its general right to be a moral and social critic, has exercised this right judiciously. Government policies selected for criticism have tended to be those that directly conflicted with the teachings of the Church, as in case of regulation of divorces and abortion. The criticism has been, it appears, highly coordinated, the primate and the bishops playing the leading roles and the lower clergy being generally limited to the recitation of their superiors' views stated in the periodic pastoral letters. Only the primate himself and very few bishops did engage from time to time in challenging the policies of the regime on general moral grounds.

Lastly, the episcopate's goal of "freedom of development" in response to the needs of the believers is clear enough. Let us just mention that the most pressing need at the moment is for new churches, especially in the fast-growing new industrial centers.[53]

Such are, in brief analysis, some of the salient factors in state-church

[53] On the other hand, it appears that there have been firm indications of the downward trend in the number of the followers of religious vocations. Concern about future scarcity of Church "cadres" has been expressed by the hierarchy on frequent occasions. See, for instance, ks. B. Bozowski, and others, "Dyskusja o ksiezach w Polsce" [A Discussion About Polish Priests], *Wiez*, XI (July-August 1968), 3-36.

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relations in Communist Poland. What is their significance for the political system as a whole? Perhaps one way of approaching the question that might lead to fruitful speculation would be to inquire into the "whys" of what appears to have been a remarkably permissive religious policy of the regime. We say "remarkably permissive" policy not of course, by reference to any absolute standards of justice or "democratic" practice (whatever they may be), but by comparison with other Communist states. Of all the Communist regimes, only in Poland is the Church a truly viable institution enjoying a large degree of autonomy from the state, exerting considerable influence in the life of society, and even showing itself capable of growth.[54]

The general hypothesis intended to be examined in this paper is that the Polish Communist state is not all-powerful and that its policies, although inspired by ideology, are significantly circumscribed by the social conditions within which the state operates. Applied to state-church relations, this hypothesis would indicate that the Catholic Church in Poland has been in the past a strong enough social force to wrest from the government a measure of accommodation. The tacit assumption here is, of course, that the regime takes its ideology seriously and thus would rather see religion disappear—and would do its best to accelerate the process at that. Unfortunately, as often happens in these matters, there seems to be no way of directly verifying our hypothesis. Thus we shall proceed by merely pointing out some facts that appear to us to support it.

Poland is the only Communist country in Europe that is solidly Catholic. A thousand years of Catholicism has left an unmistakable imprint on Polish national character. Anticlericalism, although fashion-

[54] It might also be important to note that the radical and progressive reform program initiated by Pope John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council does not seem to suit the temper of the majority of the Polish clergy and lay believers. While much space has been devoted to the discussion of "Aggiornamento" in the lay Catholic press the effect of these efforts on the Church at large has not been very significant. The rural believers and their clergy seem hardly to have been affected at all.

Another issue bearing upon our discussion is that of the possibility of the agreement between the Polish Government and the Holy See to regulate state-church relations. Such an agreement was concluded by the Vatican with Hungary in 1964 and with Yugoslavia in 1966. While both of these agreements, and especially the latter, were hailed by all parties involved as models for improving state-church relations in Communist countries, this solution is of doubtful value to Poland. As one observer stated it: "(In Poland) for a long time the episcopate under its militant primate Cardinal Wyszynski has been a self-confident negotiating party with the state. . . . No mean proportion of Polish bishops believe that the position of the Polish Church is so strong, despite or because of recurrent friction with the government, that any new agreement, any compromise, could only lead to a deterioration of the *status quo*." Hansjakob Stehle, "Vatican Policy Towards Eastern Europe," *Survey*, No. 66 (January 1968), 115.

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able in some intellectual circles before the second World War, never had a chance to develop as a viable political force. Institutionally the Catholic Church and the Polish state worked together, the doctrine of the separation of church and state never having attracted many supporters. At the onset of the war Polish political culture was permeated with religious elements. During the grim years of German occupation the generally exemplary posture of the clergy only strengthened the coalescence of religious and patriotic sentiments. These values continued to be transmitted to the postwar generation in the People's Republic through the usual channels of political socialization, although less directly in formal education and hardly at all in the mass media. These largely latent processes of political socialization in traditional values sympathetic to Catholicism and decidedly unreceptive to Marxism have persisted in the face of the not inconsiderable efforts of the regime to nullify them through censorship and other controls and through manifest transmission of the official ideology. In spite of the fact that the state was in possession of the extensive controls over the educational structures and over the mass media and used them to full advantage, its efforts have not thus far been very successful. The results have been most disappointing to the regime in the case of the students (ironically, the foremost beneficiaries of the present system) and of the peasants. Thus Polish political culture continues to be fragmented. The inability to win the broadly based support for Communist ideology has been the Achilles' heel of the system. The lack of political consensus has made compromises unavoidable. Moderation in policy toward the Catholic Church was one of them.

Another limitation on what any government can do pertains to the problem of the scarcity of human and material resources. In the Communist polity in spite—or perhaps because—of its more extensive and more direct controls over the resources of society, the problem of priorities looms large for the decision-makers. In Poland this problem was further compounded by the drastic diminution of these resources in the course of the war and even more by the fact that the new ruling elite itself was exceedingly small, greatly lacking in education, and without any experience in government. In the early days of "Socialist construction" the militant policy against the Church would involve a foolish waste of resources indispensible for ideologically and rationally more important uses. Two decades later, after considerable economic and general educational gains have been made and large new cadres of party specialists trained, the problem of priorities is still of paramount importance. Although the state finds itself now in a vastly

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improved position to implement its ideological objectives, because of the rising expectations of the population—in no small measure caused by the unrealistically ambitious claims of the regime itself—more positive and concrete goals than the secularization of society may seem to the government to merit priority.

Not the least important in these preoccupations with priorities has been the problem of intraparty struggle. Apart from the usual ideological tensions the Polish Communist Party is bound to experience, in the next few years, a takeover by the younger, much better-educated generation of Communists who entered its ranks in the postwar period. In the meantime, some of the old-guard leaders have been showing definite signs of restlessness, perhaps sensing in the uncertainties of the lame-duck period a chance for themselves to obtain control. We are convinced that the most recent "anti-Zionist" and "anti-Revisionist" purges are merely the visible part of the iceberg in this struggle for power. A ruling elite divided is a ruling elite preoccupied with its own problems and thus less likely to pay attention to other issues. Moreover, its factions are in dire need of allies wherever they can be found. Certainly they cannot afford antagonizing any significant segment of public opinion. It is hardly surprising that in the recent months state-church relations in Poland have been marked by a lessening of tensions.

The implications of the above argument for the future are clear. The confrontation between the Polish Communist state and the Catholic Church is likely to continue on the lines sugested above without any decisive victories for either side in the near future. Regarding long range prognosis, this paper claims innocence.

What is the general relevance of our conclusions? The major import of the foregoing argument has been that the Polish Communist government has found it necessary to develop a *modus vivendi*—however precarious it may be—with the Catholic Church. In the course of our examination we have presented a number of possible reasons for this toleration of an independent (and generally alien to communism) social force. They all attest to the basic fact that the political power of the Polish Communist regime is severely circumscribed in matters of religious policy. Since this paper is merely a case study of one aspect of one political system, it can hardly inform us about the rest of the political universe. Yet we believe that these findings are not devoid of certain general implications especially for the student of the noncompetitive political systems. They provide yet another argument against the use of a crude "totalitarian" model—and against the lingering habits of mind that it has inspired—suggesting that there may be fewer differ-

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ences in the political decision-making processes between the pluralistic and noncompetitive polities than is generally thought. While pointing out the less than paramount role of ideology in one Communist system, the paper illuminates the importance of behavioral approaches. Lastly, this case study, without pretensions to scientific rigor, illustrates the usefulness of the several concepts of structural-functional analysis in the study of Communist polities.

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DYNAMIC TENDENCIES IN THE AUTHORITY OF REGIMES

By RICHARD ROSE*

TWENTIETH-CENTURY history provides ample evidence of the variable nature of the authority of political regimes, yet contemporary social scientists devote much more attention to the potential sources of legitimate authority than to the causes and consequences of its absence.[1] In order to understand the very different types of authority that a regime may display, and changes in its authority through time, we must be able to account for the repudiation of regimes as well as for their legitimation. Moreover, it is necessary to explain why so many regimes long remain in intermediate categories, neither fully legitimate nor fully repudiated. The purpose of this paper is to differentiate among the types of authority of a regime, to analyze differences in dynamic changes in authority, and to propose hypotheses specifying influences upon the ability of a regime's leaders to obtain support and compliance from its nominal population.

I

A political *regime* is defined as that set of institutions coordinating and controlling the civil administration, the police, and the military within a state. This definition gives explicit recognition to the unique importance in politics of an organization claiming the monopoly of force within a society.[2] Its simplicity avoids the confusion arising from

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[1] Max Weber's work remains the best discussion, even though it is unsystematic and incomplete. See, e.g., *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, Ill. 1947); and H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. *From Max Weber* (London 1948) Part II. For discussions of the German texts, see especially Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: an Intellectual Portrait* (New York 1962), 285ff; Peter M. Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," *American Political Science Review* LVII (June 1963); and Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-building in the New States," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968).

[2] For the importance of the control of force in definitions of politics and government, see, e.g., Gerth and Mills, 78; David Easton, *The Political System* (New York

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the conflation of cultural values, procedural norms, and institutional features in David Easton's use of the word.[3] Easton is either stipulating by definition that all regimes have manifold attributes of authority, or constricting the concept so that it cannot be applied to authorities in countries ranging from Vietnam to France. The *government* of a regime consists of a group of people who, at a given time, hold the most important positions within it. In some societies, governments change from time to time but the regime remains virtually unaltered; in a politically unstable country, changing the government tends to require a change in regime too. A regime claims to control a *state*, an entity covering an area with geographical boundaries recognized by other regimes. Within the boundaries of a state or across the boundaries of two states, more than one political system may exist, i.e., persons engaged in interdependent political interaction. The confusion of the boundaries of a tangible legal and geographical entity—the state—with the abstract and often unspecified boundaries of systems of imputed interaction causes many writers on comparative politics to fail to recognize the important consequences of incongruities between the *de jure* state and *de facto* political systems.[4]

All persons resident within the territorial boundaries of a state form its *population*, the maximum number of individuals from whom the regime claims compliance and support. Persons actually demonstrating some compliance or support constitute the *subjects* of a regime. Neither of these terms makes any stipulation as to whether or not the population of a state shares a sense of political nationhood, defined by Benjamin Akzin as a desire by a collectivity to exercise major influence on the political structure of a society,[5] or a sense of community, defined by Weber as "the feeling of the actors that they belong together."[6] Collectively, the population of a state might most neutrally be referred to as a society, in Dorothy Emmet's sense of "a social aggregate," a categoric group of people who do not necessarily have the interaction and interdependence implied by the use of the term *social system*.[7] In

1953), 130ff; Gabriel Almond, "Introduction" in G. Almond and J. S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 5ff; and Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963), chap. 2.

[3] *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), chap. 12.

[4] The characteristics of primitive political groups lacking fixed territorial locales, such as African tribes, are not within the ambit of this study. For a discussion of their significance for political systems theory, see W.J.M. Mackenzie, *Politics and Social Science* (Harmondsworth 1967), chap. 13.

[5] *State and Nation* (London 1964), 33.

[6] Gerth and Mills, 183.

[7] *Function, Purpose and Powers* (London 1958), 23.

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a complementary fashion, the word *country* might be used to leave conveniently vague at an initial stage of an enquiry the precise political attributes empirically associated with the entity referred to.

Authority, a word that has a variety of related but distinct meanings in social science literature,[8] is here employed as a universal term to label collectively the different patterns of relationships between regimes and the populations from which they seek obedience and allegiance. To say that a regime has authority tells nothing of itself; it may be "discredited" or "fully legitimate" authority. In Giovanni Sartori's terms, we must descend the ladder of abstraction to avoid what he has called conceptual stretching: the use of a universal concept as if it were the basis for analyzing and comparing differences between regimes.[9] The type of authority that a regime exercises can be distinguished by *the degree to which its population acts in accord with regulations concerning the maintenance of the regime and has diffuse cultural orientations approving the regime.* The typology has two principal components—compliance and support. Both are commonly emphasized in analyses of core concepts of politics and government.[10] Compliance emphasizes the power of a regime to get its nominal subjects to act as *de facto* subjects. This capability of a regime is important in predemocratic and democratic thought, as well as in contemporary studies of regimes seeking to mobilize populations to achieve social and economic goals.[11] Support is the enduring and diffuse basis of *voluntary* obedience to a regime's regulations; a high level distinguishes some regimes from others primarily based upon coercion, calculation, or absolute ideological goals. Subjects who have internalized norms favoring unquestioning obedience and positive commitment to the regime *per se* can be governed with far more economy of means and predictability, and less of a control apparatus, than can persons in regimes relying upon specific and contingent sources of compliance.[12] The motives leading an individual to comply with a regime's regulations usually reflect a mixture of ideal-type influences; no attempt is made here to specify the sources of diffuse cultural approval.[13] When calcula-

[8] See, e.g., Robert Peabody's article on "Authority" in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York 1968); and Young C. Kim, "Authority: Some Conceptual and Empirical Notes" *Western Political Quarterly*, XIX (June 1966).

[9] "International Studies and Comparability: The Snares of Comparative Politics," (New Haven 1966), mimeo.

[10] See n. 2.

[11] See, e.g., David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965); and J. P. Nettl, *Political Mobilization* (London 1967).

[12] See Weber, 324, and Blau, 306-07.

[13] Cf. Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York 1961).

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tive, ideological, or even coercive influences may weigh against the regime in a crisis, the presence or absence of diffuse support can be crucial.

Regulations concerning the maintenance of a regime are only a limited portion of the totality of laws promulgated in its name. A distinction must be made between political laws, the violation of which is regarded by the regime as subversive and punished as a crime against the state, and ordinary laws, the violation of which is considered antisocial and subject to punishment, but not a crime against the state.[14] Anti-social behavior does not necessarily lead to anti-regime behavior. In Britain, for example, a survey found that while 46 percent of those interviewed could conceive of circumstances in which the law could be broken, the examples most frequently cited—e.g., violating a traffic regulation—hardly threatened the maintenance of the regime.[15] Only as a regime tends toward totalitarianism is there the implication that antisocial actions, such as absenteeism from work, are considered anti-regime political activity. In a nontotalitarian regime, even the assassination of a president may be regarded as an antisocial act of homicide rather than as a purposeful attempt threatening the maintenance of a regime. It is important to note that in such circumstances the power to decide what forms of noncompliance are or are not subversive rests with the regime. The latitude allowed regimes is important, because many forms of noncompliance can be given more than one interpretation. For instance, race riots in American cities today are interpreted by Black Power militants as a protest against the regime, but by the regime as the anomic articulation of interests. The prevailing governmental definition of urban violence leads to post-riot policies very different in content and impact upon potentially disaffected groups from policies that follow from a diagnosis of subversion.[16]

Regimes are macro-structures, seeking to exercise authority in relation to millions of micro-units, that is, potential subjects. Since the literature on authority patterns in small groups is large and growing quickly, this paper will concentrate on the relatively neglected area of authority as seen from the viewpoint of the regime. Statements about the authority of a regime and about the type of loyalty of individuals in its population necessarily imply descriptions of each other. Yet there

[14] Cf. the similar though not identical phrases "primary rules" and "secondary rules," discussed by H.L.A. Hart in *The Concept of Law* (Oxford 1961), chap. 5.

[15] See Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," *Political Studies*, xv (June 1967), 190.

[16] See Allan Silver, "Official Interpretations of Racial Riots," in *Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change*, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, xxix (July 1968).

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is no necessary one-to-one relation between the two phenomena. A regime can be classified as fully legitimate for practical purposes without the full support and compliance of every one of its millions of inhabitants; reciprocally, it can, for a time at least, avoid full repudiation even if, as in Vietnam in the 1960's, it has low support and compliance from a large proportion of its subjects. Unfortunately, little attention has been given to the minimum level of mass support and compliance necessary to maintain a regime. It is clear that the withdrawal of support and compliance by a small number of people may produce a reaction against a regime out of all proportion to the number involved, for initiators of an insurrection depend for success upon the multiplier- and demonstration-effects of their behavior. It is not quite clear how large the small group of defectors must be in order to alter a regime's authority pattern substantially. The point is dramatically illustrated by tables on Negro participation in recent urban American riots.[17]

The development of operational criteria for measuring levels of support and compliance is important, but consideration of what evidence is relevant should always precede manipulation of that which is conveniently, if not appropriately, at hand. Aggregate indicators of support include the existence of organizations with goals in opposition to the regime, or of non-associational groups defined by the regime as *ipso facto* disloyal, such as overseas Chinese, or Zionists in Russia. In states with competitive elections, the proportion voting for anti-regime parties would provide an indication of nonsupport. Assessment of noncompliance does not require a distinction between noncompliance based on ignorance of a law and intentional noncompliance; in both cases, a regime has failed to exercise control of potential subjects. Aggregate noncompliance may be indexed by measurements of civil violence or instability.[18] Another index, reflecting a regime's incapacity to exercise extractive or regulative powers, the two minimal functions of a regime,[19] would use estimates of the tax-collecting capabilities, the effective jurisdiction of courts, the relative accuracy of a country's

[17] See, e.g., Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, "Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities," (Ann Arbor 1968), 52; and Bryan T. Downes with Stephen W. Burks, "The Black Protest Movement and Urban Violence" (American Political Science Association, 1968), mimeo. 16.

[18] Useful collections of examples and applications can be found in S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), chap. 1, and Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston 1966), chap. 6.

[19] See G. Almond and B. Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966), chap. 8.

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census,[20] or the number of basic tabulations not reported to international data-gathering agencies.

To impose some sort of order and similarity upon the hundreds of regimes that have tried to govern states in this century, it is necessary to overlook fine distinctions. The simple procedure of trichotomizing high, medium, and low levels of support and compliance provides a typology 125 percent more discriminating than the conventional four-fold table. It also makes ample provision for placing regimes in intermediate categories, when relevant data indicate neither a high nor a low degree of support or compliance.

TABLE I. A TYPOLOGY OF REGIME AUTHORITY

FULLY LEGITIMATE	INTERMITTENTLY LEGITIMATE	ISOLATED
high s; high c	high s; mixed c	high s; low c
PARTIALLY LEGITIMATE	DIVIDED	DISRUPTED
mixed s; high c	mixed s; mixed c	mixed s; low c
COERCIVE	SEMI-COERCIVE	REPUDIATED
low s; high c	low s; mixed c	low s; low c

Using two relational attributes makes it possible to differentiate between types of regimes that are high or low in terms of one attribute, but not necessarily of others.[21] The behavioral nature of the criteria makes them empirically more meaningful than legalistic distinctions derived from constitutional law. The foregoing typology gives equal emphasis to tendencies toward full legitimacy and tendencies toward repudiation. Whereas Easton refers to the possibility that *essential variables* in a political system can be "pushed beyond what we may designate as their critical range," he does not investigate the process further; instead, he literally assigns such systems to "a limbo."[22]

Concentrating attention upon the authority of regimes is a research strategy of the middle range. It does not promise the relevance of global theories of social, economic, and political change, but it at least avoids the confusion that often arises in stream-of-consciousness theories that,

[20] It is noteworthy that of the 133 nations for which population figures are reported by the Yale Data Program, 39 have an estimated error-range of more than 10 percent. See Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964) 15ff.

[21] See Richard Rose, "Modern Nations and the Study of Political Modernization," in Stein Rokkan, ed., *Comparative Research Across Cultures and Nations* (Paris 1968), 125-26.

[22] Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, 24, 223.

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à la Finnegan's Wake, attempt to recapitulate the whole of human experience.[23] The approach starts from the parsimonious assumption that social, economic, and social-psychological conditions should be studied by political scientists—*in so far as* they affect the authority of a political regime. The central importance of the regime in politics is indicated by the fact that a number of recent studies of political change have shown a concern with regime-functions cognate to support and compliance: stability, institutionalization, capabilities affecting the social system generally, mobilizational capacity, and effectiveness. It is also relevant to note that the authority of regimes has been a central problem in political theory at least since the time of Aristotle and Polybius.

II

In considering the dynamic characteristics of the authority of a regime, it is necessary to make some preliminary assumptions concerning the amount and the direction (or directions) of changes requiring explanation. The two-dimensional basis of the classification guards against the Couéist assumption that all regimes are every day becoming more and more legitimate in every way. Logically, there are four directions in which regimes can move: legitimation, isolation, coercion, or repudiation. The majority of categories distinguished above are intermediate and thus, by implication, liable to change. A disrupted regime would be expected to move toward repudiation, a partially legitimate regime toward full legitimacy, but the direction in which intermittently legitimate, divided, or semi-coercive regimes might move is far less certain. Furthermore, among the four extreme categories, only one—a fully repudiated regime—can be said to have reached a terminal position, because it belongs to the historic past. It is unlikely that an isolated regime with high support and low compliance would, in the modern world, maintain such a position indefinitely. The dissonance between support and compliance in a coercive regime also invites much speculation about probable change in authority. A fully legitimate regime, such as Sweden or New Zealand, may appear "locked in" to full legitimacy, yet there can be no undated guarantee that its authority could not diminish.

Unfortunately, in the social sciences today, generalizations about changes in the authority of regime are often dynamic yet still ahistorical, because they are based upon socialization models that posit changes

[23] Cf. the very strong argument advanced against global theories by Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (October 1968).

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in individuals, but not gradual or discontinuous changes in regimes or in the larger environment of which both are a part.[24] Moreover, studies of socialization have to date tended to assume that learning processes have benign results, from the regime's point of view, making adolescents into fully allegiant subjects of a fully legitimate regime.[25] Typically, events occurring before the birth of subjects are also assumed to be sources of loyalty and unity. In many states of the world today, however, the totality of potential subjects have not undergone benign socialization experiences nor do they have a benign inheritance in their political culture. In some, regime-leaders are confronted with a population socialized into a political culture or subculture definitely antithetical to the regime. In all countries, the cumulative effect of past events tends to delimit the course or options of populations and regime-leaders. As Rokkan has shown, in Europe the bases of support or rejection of a regime can be traced back as far as the sixteenth-century Reformation.[26]

The universe from which one can draw generalizations concerning the directional tendency, if any, of political regimes is limited. Time for long observation is crucial, since few regimes reach full legitimacy, coercion, or repudiation in a short time. England faced its greatest civil war more than four hundred years after Magna Carta, and the American Civil War began seventy-two years after the inauguration of the regime. Today one can say that these regimes have moved to full legitimacy. But we cannot speak with confidence about the trends in the authority of regimes in long-established states such as France, Italy, or Hungary. The only information that can be gained quickly about the dynamics of a regime is negative: a regime overthrown can confidently be classified as having tended toward repudiation. For operational purposes, one might adopt the assumption that no regime can be said to have avoided repudiation unless it has survived at least long enough for its existence to have influenced the conscious political memories of more than half of its present adult population. This stipulation immediately calls attention to the fact that it is premature to speak with confidence of stable directions or a stable type of authority

[24] The "best" example of this failing is a psychologically sophisticated but ethnocentric and ahistorical analysis by Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, LX (September 1966).

[25] David Easton himself has warned against this false assumption in "The Theoretical Relevance of Political Socialization," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, L (June 1968), 131ff.

[26] Stein Rokkan, "The Structuring of Mass Politics in the Smaller European Democracies: A Developmental Typology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, X (January 1968).

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in nearly any Afro-Asian or Middle Eastern country, since, except for a handful of states such as Ethiopia and Liberia, the regimes, and in many cases the states themselves, have had an independent existence for less than two decades. Only two areas of the world—Europe and Latin America—provide a sufficient number of established states to permit inductive generalization.[27]

In modern Europe, an operational definition of regime-survival (i.e., tending away from repudiation) might well be continuous existence since before the second World War, since a regime established immediately after the war will not have a substantial number of adult subjects socialized exclusively under its influence until the late 1970's. In the twenty-eight states existing in Europe—from Russia and Turkey to Ireland and Portugal—at the outbreak of the war, the biggest group moved toward repudiation of their regimes. Twenty-two states had regimes unambiguously repudiated at least once in this period. In only six states—Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, Russia, and Portugal—have regimes survived intact throughout the period. In the former three, one might say that little change was shown in type of authority. In Ireland, the regime clearly moved toward full legitimacy after a bloody civil war. The direction of change in Russia and Portugal would require a more complex assessment. In four additional states—Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium—regimes were displaced by German occupation, but were later restored. In the first three of these countries, little change in the authority of the regimes seems to have occurred. The changes in Belgium have been more considerable, involving the rise and demise of a Fascist group, the deposition of the reigning monarch and, latterly, intense communal and nationalist agitation by Flemish-speakers.[28] In three of the eighteen states where regimes were repudiated—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—the states themselves have ceased to exist, thus demonstrating the most extreme form of change. In an additional ten countries, civil wars and/or internal coups have succeeded in overthrowing the previously established regime; in some cases, such as in France and Greece, such upheavals have occurred more than once. In Albania, Bulgaria, and Roumania, foreign invasion was an immediate cause of the repudiation of a regime, but it is implausible to assert that these regimes were then moving for-

[27] The geographically isolated and historically deviant "fragment" societies are excluded here. Cf. Louis Hartz, ed., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York 1964).

[28] See Val R. Lorwin, "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven 1966).

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ward toward full legitimacy; their postwar inheritors have been moving toward coercion. In the cases of Germany and Italy, the current regimes could be said to be moving toward legitimacy—if only because both followed regimes that had lost both support and compliance in the war. Past patterns need not recur, but in the light of the events of the past few years in Western as well as Eastern and Southern Europe, one might best forecast that today regimes are tending in very different directions, some toward full legitimacy, some toward coercion, and some toward repudiation.

The trends in Europe can be checked against Latin American experience to see whether the continental wars that have twice engulfed European states in this century might not have caused the repudiation of many regimes and left a residue of regimes with less than full legitimacy. Latin American states have been remarkably free from external military attack, and their boundaries too have remained among the most stable in the world during this century. Yet in Latin America, regimes have notorious problems in securing support or compliance. A rough calculation shows that seventeen of the twenty countries there have experienced successful coups against the regime at least once since 1945.[29] The normal expectation of a regime would be that its dynamic development will lead to repudiation. It could be argued that the violent or extra-constitutional change of leadership is so common in Latin America that a change of government by *golpe* or *cuartelazo* may be as institutionalized as a European general election, and the tactical use of violence in strikes may be no more than a form of pressure-group lobbying.[30] Yet sooner or later extra-constitutional activity is likely to lead to changes in the institutions for controlling the population, and at all times the regime's claim to full support and compliance is imperfectly realized.

The clear implication of this evidence is that it is at least as important to explain why regimes are repudiated as to explain why regimes become fully legitimate; according to Dankwart Rustow, the average regime is still unable to show the basic requisite of survival, the ability to carry out a successful change in governmental leadership: "In all three parts of the world—democratic, Communist, and developing—changes of regime have been more frequent than have orderly changes

[29] Huntington, 3.

[30] Cf. H. Herring, *A History of Latin America* (New York 1963); contributions to Martin Needler, ed., *Political Systems of Latin America* (Princeton 1964); and Martin Needler, "Political Growth and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, LX (September 1966).

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of government within a continuing regime."[31] In other words, political problems most often thought to characterize the underdeveloped Afro-Asian world also recur in societies with high levels of social and economic development. Unfortunately, much scholarly writing about authority is of limited relevance to comparative politics, for it concerns deviant cases, regimes that are already fully legitimate. Moreover, such analyses usually concentrate upon the necessary but not, *ipso facto*, significant mechanisms by which full legitimacy is maintained, rather than upon the lengthy and complex historical process by which it is initially gained. As Walter Bagehot long ago noted, the techniques suitable for developing support and compliance are often very different from those required to maintain full legitimacy.[32] A newly founded regime faces a population likely to be volatile and unpredictable; an established fully legitimate regime, by contrast, faces a population that it would be very difficult to alienate from its traditional authority. Anyone who doubts this might ask himself: would it be easier to make a new regime in France or Spain fully legitimate, or to maintain the legitimacy of the existing regime, say, in Switzerland or Sweden? In devising a framework for the study of changes in authority, one should give at least as much attention to explanations of tendencies toward repudiation and coercion as to explanations of tendencies toward full legitimation.

III

In view of the amount of instability that regimes show, it is much more useful to think in terms of propositions explaining dynamic trends in the authority of regimes rather than of static explanations, which often give a misleading impression of once-for-all authority. Dynamic analyses involve the interaction of the regime's leaders, its population, the state's attributes, the larger environment, and the consequences of duration. Given the importance of multiple causes and reciprocal influences,[33] the unpretentious strategy of formulating hypotheses explaining some developmental tendencies is likely to provide more precise and more accurate generalizations, even if narrower ones, than would grander and vaguer theoretical statements. Hypotheses may attempt to explain related but different tendencies—e.g., movement

[31] "Succession in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of International Affairs*, XVIII, 1 (1964), 107. See also Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), 65.

[32] *The English Constitution* (London 1955 ed.) 4.

[33] See Andre J. F. Kobben, "The Logic of Cross-Cultural Analysis: Why Exceptions?" in Stein Rokkan, ed.

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toward repudiation or toward survival; movement toward one type of continuing regime; or trends in either the support or compliance component of authority.

The first conditions influencing the development or decay of a regime's authority are precursive ones. At its origin, the leaders of a regime must respond to five constraints arising from pre-existing conditions or givens: the prior level of public administration, socioeconomic conditions, geographical considerations, prior cultural expectations of the population, and, not least, their own previous socialization experiences. To note that these influences are, at least for the initial years of a regime's life, relatively inelastic, further underscores the weakness of ahistorical analyses.

The greater the precursive pool of civil administrators, the more likely a new regime will be to obtain compliance from its population. The prior political loyalties of administrators appear less important than their numbers. Events in twentieth-century Germany and Russia show the malleability of civil servants, even at high levels, and the unwillingness of bureaucrats to act as an institutional focus for organizing the repudiation of a regime. Numbers are also more important than skills, for a few trained elite officials can readily become isolated from masses of the population. Only a regime with a large number of administrators will be able to overcome tendencies toward excessive decentralization, leading to regime isolation in societies where communication is difficult.

Socioeconomic conditions influence the course of a regime in at least two basic ways. The greater the *aggregate* national economic resources, the more likely a regime is to have a large pool of skilled administrators. Countries with large aggregate national incomes, even if their per capita income is low, have sufficient resources to educate administrative cadres. For instance, China ranks fifth and India eighth in size of total gross national product. Thus, even though they are tied for one hundred first in terms of per capita GNP, India and China rank third and fourth, behind only America and the Soviet Union, in total numbers of pupils in higher education.[34] Precursive socioeconomic conditions also influence communications levels.[35] The better the communications network within a society, the more quickly the regime can gain or lose support and compliance, since awareness of the regime

[34] Cf. Russett and others, 149-57; and *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1965* (Paris 1966), 249-66.

[35] See Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (April 1963).

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and its regulative efforts are a *sine qua non* for subject-allegiance, and also accelerate any attempts to repudiate it. Studies by Gurr and Huntington suggest that the existing level of economic development is less important than the character of precursive changes. A population undergoing rapid social mobilization or suffering relative economic deprivation is much more likely to repudiate a regime than is one that is not subject to tensions between its wants and its material conditions.[36]

The more geographically isolated a regime is from other states, the greater its chances of survival. A regime coming to power in a state that is geographically accessible to foreign intervention is more likely to suffer interference from foreign states, with consequences disruptive of legitimacy and ultimately of the regime, as comparative studies of Turkey and Japan show.[37] Internally, the greater the spatial dispersion of opponents, the greater the short-term risk of a regime's repudiation, for it must disperse limited resources in efforts to maintain itself. The more spatially segregated are the opponents of a regime, the better the regime's short-term chance of survival, for it may contain opposition within a part of its territory. However, the concentration of opponents makes it possible for opponents to rely upon reinforcing social pressures to maintain a sense of the group's distinctiveness; hence, the greater the long-term obstacles such groups present to full legitimacy.

The stronger the traditional culture, the more likely a regime is to be repudiated if it deviates from traditional norms. Equally, the more modern the culture, the greater the likelihood that a regime can secure compliance for new regulations. In a traditional society, individuals will be easy to govern along predictable lines, because they have difficulty in conceiving of new ways to behave. New regulations will either be inconceivable and ignored, or else, as Von Vorys notes in his study of Pakistan, the idea of governmental regulation of interpersonal relations may be rejected on principle by peasants.[38] Both the Nazi and the Federal West German regimes demonstrate that populations with modern cultural orientations can adapt very rapidly to very different kinds of regimes. Whatever the stage of development, cultural divisions will also affect a regime's authority, for better or for worse. The more homogeneous the culture of a population, the more easily a regime can

[36] Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, "The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Test of a Causal Model" (Princeton, Research Monograph No. 28, 1967), and S. P. Huntington.

[37] See Robert A. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964), 437-40.

[38] Karl Von Vorys, "Toward a Concept of Political Development," *The Annals*, Vol. 348 (1965), especially pp. 16ff.

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gain *or* lose support and compliance. If the leaders govern in conformity with dominant pre-existing expectations, then support and compliance should follow. If they challenge these norms, then repudiation is more likely. If a regime comes to power in a culturally diversified state, then, in the short run, the greater the intensity and distinctiveness of the subcultures, the greater the likelihood of repudiation. If the regime is identified with the largest cultural group, then the greater the regime's long-term chances of survival with coercive or partially legitimate authority. The existence of cultural antagonisms is likely to coalesce one group behind the regime, and the persistence of domination by one group is likely to erode the minority's willingness to avoid compliance, even when it withholds support, as in the case of Northern Ireland, which is governed with the support and compliance of the Protestant majority, and the compliance but not the support of the substantial Roman Catholic minority.[39]

The precursive experiences of a new regime's leaders can take a variety of forms. The new men of power may previously have been administrators or organizers in a party or a civil service, conspirators, agitators, military men, or occasionally in nonpolitical employment. One would hypothesize that political agitators would be best at generating support but poorest at insuring compliance, because of the contrast between the skills needed for expressive agitation and the instrumental administration of compliance. In the short run, military men would seem best qualified to maintain compliance, but in the long run badly qualified to avoid repudiation because of limited experience in dealing with civil populations or exercising leadership by mobilizing support and consent.[40] Experienced political organizers and administrators would be best at developing some support and compliance, political novices worst. In theory, founders of a new regime might put together a government formed by men with the full range of backgrounds described above, since each has some use. One would hypothesize that, in practice, the more variegated the leaders in a new regime, the greater the likelihood of repudiation through dissension within the regime. For the unity of purpose that may form a coalition to repudiate a predecessor regime is unlikely to be maintained in the absence of a common foe.

The circumstances in which a new regime takes power are varied.

[39] Initial tabulations from a large survey there show that only 10 percent of the Protestants disapprove of the Constitutional position in Northern Ireland, whereas only 33 percent of the Roman Catholics approve of it.

[40] See, e.g., S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (London 1962), chap. 11; and Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington 1967), chap. 6.

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The optimal condition for achieving full legitimacy would be gradual evolution, as in the case of Britain and Sweden. Regimes founded by a struggle for independence or by a popular insurrection against a coercive regime are likely in the short run to enjoy high support; long-term forecasts are less easy to make. A regime founded by civil war should be able to develop compliance proportionate to the thoroughness of its military victory, but, at best, only partial legitimacy. A regime established by a palace *coup* is likely to be vulnerable to repudiation, since little else need change, except a demonstrably insecure palace guard, setting a pattern, perhaps, for its own repudiation. The authority of a regime founded by legal and formal means will vary depending upon the extent to which the states sanctioning the new regime take the state's precursive political circumstances into account. India and the Belgian Congo represent markedly contrasting examples.

At its foundation, the leaders of a new regime enjoy a wide range of choice in strategies of governing, as well as considerable independent influence upon the future of their new institutions. As Gurr and Ruttenberg's careful statistical analysis emphasizes, while precursive conditions outside the immediate control of the regime can instigate a degree of turmoil in a state, the chief influences affecting escalation to internal war and conspiracy to overthrow a regime are the mediating activities of the regime itself.[41] One could even argue that the greater the precursive problems of a regime, the greater the opportunity for creative and positive responses by regime leaders. Such an hypothesis has optimistic overtones attractive to many social scientists, and may lead to emphasis upon the charismatic qualities of leaders of new regimes. Yet existence of an opportunity is not a guarantee of a response equal to the challenge. Political leaders striving to establish and maintain regimes in the face of great precursive obstacles are like candidates for military medals: the greater the difficulties the greater the opportunity for glory, but the greater too the likelihood that any commendations earned will be received posthumously.

Whatever the likelihood of survival or repudiation, regime leaders enjoy considerable latitude, in the short run at least, in basic choices concerning the relative value to be placed symbolically and effectively upon support and compliance. In terms of compliance and support, four different strategies can be identified on *a priori* grounds. A popular strategy places a high valuation upon both support and compliance; a confederal strategy values support so highly that compliance demands are limited; an authoritarian regime seeks to maximize compliance

[41] Gurr and Ruttenberg, 107.

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without regard for maintaining support or compliance, and an arbitrary regime acts without regard for the need for support and compliance.[42] It is difficult to hypothesize about the consequences of goal choices for the development of a regime, beyond the general proposition that the greater the congruity between chosen goals and precursive conditions, the greater the likelihood that the goals will be at least partially achieved. The difficulty arises not only from the multi-causal nature of regime developments, but also, more narrowly, from the difficulty of distinguishing dignified, efficient political goals. For example, leaders in a new African regime may honestly intend to establish a popular government, yet, in the course of time, their effective form of government may become authoritarian or arbitrary without readily observable changes in statements professed for internal consumption and classification by Western social scientists.

The difficulties that face leaders of new regimes might best be referred to as problems. They are not necessarily functional requisites, and those that are may lead to the regime's ceasing to function, rather than to persistence. The problems are not crises in the sense of problems capable of a once-for-all solution, an unfortunate connotation in the use of this word. Moreover, there is no necessary sequence in problems of security, support and compliance, and adaptation to environmental pressures. India is an excellent example of a regime facing all these problems simultaneously. At any given time, the leaders of a new regime, like an American president, are, in Neustadt's phrase, "the prisoners of first-things-first, and almost always something else comes first."[43]

Intense external threats to security claim overriding priority in a regime, because failure can lead to the abolition of the state as well as to the repudiation of the regime. The greater the *perceived* threat to the whole population of a state, the more it will increase support and compliance with the regime. In cases where external pressures—whether military, economic, political, or cultural—divide the population of a regime, the more likely it is that the regime will be repudiated. The more the perceived threat exaggerates the actual external pressure, the more it helps a regime survive. Given the social psychological importance of the perception of a threat from outside, there is much to be said for the creation by the leaders of a new regime of the perception of an external enemy, even when such an enemy does not exist. The

[42] These deductive distinctions are not dissimilar to Apter's discussion of reconciliation and mobilization systems in *The Politics of Modernization*.

[43] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York 1960), 155.

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difficulty with this strategy is that scapegoating measures may appear realistic to the leaders of the regime. Since, as Coser notes, the less realistic the conflict the more rigid the means used to combat it, a regime involved in a highly unrealistic conflict could pursue rigid and even self-destroying policies.[44]

The probability of an internal security threat is high at the foundation of a regime since its birth does not insure that people accustomed to comply with or support a precursor regime will, *ipso facto*, do the same with its successor. In meeting this problem, a new regime has three broad alternatives: co-option, coercion, or a show of unconcern. The less the threat to internal security, the more a new regime is likely to survive by showing unconcern, for such a strategy avoids the unpopularity often aroused by efforts to coerce a minority. Yet, paradoxically, a regime taking power after a coercive civil war is likely to survive. Once badly beaten, the losers in a civil war will be easily coerced, even if their support cannot be gained. The hypothesis is supported by the maintenance of regimes for long periods after especially bloody civil wars in nineteenth-century America, and in twentieth-century Ireland, Spain, and Yugoslavia. Where potentially subversive groups are under identifiable leadership, co-option of these leaders is most likely to increase support and compliance for a regime. When rebel leaders are few in number or weak in conviction, offers of co-option are likely to succeed. Conversely, the more numerous or extreme the disaffected, the less ready their leaders will be to accept co-option. Numbers give promise of repudiating the new regime, and extreme positions make it difficult for leaders to accept co-option (if they are biddable) without themselves being repudiated by their anti-regime followings. Coercion, in the form of incarceration, exile, or execution of opponents, promises a final solution—if it can be made to work. The greater the mass support for subversive leaders, the more difficult coercion becomes, since a mass cannot be executed or imprisoned. It can only be deprived of leaders or have members punished at random, and both strategies are likely to intensfy the desire of those not physically constrained to repudiate the regime. Yet massive coercion is the policy a regime is mostly likely to adopt in the face of massive rebellion. A mass rebellion met by massive coercion is likely to move a regime rapidly either to full coercion or to full repudiation.

Even in the absence of clear and present threats to security, the maintenance and development of compliance remains a problem in

[44] Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill. 1956), chaps. 3 and 5.

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new regimes. If forced to choose, most rulers would probably prefer to command obedience than popularity, for a regime with high compliance places societal resources effectively at the disposal of the regime leaders. Managing compliance, like managing the economy, requires skill and luck as well as more tangible resources. The greater the technical and administrative resources available, including political parties, the more likely a regime is to survive through coercing compliance. Resources are important because, as Kornhauser has demonstrated, the more elites have access to a mass population, the more readily the latter can be influenced.[45] The ratio of coercive force applied to that required is important, for, as the Feierabends have demonstrated, the greater the gap between coercion applied and that necessary, the more likely a regime is to be repudiated.[46] The duration of coercion is also important, for theories of cognitive dissonance suggest that while individual support and compliance may be in conflict in the short run, gradually the two will become aligned, by changes in cross-pressured individuals and, in aggregate, by changes in intergenerational patterns of socialization. The longer a regime can remain in power, the more the turnover of generations works to its advantage, for its presence becomes normal in a cognitive sense and, one may hypothesize, increasingly in a normative sense as well. Eastern European countries exposed to Communist regimes for more than two decades are now at a point providing interesting tests of this hypothesis. In states with few resources, a regime is more likely to avoid repudiation by reducing the number of basic political laws requiring compliance than by ineffectual efforts to apply coercion.

Cataloguing the means by which a new regime can seek support and thus gain voluntary compliance can be misleading, for the discount rate between support sought and support achieved is often extremely high. (The literature concerning the relative immunity of individuals to political influence through the mass media provides a useful cautionary example.) It is important to emphasize that Weber, in his rightly influential discussion of the means by which a regime *might* be legitimated, did not contend that these means would inevitably and equally be effective.[47] Social scientists studying a regime

[45] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (London 1960).

[46] Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "The Relationship of Systemic Frustration, Political Coercion, International Tension, and Political Instability: A Cross-National Study" (American Psychological Association 1966), mimeo.

[47] The following draws upon Weber's classification of modes of orientation to social action, as well as his classification of bases of legitimacy. Cf. 115ff and 324ff. of *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.*

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are sometimes more impressed by the efforts of regime-leaders to obtain support than are the intended potential subjects.

A new regime can rarely seek support on legal grounds, for nearly all are born illegitimate, acquiring a dignified legality only by the retrospective rewriting of history. At most, an established—especially a fully legitimate—regime, may find legal claims useful in reinforcing support and even compliance. For example, in Britain politicians will challenge the wisdom of Cabinet decisions but not advocate noncompliance with governmental actions meeting formal criteria of legality.[48] Traditional claims to authority are also difficult to assert in a new regime, since by definition it will have broken a cake of custom in establishing its authority. David Apter has imaginatively argued that the usufruct of tradition may be enjoyed in new regimes by associating traditional symbols with the nontraditional regime.[49] When traditional symbols are unavailable or else unsuitable, support may be sought by the development of new affect-arousing symbols, whether verbal, e.g., a new "ism" or a new national plan, or material, e.g., an army, an airport, or a Hilton Hotel. Given the scarcity of resources in new regimes, expressive symbols are more likely to be effective than are material symbols. In both cases, the communication of symbol-awareness and symbol-affect is a necessary precondition to secure massive support by such a means. The same is true of the use of the persona of the leader as a charismatic means of support. A personalized appeal is likely to be popular with simplifiers of Weber's theory as well as with egocentric political leaders, though not necessarily with their lieutenants. Charisma is unlikely to provide a durable basis of regime-support. Regimes primarily dependent upon the charisma of a leader for support will quite likely be repudiated for, as Weber noted, if a leader "is for long unsuccessful, above all, if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear."[50] Because all leaders will be associated with failures as well as successes, men dependent primarily upon divine claims will be peculiarly vulnerable to rejection during a period of setbacks. Efforts to claim charismatic attributes for a central institution of the regime, such as a party, are more likely to succeed in obtaining support. In the face of failure, the leader himself can be the scapegoat for the movement, while others in the party carry on the regime. Parties are also useful in building support

[48] See Richard Rose, *Politics in England* (Boston 1964), 232-33.

[49] See David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," *World Politics* XII (October 1960).

[50] *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 360. Cf. Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order* (Chicago 1966), 137ff.

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for the regime by engendering commitment to absolute values (*wertrational*). The difficulty is that support claimed on this basis may contradict claims to support on immediate calculations of instrumental utility (*zweckrational*). For example, the absolute end of economic development is likely to be of little material value to an individual in a calculable length of time, since his per capita share of any increment will be small, especially when national development involves capital investment in public goods, such as steel mills, rather than in less productive items, such as food. The Soviet regime is exceptional in having avoided repudiation while carrying through a lengthy industrialization program. It did so, however, at the cost of very repressive measures, involving millions of deaths and much disaffection. More support for the regime was probably generated by the response to the German invasion in 1941 than by earlier industrializing efforts. On balance, it seems safest to hypothesize that short-term instrumental incentives are more likely to build support than are long-term absolute goals, except where these goals have a peculiar cultural salience, as in the case of the Holy War against Israel. "Buying" support with short-term favors may, however, be counterproductive from the point of view of economic development. Such a conflict is only one of many that leaders of new regimes must grapple with.

Since the authority of a regime is a relational property, it is affected by pressures around it, as well as by its own efforts. It is perhaps better to speak of externally induced difficulties as "strains" rather than demands, for often difficulties result from persisting or structural incongruities, and not from actively articulated political claims. People who organize to make demands upon a regime are, after all, implying at least a modicum of compliance and support. The most difficult problems for a regime arise when no demands are directed at it, for then it is governing a parochial people with no feedback. Strains may take two very different forms. On the one hand, political strains may arise because of inconsistencies within individual members of the population. Alternatively, strains may arise because of the coexistence of groups of individuals whose internally consistent orientations are in conflict with each other. The prevalence of individual ambivalence should lead to greater fluctuations in the pattern of authority of a regime, as in France, whereas strains resulting from conflict among two groups would promote less change in imperfectly legitimate regimes, because of a lack of room for maneuver in bipolar conflicts, as in Northern Ireland. Where strains exist among a larger number of groups, the possible outcomes for the regime range from full legitimacy

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to full repudiation, since the absence of a single dominant group could lead to a bargaining, consociational regime high in support and in compliance, if handled shrewdly by leaders, or to a situation in which centrifugal pressures repudiated the regime, and perhaps the state as well.[51]

As strains become great between the *de jure* population and the *de facto* subjects of a political system, then the likelihood of repudiation increases. Unfortunately, the use of political-systems language has not sufficiently emphasized this point. David Easton, for example, defines the population of a political system in terms of its subjects, i.e., "politically relevant persons," overlooking the political relevance of a state's failure to make nominal subjects actually subject to its authority.[52] Problems of boundary-maintenance are also important, with internal or external war threatened by *de facto* political systems cutting across state boundaries. The eventual failure of Hitler's irredentist Pan-German policy has reduced the salience of such strain in Europe, but not in Africa.[53]

When the population of a regime is grouped into two or more ethnic communities, the probability of moving toward full legitimacy is low, and the likelihood of division or repudiation high. Whereas a regime faced with noncompliance by a parochial population still retains a central strategic position, a regime faced with lack of support or compliance from a segment of its population with alternative centers of loyalty faces a much greater challenge. Outside the continents of old states, Europe and the Americas, strains between state and national identifications are pervasive. In the remaining seventy-eight states, at least sixty lack a homogeneous ethnic population, as indicated by the fact that they are less than 90 percent homogeneous in terms of language. At least thirty of these states are subject to very strong multi-ethnic strains, for the largest single linguistic-communal group constitutes less than half the state's population.[54] From the point of view of the leaders of a new regime, "nation-building," i.e., the creation of a new state-wide communal loyalty among a population, is not practicable as a short-term strategy. As Nordlinger notes, "Not only is it highly unlikely that a national identity can be created in a space of

[51] Cf. Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies*, I (April 1968); and Eric Nordlinger, *Working Class Tories* (London 1967), 212ff.

[52] *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, 154.

[53] See Aristide Zolberg, 131ff.; and Henry Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?" *World Politics*, XX (October 1967), 133ff.

[54] Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations*, 284-87.

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a few years, but the attempt to do so is likely to usher in the unhappy consequences of repressive rule and exacerbation of potentially violent divisions."[55] None of the alternative strategies available to such leaders is immediately attractive. Leaders may keep demands for support and compliance minimal, in order to avoid repudiation by minimizing opportunities for communal friction to enter politics. Carried to an extreme, this would involve acceptance of secession. Yet, as and when secession is attempted, the leaders of a regime are likely to fight strongly for preservation of the state. As the Nigerian civil war has shown, preserving the state may involve a bloody price. A regime may decide to forego hopes of multi-ethnic support and seek to compel compliance through coercion by a dominant ethnic group; this avoids repudiation, but also makes full legitimacy remote. Efforts to build senses of identity of a higher order are not costly in terms of coercive resources, but are likely to succeed only when a regime, for other reasons, has two other rare resources—time and isolation from other disruptive influences. In the course of generations, ethnic tensions may be ameliorated sufficiently to build support by a change in the aggregate distribution of different ethnic communities within the society. For instance, England constituted about 53 percent of the United Kingdom in 1801, but today constitutes about 84 percent of it.[56]

A considerable literature has developed concerning the possible relationship between the authority of a regime and claims to authority by extra-political institutions. In theory, authoritative claims of the regime and the claims of other social institutions might be related in any one of sixteen ways, as Gibbs has shown in his discussion of law and normative phenomena generally.

TABLE II. RELATIONS BETWEEN REGIMES AND OTHER REGULATIVE INSTITUTIONS*

Regime regulations are:	PRESCRIPTIVE	CONDITIONAL	PERMISSIVE	PROSCRIPTIVE
Non-regime regulations are:				
PRESCRIPTIVE	Reinforcement	Limited	No effect	Conflict
CONDITIONAL	Limited	Limited	No effect	Limited
PERMISSIVE	No effect	No effect	No effect	No effect
PROSCRIPTIVE	Conflict	Limited	No effect	Reinforcement

* Adapted from Jack Gibbs, "The Sociology of Law and Normative Phenomena," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (June 1966), 323.

[55] Eric Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 507.

[56] On this point, see Richard Rose, "Class and Party Divisions: Britain as a Test Case," *Sociology*, II (May 1968), 138-43. Note also Richard Morse "The Heritage of Latin America," in Louis Hartz, ed., 138.

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While a typological matrix cannot be used as evidence about the frequency of any one type of relationship, there is ample scope for both regime-leaders and leaders of other social institutions to avoid direct conflicts among their respective claims to authority, for only two of the sixteen cells imply necessary conflict; the largest category consists of situations in which claims are unrelated, a finding consistent with the definitional stipulation that institutions outside the political system are not primarily concerned with pursuing political goals. Historically, church-state relationships have been the greatest source of conflict for support and compliance from cross-pressured subjects. The decline in religious commitment supports the hypothesis that regime leaders are unlikely to face institutionalized extra-political opposition; for better or worse, their opponents will be within the political system.

Another source of postulated strain can arise from conflicts between patterns of behavior in face-to-face or extra-political social subsystems and norms of the political regime. Verba's review of the literature of experimental small groups provides ample cautions about the dangers of generalizing from any type of small-group relationship to politics.[57] Harry Eckstein's recent research provides a much more formidable argument. At the risk of over-condensation, one might say that Eckstein has suggested that patterns of authority in subsystems most adjacent to the political system are likely to affect the stability of a regime. (Stability is not identical with support and compliance, but the terms overlap considerably in meaning.) When there is a graduated resemblance between the regime and extra-political patterns, government will be more stable, but it will be unstable if there are considerable strains between adjacent patterns.[58] The limitation in Eckstein's theory is that it is better suited to explain how regimes become legitimate and, *a fortiori*, how they remain legitimate. It is less suited to explain short-run changes in regime structure, for the types of social relations that Eckstein discusses are unlikely to change except as between generations, whereas regimes and regime-subject relations can change more quickly. On grounds of parsimony, it would seem reasonable to regard social authority patterns as relatively remote in a field of factors causing regimes to survive or be repudiated.

The implications for authority of changes in socioeconomic conditions are by no means simple. As Davies argues, subjects on a bare-

[57] Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton 1961).

[58] See Harry Eckstein's appendix, "A Theory of Stable Democracy," in his *Division and Cohesion in Democracy* (Princeton 1966), and his "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance: a Theoretical Framework" (Princeton, Workshop on the Social Bases of Stable Rule, 1968), mimeo., especially 28ff.

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subsistence level lack the physical energy to repudiate their leaders.[59] In countries with low standards of living, subjects and potential subjects in the populations must first be aware of the possibility of social and economic change before they can desire it. Judging by findings concerning parochialism in Italy and Mexico (not to mention the difficulty that many Western politicians have had in understanding development-economics in their own countries), it seems implausible that regimes with low absolute and per capita income will face loss of support on the basis of failure to meet rising economic expectations. Gurr's research supports this strongly: "We found no evidence that any particular level of economic performance is a necessary, sufficient, or strongly disposing condition for civil peace."[60] As Huntington and others have argued, threats to regimes arise from social mobilization (e.g., increasing urbanization and literacy), giving rise in turn to social and economic expectations which, if frustrated, can then lead to the withdrawal of support and compliance, or to support for radical changes in forms of politics. The problem is dramatically illustrated in America today by the growing noncompliance of American Negroes. This has been caused not by a fall in their living standards, but rather by their mobilization into Northern urban centers, where higher living standards encourage higher expectations than does life in the rural South, and thus provide the stimulus for higher levels of frustration and political disaffection. Unfortunately, the West German regime is atypical or even unique in originating in circumstances in the late 1940's when a very rapid rise in economic wellbeing promptly followed establishment of the regime. Most of the newest regimes today, the ones most vulnerable to repudiation, are also regimes with fewest material resources, in both absolute and per capita terms. Faced with the prospect of losing authority in the initial stages of promoting economic development, regime-leaders *might* calculate that the lower their existing level of support and compliance, the less encouragement should be given to social change. Such hypotheses cannot always be correct, for some regime-leaders may not calculate that development plans threaten their political downfall, and others may think themselves not powerful enough to decelerate or halt existing patterns of mobilization.

Given difficulties in buying support by public sector investment or raising private living standards, regime-leaders might be expected to seek to ameliorate strains by developing the regime's capabilities to maintain compliance through civil, military, and police action. In the

[59] James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York 1963) chap. 1.
[60] Ted Gurr and Charles Ruttenberg, 108. Note also, S. P. Huntington, 47ff.

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long run, this can be regarded as part of the infrastructure of development. In the short run, it is simply a bulwark against repudiation.

To develop support, regime-leaders may try to proffer psychic payoffs to their potential subjects. This is appropriate, for symbols are often inexpensive and many strains between a regime and its population are likely to have nonmaterial sources. A substantial American literature suggests that democratic political institutions may themselves be an important source of attracting support. In Gurr's precise language, noncompliance and nonsupport would "vary inversely with the availability of institutional mechanisms that permit the expression of nonviolent hostility."[61] Concern with political processes (especially democratic ones) is reasonable among political scientists, given their education and professional biases. It does not follow that it is also reasonable to expect this among less educated people outside the Anglo-American world. As Sam Barnes has shown, even in a Western country such as Italy, Socialist party activists may define democracy in terms of substantive outcomes rather than process features.[62] Where education is even lower, and democracy is likely to be culturally alien, a concern with process is likely to be even less important. In such environments, a regime seeking to provide the substance of public order through enforced compliance may, if successful, win support more readily than would a regime seeking to stimulate popular participation in government without regard to its effect on public order. Moreover, in the many societies where populations are in zero-sum conflicts about important expressive concerns, no process short of the redefinition of goals so that victory for one is not defeat for the other side, or a test of arms, is likely to prove conclusive. The circumstances of the partially legitimate regime in Northern Ireland provide an apt illustration. In a country where the two-thirds who are Protestant overwhelmingly support the regime, and the Catholic third do not, free elections do not ameliorate conflict, for the same party has won every general election held since 1922, and the chief opposition party does not like to be called loyal. Where democratic forms provide no substantive redress, extra-legal noncompliance is likely—a lesson as true in American race relations as in Irish political history.[63] In the last resort, *what* a regime does to ameliorate basic strains is more likely to affect its survival than *how* it attempts to do so.

[61] Ted Gurr, "Psychological Conditions in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, xx (January 1968), 269.

[62] Samuel Barnes, *Party Democracy* (New Haven 1967), 174ff.

[63] See, e.g., Arthur I. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-In, 1919 and the 1960's* (New York 1966), 278f.

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In a dynamic analysis it is especially important to note that many of the constraints affecting the *future* resolution of contemporary problems of authority arise from precursive conditions. These determine the immediate problems facing leaders of new regimes, and exert a substantial influence upon later developments affecting both the regime and its population. Even when historical analysis provides explanations for full legitimacy, as in the case of Britain or Norway, the last line in the explanation is itself completely deflating: "Then allow to simmer gently for several centuries."[64] Contemporary actions of a regime can only accumulate influence slowly, even at high rates of compounding. By contrast, difficulties arising from security threats, level of socioeconomic development, cultural orientations, and communal conflicts have already been compounding for generations. In a modern society, social scientists may prefer to overlook the past because the moral is pessimistic, and subjects may put it out of mind because they tend to be relatively adaptable. But most new regimes are not founded in extremely modern societies; one attribute of premodern populations is that historical fatalism and noncalculating outlooks are likely to be pervasive.

Formally speaking, the greater the number of precursive and contemporary influences tending toward repudiation, the lower a regime's chances of survival. And, as LaPalombara and Weiner note, "One of the great paradoxes of political development is that newly formed governments, that is, governments with the least experience, are typically faced with the severest loads."[65] Unfortunately, the regimes with the severest loads also tend to be those with the fewest capabilities. One would hypothesize that in such circumstances, the greater the gap between resources and loads, then the greater the priority that regime-leaders will give to short-term *ad hoc* strategies for survival. A regime can give priority to socioeconomic development only *after* it has solved its pressing political problems—unless it wishes to run a high risk of repudiation. The use of probabilistic language is a continuing reminder that, quite apart from the inadequacies of individual hypotheses, regimes may survive or become fully legitimate in exceptional circumstances, thanks to the active efforts of leaders as well as to fortuitous historical events. Yet for most regime-leaders, what Halpern calls "treading water," i.e., avoiding repudiation without

[64] See, e.g., Harry Eckstein; and Richard Rose, "England: A Traditionally Modern Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965).

[65] Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton 1966), 427.

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necessarily increasing support or compliance, may be the most realistic goal. The practice is often made easier by the fact that conscious activities leading to the full repudiation of a regime are also difficult to carry to fruition. A regime can tread water for a long while in a category between full legitimacy and full repudiation. And, as Halpern notes, "treading water effectively and for a long time may well be one of the highest tests of statesmanship in the Middle East. There are no simple ways out."[66]

To suggest that rational political leaders in new regimes should give far more attention to maintaining compliance and, if possible, support than to schemes of social and economic development is not to assert that all leaders of new regimes are rational. On balance, actions designed for self-preservationist ends seem more frequent in politics today than do successful policies of social development. Given the indifferent success or outright failure of so many development plans, it seems reasonable to work from a self-preservationist and risk-avoiding assumption. Such an assumption is not exclusive to new regimes in new states. It has been recognized at least since the time of Machiavelli, and has most recently and elegantly been celebrated by Anthony Downs in *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. If Western politicians are expected and allowed to maximize short-term benefits, then how much greater an allowance should be made in states in which the risks of repudiation of the regime itself are much greater, and the penalties for loss far higher than in a Western election. Such behavior may preclude much hope of the rapid flowering of fully legitimate modern regimes throughout the world. At least it offers political leaders hope that through the practice of time-honored prudential tactics, something may be saved rather than all being lost.

[66] Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton 1963), 358-359.

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THE STUDY OF COMPLIANCE MAINTENANCE AS A STRATEGY FOR COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

By DEANE E. NEUBAUER AND LAWRENCE D. KASTNER

THE focus of this article is upon the compliance-inducing mechanisms present in any political system. The notion of compliance relationships is central to all conceptualizations of the political system and its functions, as it is related to all political "primitives" such as power, influence, authority, etc. Political systems exist above all for the purpose of establishing compliance with some set of norms or values. The primary institutional form reflecting the performance of this function is government. Members of governmental institutions attempt to maintain the compliance system (a) because of the security of habits, and (b) because they share the same set of norms or values. For a number of reasons the efforts of these actors to maintain the compliance system may not be coordinated: they may or may not act "rationally" according to the criteria of rationality applied, but the end product of their activity is a stream of demands for compliance that is oriented toward the enhancement of a desired normative system.

In general we can speak of a continuum of compliance-inducement mechanisms around which more or less stable interactive situations can be structured. At the one end of the continuum are what might be referred to as "voluntary compliance mechanisms"—mechanisms that do little more than provide information about the situation for the recipient of a demand, which information in turn evokes a voluntary inducement to comply with the specific request, demand, or order. The other end of the continuum is identified by the instruments of coercion, including force and violence. Clearly, there is a similar continuum of responses from the recipient of demands, ranging from immediate obedience to armed resistance.

It is obvious that compliance is not costless. Even "voluntary compliance mechanisms" impose some costs, such as the "objective" cost of printing up and distributing billboards, law books, or whatever is needed to communicate the demand. "Involuntary cost mechanisms" are still more expensive, and resistance from the populace raises these costs. Politicians are aware that resources are limited, and it is safe to assume that they will desire to minimize compliance costs. Logically,

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then, they will favor voluntary compliance over involuntary compliance. Governments over time will seek to rely upon voluntary compliance mechanisms in order to spread their limited resources as far as possible.

There are many factors that determine exactly how politicians do choose to allocate their resources and which compliance mechanisms they choose to employ. For example, ideology may dictate that compliance be more extensive than a simple and abstract cost-benefit analysis would suggest. Also, politicians may easily mistake the amount of resistance a particular proposal will meet. By and large, an attempt to find an optimal point of cost minimization seems doomed to failure as a political process. Politicians instead muddle along with various intuitive notions of what is possible. ("The people won't stand for it," "The time is not ripe," or "Two steps forward and one step backward" are familiar manifestations of this less strict calculus.) At a minimum, it can be stated that governments (always meaning actors in roles) desire and frequently seek to drive down compliance costs over the whole range of compliance activities. Before going on to examine the relevance of the cost-minimization goal for comparative research, it might be best to review some further influences on the compliance strategies employed by governments.

The motivations for compliance experienced by the recipient of a compliance demand may be as complex as those at the origin of the demand. Actor A might comply with actor's B's demand simply because he sees no reason not to; that is, there is nothing at stake. Actor A may see that he will directly benefit from compliance with B's demand. Actor A might comply because B threatens his well-being, etc. This list is hardly meant to be exhaustive.[1] Nor is there a simple relationship implied between A's motivation and B's compliance mechanism, for A might misperceive B's actions or vice versa (hence the possibility of "mistakes" or irrationality in a government's attempt to minimize compliance costs). The key to the stability of the control structure between the generalized A and B and between governments and citizens lies in the fulfillment of one or both of two conditions: (a) the "led" perceive the requests, demands, and orders of the leaders for compliance as legitimate and comply with them voluntarily, or (b) the leaders are capable of forcing compliance on the vast majority of the populace. The two are related. Demonstrations of force at one time may lead to voluntary compliance, or, at least, compliance with-

[1] See especially Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950).

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out a show of force. Legitimacy can be established only after a sustained period of effective government, which in the interim may have to rely upon involuntary compliance mechanisms.

There are, of course, some commonsense limits to the compliance cost level that can be sustained by individual political systems. A political system exists and interacts with at least three other kinds of systems from which it draws resources and which in turn consume its outputs: the economic system, the social system, and the international system. The empirical characteristics of these three related systems affect the amount of resources available to the political system to perform all its tasks, including compliance maintenance. Some political systems—for example, those newly created in an environment of a fractionated, poorly integrated social system and a nonindustrial economic system (the circumstance of most African countries in the postwar period)—are likely to possess very limited political resources to expand upon compliance maintenance. If compliance demands are intolerably high in the view of the recipients and are therefore resisted, the ability of the governmental authority to sustain the expenditure of resources at this high level may quite quickly reach its limit. Furthermore, the expenditure of compliance resources in one sector may reduce the amount available to establish and maintain minimal compliance relationships in other sectors.

Similarly, a government's capability for establishing and maintaining any particular pattern of compliance relationships is a function of the role that government performs in the international system. If this role is an active, low-statused one, for example, the government may find that many basic compliance-related factors are influenced by the context of these external relationships. A minor power dependent upon a major power may have its foreign policy and involvement decided *de facto* by the major power, may be equally dependent for the support of its internal security forces, and may even become little more than an economic satellite. All such dependencies directly affect the nature of the compliance relationships built up between a government and its citizenry. In a similar manner active major powers can and do become involved in basic international policy sets that may be perceived by substantial segments of the population as representing interests contrary to their own. Demands upon the population flowing from such obligations may strain and even rupture "normal" and long-standing compliance relationships. Yet, for the government, despite its generalized long-run propensity to endure low compliance costs, the choice between reestablishing "normal" compliance relations and

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altering basic policy sets may not be a realizable choice; the logic of the international commitment, involving as it does actors engaged in their own muted compliance system, frequently does not permit unilateral policy alteration. Examples of both situations abound, as do those illustrating the interaction of compliance structures and occurrences within the social and economic systems. The important point to be made is that while any government enjoys some range of alternatives with respect to the structure of the compliance system it desires to establish and maintain, that range of alternatives is always under externally imposed constraints.

To repeat, there is always some set of options available for the pursuit of conscious goals. These options take substance from the kinds of compliance mechanisms deemed necessary for the particular set of political tasks at hand, and from the costs of creating and using these mechanisms, depending upon the level of resources available to the system. Despite the lack of attention to the controlled and "rational" allocation of compliance resources, political leaders do in fact manipulate a variety of compliance mechanisms on the basis of their intuitively perceived costs for the purpose at hand, and it is the appropriate matching of costs with resources that seems to account for the ability of some polities to develop more rapidly or effectively than others.

We can make two further points. First, the amount of compliance resources available for employment is affected by limitations placed upon the use of high-cost compliance mechanisms stipulated in the "rules of the game." In constitutional democratic political systems in which the bias of the control relationship is presumed to be toward the citizenry, certain forms of direct central-government coercion are deemed contrary to the rules of the game (the cost to the central authority of employing them is "too high"). In other kinds of political systems, no prohibitions are placed directly upon the employment of high-cost compliance mechanisms, but their use is limited by the ability to convince other groups within the population that the group or individual subjected to enforced compliance is being legitimately acted upon. This is inevitably accomplished through the employment of some sanctioned symbol-set (ideology) that establishes the ranking of favored groups within the population and thus implicitly establishes the cost to the central authority of acting against them with high-cost compliance mechanisms. Low-ranked groups can be set upon "legitimately" since their low status is established and verified by the norms that in this case stand as the rules of the game (e.g., German Jews,

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Russian Kulaks, American Indians, and American Negroes). This observation introduces the second point: compliance mechanisms are both symbolic and material. The two points are related in complicated ways, one of which is the manner in which central symbols are embedded in the organizing rules of the game to legitimize the use of material compliance mechanisms. Individuals and groups voluntarily comply with requests, demands, and orders because (for whatever reason) they perceive the request, demand, or order as "right," "just," "expected," etc. The more highly developed and implemented are the dominant symbol-sets that define the purpose and activities of a government, the greater will be the number of activities and policies that can be justified in terms of those symbols, and thus the greater will be the probability of inducing voluntary compliance to new governmental programs and policies (keeping their compliance costs low).

It is at this juncture that we can see clearly the relationship of those compliance mechanisms that operate primarily in the political system and those that are the product of other groups and structures within society. In so-called "highly integrative" societies there appears to be a close correspondence between the compliance demands expressed through governmental activity and the expectations of the population with respect to those demands.[2] This close correspondence results in part from the existence of fairly high levels of agreement on the "legitimate" content of compliance demands, which in turn is a reflection of the acceptance by the governmental sector of those symbols, beliefs, and values sanctioned by society or vice versa. In slightly different terms, the highly integrative characteristics of such societies reflect a widespread sharing of legitimacy symbols so that the government does not attempt to include within the scope of its compliance demands those behaviors deemed the province of other social institutions. The mutual reinforcement of belief and expectations results in an overall reduction of compliance costs as (a) abortive attempts to gain compliance in "nonlegitimate" areas are avoided, and (b) other social institutions contribute to the maintenance of "normal" relationships. Nonintegrative societies, on the other hand, are frequently characterized by (a) multiple and competing legitimacy symbol sets, (b) disagreement over the legitimate scope of governmental compliance demands, and (c) relatively widespread citizen-reaction to those sets of governmental compliance demands perceived to be outside the legiti-

[2] Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLVIII (March 1965), 52-64.

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mate scope.[3] With respect to this point, basic and important social groupings generate compliance expectations not shared by the governmental sector, and thus serve to raise the overall level of compliance costs in the political system.

How does the above framework compare with some of the current comparative government models? First, the framework is not deterministic; it assumes that important actors within the political system have considerable discretion to choose what are deemed to be appropriate compliance mechanisms, to justify and rationalize them by whatever standards seem relevant, and to modify them when it is judged appropriate to do so. Second, the measure or standard for assessing the "level" of compliance is clear; the compliance "success" of a system is determined by the cost of compliance-inducing mechanisms per unit of return controlling for scope of activity. Third, this framework is capable of application across the whole range of political systems by virtue of the fact that the standard for determining compliance in any given political system can be taken as given. Thus, it is a matter of indifference whether the institutional form of the political system is Communist, liberal-democratic, one-party, multi-party, etc. The range of behavior over which any government attempts or desires to exert compliance is taken as given. What we are interested in is the ratio between this institutionalized expectation and the costs paid to obtain it. Thus, if a regime accepts as its goals the eradication of "unofficial" political opposition, the centralization of the economy, and the subjugation of all other social groups to those sanctioned by the regime, our interest is in the examination of the kinds of compliance mechanisms necessary (or deemed necessary) to accomplish the task (terror, imprisonment, hyperactive socialization agencies, etc.) for the purpose of estimating or approximating some expectation-return ratio. We can then compare this compliance-cost ratio with that of other regimes that employ differing standards of value and differing compliance expectations. Finally, the framework has room for, and manifestly provides a linkage for, a number of concepts and their respective "literatures" that heretofore have not been well integrated. We have already indicated the role of legitimacy and socialization. The framework also supplies a linkage for which the late V. O. Key long pleaded on behalf of the concept of "public opinion" (and the attendant studies of propaganda). Clearly the opinion of the mass

[3] Many have written about the problem of legitimacy, but perhaps none so well as Seymour Martin Lipset. For example, see his "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (March 1959) 69-105.

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publics is one factor in determining whether compliance is forthcoming. Political leaders may or may not value public opinion despite the prescriptions of democratic theory, yet undoubtedly they may use public opinion as a gauge of compliance costs. The slippery concept of stability may also be applied, so that we might talk about the stability of compliance costs and demands, etc.

The compliance framework rests upon the primary assumption that compliance maintenance is a root function of any political system. Despite differences in their preferred terminology, most commentators seem to agree at least on some central place for such a function. A subtle problem is raised, however, when we consider the extent to which this formulation contradicts some of the basic value-pretensions (if not the practices) of liberal democracy. One implication of the "open society"/"permissive conflict" argument of liberal democracy is that a mature democratic political system should be able to tolerate a certain amount of noncompliance on various issues. Thus, the argument would go, measuring degrees of democracy by the level of compliance actually would penalize what by other criteria would be counted as positive instances of political democracy. We can offer two responses to this contention. First, such an argument seems to lend this analytical framework a degree of exactness it does not deserve. The purpose in advancing the framework is to provide an instrument sufficiently general to examine some features of compliance mechanisms and relationships across a wide range of variation. Consequently, we are examining at the *margins* what we perceive to be basic and characteristic differences in the ability of many political systems to induce their populations to comply with their requests, demands, and orders. Second, and more important, the manner in which dissent emerges in a democratic society is intimately related to some of the basic assumptions that underlie the compliance framework. In a democratic society, the level of noncompliance that occurs in the system and the perceived level of compliance inducement a government is compelled to employ are products of shared norms in the system, including some level of agreement over legitimate procedures for expressing dissent. To use the traditional language of democratic theory, dissent that is sufficiently unaccommodated to produce active and/or violent noncompliance is indicative of the breakdown of basic institutional forms and consequently, from the perspective of our framework, a decline in political democracy.

It may be wise at this juncture to anticipate the objection that this framework for analysis is inherently "conservative" in the sense that

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it adopts the perspective of the system, that it focuses on the institutionalization of "law and order" and that it views threats to system maintenance as an "abnormal" occurrence. This is a complex issue. First, this framework does indeed assume that people and their institutions are conservative, that they resist radical change and attempt to routinize all required "new" behavior. This bias seems not only reasonable but appropriate given the demonstrable behavior of the actors we are examining. Second, it must be admitted that some perspective is inherent in every analysis. It might even be preferable to take a perspective that is appreciable by the greatest number for the sake of ease of communication. Yet the framework does not necessarily demand that we focus on either end of the compliance-noncompliance dimension elucidated in this paper. Finally, it should be noted that the framework is neutral with respect to policy content. In this more important sense the framework is not conservative: it does not express a preference for the assumed conservative behavior of the actors nor for the preservation of any particular system.

There are brief suggestions in the above as to how such a framework for analysis might be employed empirically. We can extend these suggestions for empirical work by distinguishing three dimensions of behavior for which it is necessary to establish some empirical indicators: (a) the scope of activities over which the government demands compliance, (b) the nature of compliance mechanisms employed and the relative level of their use, and (c) the level of noncompliance.

Determining the scope of activities over which the government attempts to induce compliance is clearly capable of only the most general kinds of approximation. There are some single areas of activity that seem crucial to differentiating nations, e.g., determining the degree to which governments can compel the physical relocation of members of the population. Yet the very notion of scope rules out focusing on a single area of activity. However, it is clear that the degree of individual compulsion is a significant element of scope. This is the factor that has classically given meaning and importance to the scope of governmental activities. A second factor, of increasing importance in the modern era, is the range of organizational co-optation by the state as represented by (a) central direction of the economy, (b) the takeover of key social-welfare functions, and (c) the level of state economic productivity. Finally, the level of social complexity must be used as a control, for it dictates the upper limit of scope (e.g., modern labor unions cannot be coerced unless they exist). As a first approximation, GNP might be used as a measure of social complexity. This three-

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factor measure of scope will obviously require a great deal of sophisticated work to bring it even to the level of an ordinal index, yet we do not believe it is an impossible task.

Determining the nature of mechanisms employed to induce compliance and their level of use involves examining the "levels" of the mechanisms used and the intensity of their application. We care not only that there is a military, but also how large that military is, how often it is used. There are at least three "levels" of mechanisms available to a state. First, the state has available some direct mechanisms, its employees. The direct mechanisms can be seen in the size of the military, in the size of the police, and in terms of internal bureaucratic control. Second, the state can accomplish its goals through more indirect mechanisms, i.e., through regulation and through "contracting out" its work (for example, obtaining the services of a private garbage collection agency to keep the country clean). Third, the state can employ symbolic means of inducing compliance. This involves considerably more than waving the flag. Nations vary in the extent to which they invest in such things as compulsory youth socialization, but they all devote attention to "educating" their publics to accept some preferred set of symbols that evoke high compliance response to specific governmental demands. The level of mechanism used and the intensity of that usage—controlling for scope—are of interest in and of themselves as ways of comparing political systems, but their practical significance and their significance for this framework comes from the public response—compliance or noncompliance.

The level of noncompliance is determined by examining confrontations with the agents of the compliance structure and is ranked according to the scope and intensity of the activity (for an individual) or the quantity and type of response (for the aggregate). One warning is unfortunately necessary. It will probably be the case that operationalization of the concept of compliance will be inspired by incidents of noncompliance, usually those in which violence is present. Of course compliance may be determined by a general formula: total number of acts minus acts of noncompliance. Yet it will not always be the case that the total number of acts will be determinable. This is a regrettable circumstance, already perceivable in the recent studies on international transactions and the studies of violence.[4] In

[4] This problem is amply illustrated in an article studying the problem of system vs. subsystem dominance in international relations. The author worries about the comprehensiveness of the *New York Times* index for reporting "incidents," yet a greater concern is that "normal" interactions within the subsystem are not reported at all, so that no test can be made of whether these common, everyday contacts were interrupted

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order to avoid distorting the concept of compliance in this manner, we should keep in mind that compliance is the rule, noncompliance the exception. Data on noncompliance are readily available. At the bottom of the list would be the number and nature of misdemeanor-arrests. (In the state of California in 1966 there were some three million arrests, most of which involved moving-traffic violations. Given the nature of modern urban society, the most potentially dangerous weapon in the hands of most citizens is the automobile. It is obvious that the state must preserve order and some minimal level of safety on the highways. The large number of three million citations is indicative that many of us feel predisposed not to comply with some of the most basic and least controversial demands made upon us.)

Next on the list would be the number and nature of felonies. There is a tendency among political scientists to consider "crime" as outside their scope of interest unless it is connected with some explicitly "political" activity, e.g., assassination of a governmental figure. This limitation is shortsighted for at least two reasons. "Crime," whether organized or unorganized, constitutes a real threat to the governmental ability to maintain some general state of law and order—that is, to operate above some minimal level of compliance, to maintain its legitimacy. Second, "organized crime" frequently represents the consequences of a government's unwillingness and/or inability to perform publicly some necessary function, which is therefore performed *sub rosa* by "criminals" (e.g., providing liquor during prohibition, exchanging goods on a "black market" etc.).[5] The level of organized crime may be one indication of a government's inability to enlarge the scope of its compliance demands because it lacks the resources to do so, or it may indicate a dysfunctional constraint on the scope of compliance that, given the resources for inducing compliance, should not exist. "Organized disorders" or group disorders constitute a third order of acts of noncompliance, ranging from breaches of the peace to riots, to rebellion, to revolution. The assumption in this ordering is that by and large most of the cases in the previous two categories are individual cases of noncompliance, whereas this latter group represents a greater instance of noncompliance because it involves groups of persons, sometimes very

during a crisis. Charles McClelland, "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events 1948-1963," appearing in J. D. Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York 1968), 159-86.

[5] The term and the examples are Thurmond Arnold's, *The Symbols of Government* (New York 1935).

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large groups. (Another reason to treat organized crime seriously in this noncompliance framework.)

Obtaining measures on these three features of the compliance structure permits us to formulate ratios that are comparable over time and across nations. The general formula is $a/b=c$, i.e., what scope of activities controlling for mechanism use produces a particular level of compliance (or noncompliance). Clearly this is a measure of efficiency that might even be used as an indicator of political development; those nations that are most efficient are the most developed.

More important, this framework makes possible the unification of a wide range of political phenomenon. For example, the diverse problems of tax collection in France and riots in the United States are equally amenable to treatment under this framework. The French are notoriously poor at paying taxes. The attempt to evade the tax burden and shift it to others has posed a severe problem for the governments because of both the cost of collections and the shortage of revenue. The problem plagued Louis XIV just as surely as it did De Gaulle. Today, the modernization of the French economy, so necessary to internal peace, is hindered by the refusal of the average Frenchman to use a checking account at a bank and to accept a check from his employer. He does not want, in the form of checks or any other form, records of his income that might be examined by a tax collector. This preference for cash imposes a great cost upon business for its transactions and furthermore makes the French economy subject to waves of monetary crises. The money disillusionment, to bend a phrase, is considerably less severe in the United States during a period of inflation, in part because Americans are now conditioned to accept money in any form (e.g., "paper is paper so long as I can buy what I want"). This simple act of noncompliance, the refusal to pay taxes, is a major contributing factor to the mental attitude of the average Frenchman, who by it on occasion has almost brought his government to a standstill. The government of the United States has also borne increased compliance costs. These stem from acts of noncompliance in black communities such as Watts and from resistance to the war in Vietnam. Some important changes in the mental framework of Americans is occurring. For example, in the past policemen have not been cognitively related to the central government, because of the much-noted decentralization of the American system of government. In just a few short years, this structure, which always existed primarily in our minds, has been reformed so that many Americans now perceive policemen as agents of one "system." Now fluctuations in respect for the central gov-

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ernment, local governments, and the police are more closely tied, thereby making the descent into political decay much more rapid than would have been possible in the past. These two problems are integrally related; they belong together. The compliance framework makes possible the organization of these two and numerous other phenomena in a way that would systematize rather than merely catalog our knowledge of comparative government.

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IMPROVING DATA ANALYSIS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

By EDWARD R. TUFTE*

I. The Problem

STUDENTS of politics use statistical and quantitative techniques to:

summarize a large body of numbers into a small collection of typical values;

confirm (and perhaps sanctify) the results of the analysis by using tests of statistical significance that help protect against sampling and measurement error;

discover what's going on in their data and expose some new relationships; and

inform their audience what's going on in the data.[1]

Most textbooks of social statistics tell us a lot about summarizing and sanctifying in their many chapters on descriptive statistics and significance tests, but they have little to say about how to discover the unanticipated or how to learn something new from the data. Graphical techniques are, for example, among the most powerful procedures for both discovering and informing. Yet most textbooks give only the most humdrum, and often misleading, advice about displaying the data—such as the "necessity" for showing the zero point and for equal class intervals. With this kind of advice, students naturally come away with the impression that the only point of graphing is to make a pie diagram showing how next year's budget is going to be spent. Similarly, most textbook discussions of how to fit straight lines to data—potentially the most powerful technique of data analysis available in many situations—are devoted to explaining how to see whether a particular coefficient is significantly different from zero (sanctification again). Little is said about how to analyze residuals or how to transform the variables entering a regression—techniques that will help us discover patterns in the data far better than any significance test. Finally, almost to guar-

* I wish to thank Hayward Alker, Jr., Stanley Kelley, Jr., Gerald Kramer, John McCarthy, Susanne Mueller, Walter Murphy, Dennis Thompson, and John Tukey for their advice and criticism. I also thank Joseph Verbalis, who constructed the figures.

[1] For similar categories, see John W. Tukey and M. B. Wilk, "Data Analysis: Techniques and Approaches," *Proceedings of the Symposium on Information Processing in Sight Sensory Systems* (Pasadena, California Institute of Technology, November 1965). This paper is also reprinted in Edward R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems* (Reading, Mass. 1969).

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antee that budding social scientists learn little about discovering and informing, most textbooks of social statistics contain few, if any, actual case histories of data analysis.[2] No wonder most questions concerning data analysis ask whether a scale is "really" an interval scale or whether a one-tailed t-test is appropriate in a particular situation.

The results of all this bad advice show up in many recent quantitative efforts in political science. For example, consider the essays collected in *Quantitative International Politics*, a book representative of many quantitative studies of politics.[3] Instead of residuals off a regression line, we see almost every page littered with the results of significance tests often complete with all the relentless detail of computations, degrees of freedom, test statistics, and probability levels. Residuals (that part of the variation that is "unexplained") are not analyzed in any of the essays simply because no one fitted a line to any data. And even though there is lots of talk about how complicated the world is, no author uses multiple regression, which would allow the inclusion of more than a single explanatory variable. Instead of a sensitive analysis of the problem of multicollinearity (the difficulty in separating out the independent effects of highly correlated describing variables) and its immediate and profound consequences for testing theories of politics, we see a single correlation matrix twelve pages long in an article that totals twenty-eight pages.

In short, then, much of current political data analysis leaves the impression that the important uses of quantitative methods in the study of politics are either to summarize a large body of data or to sanctify an observed relationship at the .05 level of significance.

How can we do better?

From the point of view of discovering and informing, the following four points help summarize a good approach toward effective data analysis:

(1) Significance tests deserve a secondary role in data analysis. They can be useful, but only after we look at the right things. Significance tests cannot tell us what to think.

(2) The distinction between interval and ordinal measurement is usually of little importance in data analysis. The wise assignment of numbers to ordered categories, coupled with the use of techniques that exploit the properties of numbers, is generally preferable to working with ordered categories.

[2] An important exception is W. Allen Wallis and Harry V. Roberts, *Statistics: A New Approach* (Glencoe, Ill. 1956).

[3] J. David Singer, ed. (New York 1968).

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(3) Looking at correlations is only a partial, first step in the analysis. Correlations are often misleading.

(4) The most effective method of data analysis usually begins by fitting lines to relationships between variables (transformed variables if necessary) and then continues by examining, with the aid of graphs and scatterplots, deviations off the fitted line.

Many people have argued one way or another about the first two points above, and these issues, broadly speaking, are not settled. But if we consider the issue of the utility of significance tests and the problem of levels of measurement from the point of view of discovering and informing—in other words, from the point of view of the pragmatic data analyst—we should find propositions 1 and 2 fairly easy to accept. Let us now look at the four basic points in more detail.

II. The Reconstructed Science of Significance Testing

The overemphasis on significance testing has arisen in part, I think, because some have taken the reconstruction of what scientists do more seriously than actual scientific practice.[4] Thus the rote paradigm of significance testing—Assumptions (Level of Measurement, Model, and Hypothesis); Sampling Distribution; Significance Level and Critical Region; Computing the Test Statistic; and, behold, The Decision—represents a severe and impractical formalization that fails to provide useful guides to effective data analysis. Such a paradigm often serves only to make researchers feel guilty that they have violated one of the unrealistic assumptions of statistical significance tests.

What good are tests of significance, then? Such tests help protect against the possibility that a relationship arises because of happenstance in a random sample.[5] They are also useful as a rough sort of screening device in the analysis of data collected nonrandomly. They may help us adjust our feeling of certainty or uncertainty about a result. Thus the responsible investigator will use tests against the null hypothesis or, often better, confidence intervals to assess the stability of his results. Significance levels are often misused, however, because the dichotomy between "significant" and "nonsignificant" is too sharply drawn and the investigator regards those relationships that reach the .05 level (sometimes the .01 level is the sacred probability) as being the only truly meaningful results. This is bad practice; the relevance of a result does

[4] See Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco 1964), chap. 1.

[5] Leslie Kish, "Some Statistical Problems in Research Design," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (June 1959), 336. Another good discussion of significance tests is William H. Kruskal, "Tests of Significance," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York 1968), vol. 14, 238-50.

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not hinge on its exact significance level. Emphasizing the importance of substantive judgment in interpreting the results of data analysis, one statistician has proposed the "interocular trauma test" of significance: you know what the data mean when the conclusion hits you between the eyes. Edwards, Lindman, and Savage comment further that the "enthusiast's interocular trauma may be the skeptic's random error. A little arithmetic to verify the extent of the trauma can yield great peace of mind for little cost."[6]

Finally, probability levels and test statistics tell us very little about the strength and nothing about the substantive significance of a relationship. The important question is, "Does the result show a relationship which is of substantive interest because of its nature and magnitude?"[7] Significance tests are silent on this matter. Mosteller and Hammel throw light on the problem by noting that when the investigator uses tests of statistical significance, he then faces "the standard difficulty of what to do with the relationships once significance is established. Significance tests have little to say about this. What to do is never made entirely clear, and, as far as we can see, it will be up to the investigator to use his own judgment in appraising and weighting reports that show relations with conditions of observation. Perhaps it will never be possible to improve on individual judgment in such matters; the treatment may be an open statistical problem, or it may be that regression methods could aid the research worker."[8]

In short, then, it seems obvious to suggest that scientific, mathematical, or statistical jargon should not be used merely to sanctify the results of political analysis. Hempel has put the matter clearly: "To say that 'A man *M* walks down a street *S*' does not increase the scientific validity of a statement." And to attach a test statistic and a statistical significance level to a statement does not help it much either.

III. Getting out of the Rut of Cross-tabulations: Pinning Numbers on Ordered Categories

How seriously should a data analyst take the distinction between ordinal and interval measurement? Many have taken the distinction very, very seriously—almost to the point of paralysis. While there is

[6] Ward Edwards, Harold Lindman, and Leonard J. Savage, "Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research," *Psychological Review*, 70 (May 1963), 217.

[7] Kish, 336.

[8] Frederick Mosteller and E. A. Hammel, book review, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 58 (September 1963), 836.

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a conceptual distinction between ordinal and interval measurement,[9] the issue that should concern the data analyst is whether this distinction has any practical meaning for his work. One good reason for pinning numbers on ordered categories is that the researcher often knows more about the phenomenon than the mere ordering of observations implies; thus, assigning numbers helps to build that additional information into measurement. For example, if the researcher knows that $A>B>C>D$ and, on the basis of his substantive understanding of the thing being measured, he also knows that D is far from C compared to, say, the difference between A and B, then the measurement should incorporate this information by assigning, for example, the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 9 to the ordered categories. Of course it is arbitrary.[10] The point, as Tukey has put it, is to be *wisely* arbitrary. The argument raises two issues:

(1) Should we pin numbers on ordered categories?

(2) If yes, just exactly *what* numbers are to be assigned to each category?

From the point of view of doing the detective work of data analysis, we want to assign numbers to orderings. By doing this, we improve measurement by taking advantage of any additional information above and beyond the fact of ordering. Numbers put more substance into measurement. An additional gain is that considerably more powerful techniques can be used in the analysis of the data and thereby increase our chances of learning something new. In the face of these potential gains—better measurement and better analysis—there appears to be very little in the way of potential costs. By sticking rigidly to the distinction between ordinal and interval levels of measurement (a distinction often difficult to make in practice), we are, in effect, censoring the data and shutting off part of what the data could tell us—if we would only let them.[11]

Admitting, then, the possibility that numbers actually should be assigned to ordered categories, just exactly what numbers should be

[9] For a recent statement of S. S. Stevens, see his "Measurement, Statistics, and the Schemapiric View," *Science*, 161 (August 30, 1968), 849-56.

[10] For a discussion of the problem of "being arbitrary," see J. C. Nunnally, *Psychometric Theory* (New York 1967), chap. 1.

[11] One common practice is to convert the numerical values of variables into ordered ranks before computing measures of association. Such a transformation, presumably made because it somehow seems statistically more conservative (it is not), may throw away useful information in the data and also sometimes discourage efforts at multivariate analysis. One other alternative is to employ some of the nonmetric multivariate methods.

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assigned? Several methods have been proposed,[12] but three fairly useful and simple rules are:

(1) The assignment should incorporate the investigator's substantive understanding of the thing being measured.

(2) The simple linear assignment of numbers to categories (e.g., assigning 1, 2, 3, 4 to four ordered categories) usually won't do. Such a linear assignment is not, in any way, a sounder or more conservative choice than any other assignment. And the chances are that such an assignment is not consistent with the first principle of incorporating substantive information into the measurement.

(3) The assignment should often be made so that the distribution of counts begins to look somewhat like a normal distribution.

If the concern is, for example, the magnitude of internal conflict in a society, the measurement might begin with the four ordered categories: (a) petitions against the government, (b) peaceful, massive demonstrations, (c) violent demonstrations, and (d) civil war. Plainly, the category (d) of civil war is in a league by itself so far as internal conflict is concerned. The assignment of numbers to the four categories should take this into account. One such assignment would be the numbers 1, 2, 5, and 17. It would be even better to start with more than four categories—in fact, with as many categories as possible—especially since there is no reason to believe that internal conflict in societies is distributed in four clumps (and certainly not in four equally spaced clumps, as the assignment of 1, 2, 3, and 4 would assume). But, at any rate, we should never work with only two categories. Throwing everything into two bins by dichotomizing the data is just about the most severe form of censorship we could impose on the data. Even with the choice of the optimal cutting point, a major amount of information is lost by dichotomizing the data.

IV. The Pitfalls of Correlations

The correlation coefficient is often used to summarize the relationship between two variables. It is overworked. The contributors to *Quantitative International Politics* report a grand total of about 1600 correlations in their various essays. Or, taking another example,

[12] The discussion here is necessarily rather brief. For more information, see Robert P. Abelson and John W. Tukey, "Efficient Conversion of Non-Metric Information into Metric Information," *Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association* (Washington 1959), 226-30 (also in Tufte); Abelson and Tukey, "Efficient Utilization of Nonnumerical Information in Quantitative Analysis: General Theory and the Case of Simple Order," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 34 (December 1963), 1347-69; and Roger N. Shepard, "Metric Structures in Ordinal Data," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 3 (1966), 287-315.

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Thomas Dye's *Politics, Economics, and the Public* includes more than 5000 correlations. Such coefficients have serious defects; indeed, their faults are often so great that some have recommended that "most correlation coefficients should never be calculated."[13] What are the pitfalls involved in the use of correlations? What are the alternatives to correlation coefficients?

The three scatterplots shown below convey widely divergent information about the relationship between X and Y. The first plot shows no relationship, discounting the extreme outlier on both measures. The second plot suggests a moderately strong linear relationship between X and Y. The third plot reveals a rather marked curvilinear relationship between X and Y, indicating that as X increases, Y gets bigger even faster. Despite the great variation in the visual message, *the correlation between X and Y is the same in all three cases.*

This example shows that a correlation coefficient is a pretty poor way of summarizing the actual data as revealed in the scatterplot. One practical moral here is that any computer program that produces a correlation matrix should also produce scatterplots of the relationships. A



[13] John Tukey, "Causation, Regression, and Path Analysis," in Oscar Kempthorne and others, eds., *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology* (Ames, Iowa 1954), 38.

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



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more obvious moral is, of course, that people should use scatterplots more than they do. A major benefit of scatterplots and of most graphical procedures is that they allow the reader to decide for himself how much he wants to learn from the data—instead of having the relationship summarized, and perhaps maimed, by a correlation coefficient or other summary statistic.

Sometimes correlations take us too far away from the substantive matters at hand. For example, consider some hypothetical data relating the number of dollars spent for precinct work on election day and the voter turnout in each precinct. One way to summarize such data is to say, "The correlation between dollars and votes is 0.73." That doesn't say as much as does the statement: "On the average, every $10 produces 1.7 votes." Expressing the result as a correlation coefficient is less informative in this case than is expressing the result as the slope of the line fitting the data. Often both coefficients are informative.

The faults of correlation coefficients do not disappear when correlations are built into a more complex model through the use of partial correlations (as is frequently done in efforts at building "causal models"). While the Simon-Blalock version of causal modelling pays lip service to regression coefficients, most applications of causal modelling never deal with regression coefficients; they are devoted to seeing whether certain partial correlations go to zero.[14] And just as simple correlations can mislead, so can partial correlations.

Finally, it is common practice in using data based on geographic units to "deflate" the values of a variable by dividing it by the population of the geographic unit, and then to correlate the deflated variables. For example, a typical ratio or index correlation (as they are often called) is the correlation between welfare expenditures per capita and income per capita, computed over the fifty states. Similarly, most of the correlations computed in various collections of data for the nations of the world are ratio correlations based on "per-capitized" variables. Ratio correlations can be misleading, and the questions they are designed to answer can be more usefully framed as regression problems.[15]

[14] See Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (December 1968), 1258-64, and further discussion at 1269-71.

[15] See Wallis and Roberts, 546-56, on the hazards of ratios. The problem was discussed by Karl Pearson, "Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution—On a Form of Spurious Correlation Which May Arise When Indices Are Used in the Measurement of Organs," *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, LX (1897), 489-98. See also Edwin Kuh and John R. Meyer, "Correlation and Regression Estimates When the Data are Ratios," *Econometrica*, 23 (October 1955), 400-16; and F.E.A. Briggs, "The Influence of Errors on the Correlation of Ratios," *Econometrica*, 30 (January 1962), 162-77.

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Often, then, correlation coefficients are very inadequate tools of analysis. Scatterplots and regression coefficients are more useful. Regression coefficients are certainly preferable in situations where increments along the scales of each variable make some sort of substantive sense.[16] In general, the best procedure is to use both correlation and regression coefficients when they are meaningful. Unfortunately, for all the correlation coefficients reported in *Quantitative International Politics* and in *Politics, Economics, and the Public*, no author reported a single regression coefficient.

V. The Importance of Fitting Lines to Data

Political scientists have tended to be diverted by what are essentially secondary issues in data analysis—significance tests and the distinctions among various levels of measurement. Furthermore, I have argued that correlation coefficients have been overworked and their serious defects ignored in most political data analysis. How, then, can we do a better job of data analysis? How can we get out of summarizing and sanctifying and on to discovering and informing?

The answer to these questions, I think, is rarely to be found in a search for new and exotic techniques—especially if we want to communicate our results to more than a tiny fraction of those involved in the discipline. Almost every new issue of a political science journal introduces a new mathematical or statistical technique. At times it appears that new techniques are introduced not because they fit the substantive problem under investigation, but rather because a new computer program is available to produce some results. There is a real and already visible danger of faddishness in applications of quantitative methods. It is not surprising that the limits of such techniques are often underappreciated by their users. Misguided applications of these techniques, however, not only lend a spurious air of certainty to often false conclusions; such misapplications can also lead to an unwarranted distrust of the methods that seem to have produced the conclusions. Both causal modelling and factor analysis may wind up by being the victims of their own advocates. This may be only wishful thinking, however.

[16] Tukey, 35-66. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., makes a similar argument in his "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967), 130-36. Blalock's application of the argument to the Miller-Stokes data, however, is a most inappropriate example. For some useful applications and contrasts between standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce Russett, "Multifactor Explanations of Social Change," in Russett and others, *World Handbook and Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964), 311-21.

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All in all, political scientists have tended to ignore the useful regression procedures that fit lines to data. For example, none of the authors in *Quantitative International Politics*, a book that is aggressively quantitative, used even the most elementary kind of regression model. In the remainder of this paper, I want to suggest why multiple regression actually is a useful procedure for data analysis.

Fitting lines to relationships between variables (or variables that are transformed) and then examining the deviations off the fitted line by graphs and scatterplots has a good many virtues:

(1) In regression analysis (unlike factor analysis), the research worker must have a fairly specific idea of just what it is he wants to explain. Simply, he has to think in causal terms and know what his response (dependent) and describing (independent) variables are.[17]

(2) Fitting lines to data generates residuals, those parts of the variation in the response variable left unexplained by the describing variables. The effective analysis of residuals is a major tool for discovery.

(3) The resulting regression coefficients, especially if they are unstandardized, occasionally have substantive meaning and policy implications.

(4) Econometricians have built up a large body of useful experience in the application of regression methods to substantive problems. Their advice is sometimes more useful to political scientists than is the advice of other sorts of statisticians.

Finally, let us turn to three important matters in the fitting of lines to data: the analysis of residuals, the transformation of variables, and multicollinearity.

VI. The Analysis of Residuals

Usually the describing variables do not account for all the variation in the response variable. Trying to find something that will explain some of the residual variation helps us discover the unanticipated in a collection of data.

The first step in the analysis of residuals is simply to label them; that is, to calculate the residual for each observation, look at the whole collection of residuals, and see what those observations with residuals of the same size have in common. The next step is to plot the residuals against a wide assortment of things. Here, the computer programmers have let us down a bit, although some regression packages have options

[17] Hayward Alker's "The Long Road to International Relations Theory: Problems of Statistical Nonadditivity," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), at 646-47, has a useful discussion of this point.

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for plotting residuals.[18] As far as plotting goes, Tukey and Wilk suggest:

"Kinds of plots of residuals that are very often valuable include (i) plots against fitted, or possible values; (ii) plots against variables which have been employed as a basis for the summarizing fit; (iii) plots against variables, which were not used in the fit, e.g., time; (iv) plots which display residuals identified according to some meaningful characteristic, e.g., according to whether the residual is or is not from an observation which was used in developing the fitted summary; (v) probability plots of ordered residuals, including empirical cumulative distribution plots and plots of empirical quantiles against quantiles of reference distributions, such as the unit normal. While all such plots provide indications of the spread of the body of residuals, it is far more important that they combine palatable summaries of individual residuals with sensitive indications of distributional peculiarities of the entire collection of residuals."[19]

VII. Transformations of Variables

Transformations of variables—that is, any systematic changes in the observed values of the variables made during the course of the analysis—play an important role in the process of fitting lines to data. Transformations are useful because they enable us to use linear techniques to fit rather complicated, nonlinear models to the data, because they often point to substantive results, and, finally, because they help the data satisfy certain statistically desirable properties such as normality and stability of variance.[20]

For example, in the analysis of crossnational aggregate data, the

[18] There are a number of other areas in which current packaged programs are deficient for the needs of social scientists. Two examples here serve to show that we must be careful even though the result came out of the computer. Longley, in a test of commonly used regression programs, found many inaccuracies in the output—including even the wrong sign attached to some coefficients! In this analysis of difficult but real test data (with highly collinear variables), several well-known programs proved accurate to only one or two digits in their estimates of regression coefficients. See James W. Longley, "An Appraisal of Least Squares Programs from the Point of View of the User," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 62 (September 1962), 819-41. Second, many cross-tabulation programs have contributed to the frequent misuse of the chi-square test in the analysis of contingency tables. The test is not appropriate for ordered metrics. Of course, it is not entirely the fault of programs when their users dutifully report whatever the printout says.

[19] Tukey and Wilk, 12.

[20] For converting nonlinear models into linear fit problems, see the useful book by N. R. Draper and H. Smith, *Applied Regression Analysis* (New York 1966), chap. 5. The best place to learn about transformations is in the informative and straightforward essay by Joseph B. Kruskal, "Transformations of Data," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York 1968), vol. 16, 182-93.

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logarithm of the variable is often used in place of the actual value of the variable, for convenience and also to meet statistical assumptions. When the variables are logged, moreover, there is an additional gain in terms of the substantive interpretation of the regression analysis. In the two-variable case, with both variables logged, we have

$$\log Y = b \log X + c .$$

It can be shown that b, the estimate of the slope, is the elasticity of Y with respect to X.[21] Thus b estimates the proportional change in Y resulting from a proportional change in X. An increase of 1% in X, then, produces under this model a change of b% in Y. This neat interpretation of the slope is an extra benefit of the use of the log transform.

Transformations are also useful in the analysis of percentages. For example, is it always meaningful to assume that the difference between 50% and 60% (an increase of 10%) has the same meaning as the 10% difference between 85% and 95%? The research worker should, when it is appropriate, take into account that a 10% increase starting from 85% as the base is actually often a bigger and more important substantive change than the same amount of percentage-change beginning at an initial level of 50%. If this reasoning is correct, then the tails of percentage distributions should be stretched by transformations of percentages. A number of options are available.[22]

VIII. Multicollinearity

If two or more describing variables are highly intercorrelated, then it is difficult and perhaps impossible to assess their independent effects on the response variable. As the correlation between two independent variables approaches unity, it becomes impossible to tell one variable from the other. The difficulty, called multicollinearity, not only affects the estimates of partial slopes and partial correlations in multiple regression procedures; it also similarly weakens inferences based on cross-tabulations.[23] While occasionally the use of additional information may alleviate the problem, it often happens that when the social scientist must rely on "experiments" performed by nature, he will be unable to

[21] See Alker and Russett, 311-13; also J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York 1963), 44-52.

[22] See J. B. Kruskal and the references cited there. Another useful discussion is Car. I. Hovland, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Fred D. Sheffield, "A Baseline for Measurement of Percentage Change," in Paul Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, eds., *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe, Ill. 1955), 77-82.

[23] J. Johnston, 201-07; Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," *Social Forces*, 62 (December 1963), 233-37; and Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 49 (February 1967), 92-107.

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obtain the independent variation necessary to assess the independent effects of his explanatory variables.

The problem of multicollinearity has a number of obvious consequences. Some theories that assert the importance of one variable over another, while theoretically testable, are actually incapable of being tested if the describing variables are highly intercorrelated. For example, it may be desirable to separate out the independent effects of economic development and social mobilization on a particular response variable such as military intervention in politics. Yet, for cross-section data in Latin America, the correlation between economic development and social mobilization is 0.89, based on twenty-one observations. Under these circumstances it is simply impossible to assess reliably the independent effects of these two variables.[24] No statistical method—cross-tabulation, regression, path coefficients, or what have you—will break this "multicollinearity deadlock."[25]

An additional danger of multicollinearity is that the analysis, in most cases, can be done as usual. The estimates generated when the describing variables are collinear are, however, subject to large instabilities. The following signs, among others, help alert us to the presence of multicollinearity: (1) high correlations among describing variables; (2) a sizable multiple correlation for the overall regression, but with no particular regression coefficient reaching significance; and (3) large changes in the values of the regression coefficients when new variables are added to the regression.

IX. Conclusion

We can, I think, learn a great deal about politics and society through the statistical analysis of the appropriate data. There are now enough good examples to provide considerable support for this assertion. Techniques of quantitative analysis can help us inform and discover as well as summarize and confirm. We must hope that fewer and fewer applications of quantitative methods will aim only to impress or sanctify.

[24] See Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics*, xx (October 1967), 94-95. The finding that economic development is positively correlated with military intervention after the effect of social mobilization is removed is unfortunately not testable because of the high instability of the partial correlation due to multicollinearity. Another example of the problem is discussed in Forbes and Tufte, 1262-64.

[25] Johnston, 207. See Farrar and Glauber for discussion of some modest palliatives.

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Review Article

WESTERN CONCEPTS AND CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

By TANG TSOU*

Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*. New York, Random House, 1968, 178 pp. $1.95.

Lucian Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development*. Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1968, 255 pp. $2.90.

James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, 233 pp. $5.50.

THE massive effort in the United States to develop the study of the Chinese Communist regime and movement began in the wake of the postwar upsurge in the development of the social sciences, particularly in the field of comparative politics. Inevitably, it has come under the controlling influence of the exciting intellectual ferment in these disciplines. With the publication of Chalmers Johnson's *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (1962) and Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (1966), the study of contemporary China can be said to have begun its drive to maturity. In contrast to the purely historical studies of Chinese politics prior to that time, Johnson develops his carefully researched account of the Chinese Communist movement from 1937 to 1945 within the context of a general analysis of mass nationalism, explicitly applying Karl W. Deutsch's notions of communication and social mobilization. Schurmann produces a masterly synthesis and analysis through an integration of empirical findings with theories and concepts that were formulated by nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century social theorists but that have been further developed by contemporary social scientists such as Reinhard Bendix, Talcott Parsons, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Amitai Etzioni, and Robert K. Merton. Rather than concerning himself exclusively with Chinese politics, Johnson arrives at his conclusions by an

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explicit comparison of two similar cases of national communism. Similarly, Schurmann discusses the departure of Chinese theory and practice from their Soviet prototypes, thus explicitly and implicitly contrasting the two systems. In his analysis of the process of revolutionary change in China, Schurmann starts with a notion of traditional China in which "the trinity of ethos, status group, and modal personality was represented by Confucianism, the gentry, the *pater familia* (*chiachang*)" (p. 7). Dissatisfied with explanations of contemporary events that simply find parallels and analogies in the many diverse aspects of China's long tradition, he reports his impression of how "little Chinese" the political system appears to be (p. xvi). These two books mark a sharp break with the tradition of Sinological studies and with their almost exclusively historical and humanistic emphasis. They have avoided the mechanical emulation of Soviet studies. They have also gone beyond the application of the model of totalitarianism, which has been found too static, formal, and value-laden to be conducive to comparative studies of the deeper sociopolitical processes at work in both Communist and non-Communist systems. They represent an important step toward building contemporary Chinese studies on the paradigms found in the social sciences.

Professor James R. Townsend's *Political Participation in Communist China* applies the general pattern of analysis established by Schurmann and Johnson to a careful examination of one aspect of the Chinese political system. Professor Lucian Pye, one of the pioneers in postwar studies of comparative politics, "returns to China" with an interpretation of the "spirit of Chinese politics," stressing the continuity of the Chinese political culture and the crisis of authority developed under the changed circumstances of twentieth-century China. Although he focuses his attention on the psychocultural dimension, his work, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, is based on the same general approach as that of Schurmann and Johnson. Dr. Robert Lifton's book, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, marks a new departure in so far as his use of theories and concepts is concerned.

The new types of approach represented in these three studies raise general methodological questions for scholars in the Chinese field. First: whether, how, and to what extent can concepts and theories originating in the democratic West be applied to the entirely different political system of China with its totally different cultural setting? Second: how ought the problems of tradition and modernity, continuity and change, to be handled in the very special case of China with

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its long, unbroken tradition and its complex problems of modernization? Third: to what extent can psychological interpretations add to structural-functional analysis? In so far as these problems are raised by the works of Townsend, Pye, and Lifton, they will be discussed in the following pages.

I

Scholars studying another society must of necessity employ concepts, generalizations, and theories developed or generally accepted in their own society, even if they must begin by understanding the goals, values, viewpoints, and ideologies of actors in the other society as these are understood by the actors themselves. Two types of concepts, generalizations, and theories can be distinguished in this context; each of these two types creates its own distinct problems and dilemmas when applied to a society, such as China, with an entirely different political system and cultural background. The first type consists of concepts, generalizations, and theories believed to be universally valid. David Easton's input-output model of the political system, Karl W. Deutsch's cybernetic model of political communications and control, the controversial notion of the ruling elite, and the neo-Freudian theory of personality development underlying Lucian Pye's study are cases in point. As is generally recognized and indeed intended by the theorists themselves, these concepts and models provide useful frameworks for area studies in that they direct our attention to data of theoretical interest, serve as the theoretical underpinning for empirical and historical studies, and establish a common language for area studies and the social sciences. When applied to the study of a specific political system, the limitations of these concepts and models do not come from the logical suppositions alleged by Giovanni Sartori that such concepts are not "defined by an opposite" and that "only the concepts defined by an opposite have an empirical applicability, for a concept without contrary has no descriptive denotation and hence cannot be tested on empirical grounds."[1] Rather, these limitations stem from the simple fact that in so far as these universal concepts and models are valid, their application to area studies merely confirms their validity but does not enable us to derive specific hypotheses on the differences between various political systems. The application of social-science concepts and theories of this type represents nothing more than a prelude to our study of a particular system in our comparative enterprise. For

[1] Giovanni Sartori, "Functionalism in a Comparative Perspective," Chapter XVIII of a manuscript to be published, pp. 148 and 150.

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our task is precisely to show how the distinctive configurations of structures, patterns of behavior, and combinations of symbols are evolved from the common nature of man to confront universal problems of human existence as they arise at different times and places. This task has been most successfully and systematically accomplished in Lifton's book.

The confrontation between supposedly universal concepts and area studies is not without theoretical interest in other aspects. In some cases, it reveals that the allegedly universal concepts are actually culture-bound. In other cases, area studies may show that a concept that falls short of universal applicability may nevertheless find empirical support in specific cases. For example, Professor Robert Dahl has convincingly shown that the ruling-elite hypothesis has not been strictly tested in so far as it is used in the study of the United States or local American communities. But it is quite reasonable to suggest that imperial China during normal times can pass his tests for the existence of "the weaker system of elite rule,"[2] and that in all cases but one of unsuccessful peasant attempts to overthrow the throne since the establishment of the Han dynasty,[3] the centralized empire passes his tests for the "more stringent case" in which "a small group dominates over another that is opposed to it." During the Hundred Flower episode of Spring, 1957, Communist China provided a clear-cut example of disagreement between the ruling elite and the non-elite. In the land reform program, the Three-anti and Five-anti campaigns, the socialization of industry and commerce, the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, the Anti-Rightist movement of 1957-58, and even the initial months of communization, both the population in general and the various groups specifically affected by these "mass movements" fell in with ready compliance with the elite when the "word" was authoritatively passed down. It is not without good reasons that almost all writings on Communist China are based explicitly or implicitly on the ruling-elite model. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that one of the reasons the members of the New Left in the United States are so fascinated by Communist China and Mao's atttack on the "establishment" is that China corresponds closely to the ruling-elite model with which they analyze all political systems.

The second type of concepts, generalizations, and theories that have

[2] Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, LII (June 1958), p. 467.

[3] C. P. FitzGerald, *Revolution in China* (New York 1952), pp. 12-16. FitzGerald explains this one exception in terms of an alliance between scholars and peasants to drive out the Mongol rulers.

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been applied to Chinese studies can be divided into two subtypes. One consists of those concepts, generalizations, and theories that have been either developed in the study of Western democracies or shaped by the influence of the democratic currents of thought. Townsend's key concept of political participation belongs to this category. So do such notions as integration, interest articulation, and interest aggregation. The other subtype consists of concepts, generalizations, and theories specifically developed in the study of political systems that stand at the opposite pole of the Western democracies or are quite different from them. The theory of totalitarianism is particularly relevant here. But Robert Tucker's notion of a nationalist mass-movement regime, Edward Shils's "modernizing oligarchy," and the generally used notion of "transitional society" Pye helps to formulate also fall under this rubric.

The trend toward applying the first subtype of concepts, generalizations, and theories to Chinese studies has been, in a sense, a reaction against the mechanical use of the theory of totalitarianism and the mistaken treatment of Chinese communism as a replica of Stalinism. It has also been fostered by a shift of the attention of the analysts of the Western political systems from normative theories of democracy to practice and actual behavior. Accompanying this shift is an increasing awareness of the possibility that a totalitarian system may not be so monolithic and its control not so effective as they initially appear to be. Taken together, these two considerations have given rise to the thought that in drawing so sharp a contrast as we did, we may simply have been juxtaposing democratic rationalizations to totalitarian pretensions. There is also the feeling, encouraged by the quest for universally valid concepts and theories, that common processes and similar responses to similar problems must underlie all political systems. One example of the extreme and untenable forms in which this trend of thought can find expression is the theory of the convergence of American and Soviet societies, a theory that Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington rightly and systematically criticize.[4]

The application of the first subtype of concepts, generalizations, and theories has given rise to a serious though not insoluble methodological problem. As most forcefully stated by Sartori, the issue is whether a concept, with very specific empirical referents and definable meaning when applied in one kind of political system, can be applied in another kind of system (in the case of China, an opposite type) without creating utter miscomprehension or becoming meaningless.

[4] *Political Power: U.S.A.-U.S.S.R.* (New York 1967).

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According to Sartori, a concept at this level of abstraction is defined or at least delimited by its opposite. Examples of such polar categorizations are expression versus repression, electioneering versus mobilization, participation-voluntarization versus manipulation-conformity, and integration versus homogeneity.[5] The warning that Sartori's abstract remarks hold for scholars in the field of China is that the first set of polar concepts—i.e., "expression," "electioneering," "participation-voluntarization," and "integration"—cannot be applied to the study of Communist China, for which only the second set of concepts is appropriate.

Townsend's careful study of political participation in Communist China reflects some of the difficulties involved in what Sartori calls "conceptual stretching" in the horizontal direction to cover heterogeneous referents. But at the same time it provides a concrete example of how the application of the concept of "participation" can be handled intelligently and meaningfully. By implication it also suggests a solution to the methodological problem posed by Sartori. The difficulties find expression in the need felt by Townsend to begin his book by affirming at once the "dominant place" of the Western experience in any discussion of political participation and by underlining sharply the differences between the Chinese Communist and the Western democratic "styles of political participation" (pp. 2-3). Townsend states these contrasts in terms of "execution of Party policies" versus the exertion of "popular influence on political decisions"; "direct contact between cadres and masses" versus reliance on "representative institutions"; cultivation of popular support for a "supreme, unified national interest as defined solely by the Communist Party" versus "the recognition of a national interest as a fluid combination of diverse interests that may legitimately compete"; emphasis on "the quality and morality of political leaders" versus the exaltation of "legal and institutionalized popular control"; and, finally, the denial of "limits to the extension of demands for political activity" versus the insistence on the limits imposed by the "inviolability of private life" on public obligation. This formidable list of contrasts raises the question whether the Chinese style of political participation is "participation" in the strict sense of the term or if it can be more accurately characterized in terms of a combination of mobilization, manipulation, and repression. In his discussion of the 1953-54 basic-level elections in Communist China, Townsend concludes that "in the eyes of the CCP, the elective

[5] Sartori.

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function is a relatively minor aspect of popular participation in an election campaign." In contrast, several other functions emerged as major aspects of the election campaign. These were the raising of mass political consciousness, increasing production, strengthening unity, educating the masses and the cadres, and securing demographic and political information (pp. 134-35).

Townsend defines political participation as "all those activities through which the individual consciously becomes involved in attempts to give a *particular direction* to the conduct of public affairs" (p. 4, italics added). Interpreted strictly, this definition describes more accurately the democratic than the usual Chinese Communist practice. It does not adequately cover a situation in which the Party plays an exclusive role in defining a supreme, unified national interest and making policy decisions, and in which the task of the masses is primarily the implementation of policies.

Yet in his general discussion and by his detailed description of participation in Communist China, Townsend does suggest by implication a solution to the methodological problem posed by Sartori. On the one hand, in justifying the use of the concept of participation, he points out that "the extensive use of propaganda to mobilize the population, the manipulation of political organizations by their elites, the inability of citizens to exert effective influence on decision-makers, and the lack of significant electoral choice—all characteristic features of Chinese political life—are by no means absent in democratic politics" (p. 6). On the other hand, in discussing the CCP's assumption that both Party leadership and mass voluntarism can be preserved, he notes that "Party leadership of the liberated areas [during the Yenan period] was real enough, but it rested on the foundation of a broad popular consensus that virtually eliminated the need for coercive measures against the population of these areas" (p. 84). In analyzing the Party's ability to enlist mass support during the period of political construction, he emphasizes that "Party policies, at least in their stated objectives, were consistent with majority interests" and that "the obvious presence of CCP control makes it easy to underestimate the attraction of participation in the early mass movements" (p. 90). In discussing the aftermath of the collapse of the Great Leap and the commune system due to the peasantry's passive resistance and slowdown, he accepts John W. Lewis's view that village kinship and friendship ties were still prerequisites for successful leadership in the production team (p. 172). He concludes that "the action to which we are referring is voluntary in the sense that the consequences of inaction, in most cases,

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are not so severe as to compel action unless there is also present some degree of willingness to act" (p. 193). All this suggests that the interests, voluntary actions, and particularistic ties of the masses have sometimes been factors in accounting for the CCP's success in mobilization, manipulation, and control, and at other times obstacles to be overcome.

The methodological implication of these discussions by Townsend is that while we must take fully into account the basic differences between voluntary participation in a democratic system and mobilization-manipulation in a totalitarian system, we can nevertheless consider these dichotomous concepts as referring to a similar function in the two political systems—i.e., the structuring of the relationship between the individual and the political authority. For lack of a better term, we can call this function "political involvement." Political involvement in this sense can be conceived in any political system as a combination or mix between participation and mobilization-manipulation. In so far as this dimension of political life is concerned, the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian system can be understood as a difference in the pattern in which voluntary participation combines with mobilization-manipulation. The different total patterns in which the various dimensions are combined will differentiate one type of political system from another. Similarly, the "uniqueness" of any particular case will be sought in the specific combination of factors that is different from the combination in other cases belonging to the same type.[6] This way of conceptualizing our problems has the advantage of bringing our abstract notions closer to political practices in a polity, and of directing our attention to the complex realities in any type of political system. It will also facilitate our perception of the quantitative and qualitative changes of a specific dimension of political life and the direction of these changes. One of the great merits of Townsend's study is its detailed and careful analysis of the changing pattern of political involvement in China, from noninvolvement or nonparticipation in traditional China to the different combinations of voluntary participation and mobilization-manipulation in different periods of the history of Chinese communism, with the element of voluntary participation declining in importance since the Yenan years until the element of mobilization-manipulation reached its height during the Great Leap.[7]

[6] Sidney Verba, "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," *World Politics*, xx (October 1967), 114.

[7] The more fundamental and more difficult problem of integration versus uniformity can be dealt with in the same fashion. In all political systems, the processes of both integration and "homogenization" are at work. In the democratic West, integration

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At times, the application of concepts, generalizations, and theories developed in the West to the study of the type of system to which Communist China belongs is not entirely without its difficulties. Pye's discussion of one of the reasons for Peking's failure to achieve rapid economic and social development is a case in point. Agreeing with the view expressed by many scholars in the West, Pye asserts that "totalitarianism is uniquely a product of the modern industrial world," or more specifically, of its capacity for building large-scale and highly disciplined forms of human organizations (p. 235). According to him, the Chinese are fighting the reality of history "in their effort to utilize the modern system of totalitarian rule when so much of their society is still essentially pre-industrial." It is not easy to reconcile this conclusion with Pye's own perceptive psychocultural analysis of the capacity of the Chinese for organization-building. Furthermore, he cites the failure of the Great Leap as a proof of his point. Yet, one can reasonably argue that the failure of the Great Leap was due not to a lack of the capacity for building large-scale and highly disciplined forms of human organization, but rather to an ideologically inspired miscomprehension of socioeconomic reality, as he himself points out in his discussion of the commune system (pp. 199, 211, 231). The Party's management of the retreat from the Great Leap and its success in preventing the economic disaster from developing into political chaos were a reflection of its organizational strength. We can at least suggest that between 1949 and 1957 Chinese totalitarianism was probably just as effective as the Russian variety and the Chinese system more totalitarian than Italian fascism,[8] to cite two nations that stood at a much higher level of industrialization than China. We can also venture the hypothesis that the bureaucratic tradition of the Chinese empire and the twenty years of guerrilla warfare could be an alternative source for the capacity to create the large-scale and highly disciplined forms of human organization on which a modern totalitarian system depends. Similar factors may account for the relative success of North Vietnamese totalitarianism when compared with the political instability of many regimes in the underdeveloped world.

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of the various functional groups is achieved partly by the general acceptance of certain basic principles of "right" and "wrong" and the "rules of the game" guiding the struggle for power and material resources: in other words, uniformity at this highest level combined with diversity at other levels. In few other political systems are the leaders more determined to establish uniformity in all spheres of life than in Maoist China. Yet even Mao and the Maoists must seek the integration (in their own terminology, *chieh-ho*) of the different groups.

[8] It is immaterial here whether or not we regard Fascist Italy as a totalitarian system.

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In sum, the application to Chinese Communist studies of concepts, generalizations, and theories developed in the West has enable us to see the theoretical and general significance of seemingly unique and superficially trivial facts about China. When skillfully done, it can also lead us to understand the distinctiveness of Chinese politics. Yet in undertaking this task, we must be constantly aware of the methodological problems created by the application of the various kinds of concepts, generalizations, and theories to a sociopolitical system like China's, which is so different from those in the West and which has emerged out of an entirely different and extraordinarily complex political tradition.

The application to area studies of concepts, generalizations, and theories developed on the basis of Western experience marks the beginning of the drive to maturity of non-Western studies. Full maturity can be attained only when scholars specializing in area studies can fashion new concepts, generalizations, and theories of universal or general applicability on the basis of the integration between their Western intellectual tools and their knowledge of non-Western nations. Lifton's book is the first in the field of Chinese studies that points toward this direction. Partly from his research on the survivors of Hiroshima and partly on the basis of his broad intellectual concern with "man's struggle for various forms of renewal and transcendence," he has evolved a series of concepts around what he calls "modes of symbolic immortality" and has begun to apply them to different epochs and to a general view of the historical process (p. xiii). The Cultural Revolution in China, staged by an ageing tragic hero intensely concerned with the possible death of his revolution, provides Lifton with an extreme case in which "man's continuing need for an assurance of eternal survival for his self" coincides with a revolutionary romantic's struggle for revolutionary immortality. The result is the most fascinating book ever written on Communist China, portraying "the Chinese experience as both distinctive and part of the general flow of human events." Dissatisfied with the usual practice of seeing the Chinese revolution in terms of the French and Russian revolutions, Lifton urges us to use "the Chinese situation as a paradigm for revolution in general" and to reexamine the French and Soviet experiences in relation to the theme of revolutionary immortality (pp. xvi-xvii). His ultimate concern is the development of a general view of the historical process and the search for "new conceptual connections between individual and collective patterns" (p. xv). Generalizing from Lifton's suggestions and from his interest in extreme historical

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conditions, we may venture the thought that precisely because of China's long history and large size, the nature of her confrontation with the West, the extent of the disintegration of her society, her protracted period of revolutionary struggle, the sharp contrast between the early success and recent failure of the CCP, and the unexpected and novel attempts made by Mao to realize his revolutionary vision, the seemingly unique characteristics of Chinese politics throw into bold relief certain universal political problems and reveal some general dilemmas of the human condition in a magnified and easily recognizable form. If so, scholars like Lifton may develop from their study of China new views of the historical process and new conceptions of the political system, thus reciprocating the contributions made by social-science theory.

II

The extraordinary degree of continuity in the traditional order in China, followed by an apparently new and distinct sociopolitical system, has posed a formidable challenge to scholars. The problem of tradition and modernity in political development, and of continuity and change in history, cannot be ignored. It is faced directly and squarely in Townsend's study of one aspect of the Peking regime, Lifton's treatment of two related themes, and Pye's sweeping interpretation of the whole political system and the political culture of China, past and present. These works provide us with examples of the inviting opportunity afforded by China for the investigation of this problem, and also reveal some hidden pitfalls in such an enterprise. The opportunity can be most fully realized when a scholar has selected a significant and well-defined problem on which there exists a wealth of historical material and adequate monographic works on the premodern period. G. William Skinner's impressive and ingenious study of the persisting influence of the premodern peasant marketing system on the units of agricultural collectivization under the Communists, and David S. Nivison's discussion of the relationship between the Communist practice of ideological remolding and earlier, pre-Western Chinese thought, are cases in point. So is Townsend's examination of political participation in traditional, transitional, and Communist China, although in his case the problem studied is much less complex. Whereas Skinner and Nivison uncover the strong links between the past and the present, Townsend finds a sharp break in the pattern of political participation. He has successfully shown us the way in which the noninvolvement on the part of the masses in national

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politics in imperial China has been replaced by the extension of the central government's authority down to the lowest levels of society, by the regime's demands for positive popular commitment to its goal and program, and by the active mobilization of the masses in the execution of its policies.

Yet underlying "this most striking difference between the political system of Communist China and that of imperial China" (p. 213) are a number of continuities with the past on a deeper level. Townsend implicitly recognizes these continuities in his discussion of the moral leadership of the Communist elite, and the limitation of popular involvement to the execution of policies made exclusively by the elite. Pye explicitly states and analyzes them. In so doing, he has defined some of the traits shared by the traditional and Communist Chinese political systems with a freshness and relevance to theory not found in many other works. In contrast to many scholars, however, Pye concludes that in most cases these features have become serious handicaps to China's modernization and have contributed to the failure of the CCP. He observes that to a very large extent the Chinese polity, traditional or Communist, is "a self-contained system very little influenced by citizen or nongovernmental elites" (p. 13). As a corollary, the Chinese believe without question that the needs of the public can be met by the actions of officials who pose as sympathetic and understanding, rather than by a system of political representation through which the interests of the various groups are expressed and influence official policies (p. 22). The result is that Chinese politics is "so peculiarly insensitive to changes in the social and economic environment" (p. 14). The Chinese have always attached "sovereign importance to the value of politics." This emphasis on the primacy of politics has inhibited the development of autonomous systems of human relationships and specialization. The Chinese have shown extraordinary concern for the efficacy of moral persuasion and the importance of self-cultivation. This has led to "a planned effort to establish the cult of the leader" (p. 31). The "almost compulsive need for ideologies" suggests that "for the Chinese a basic function of ideologies has been to make it possible for them to avoid a direct confrontation with the realities of their politics" (p. 31). The Chinese have suffered "little confusion over the reality of their identity," and have never lost their "identification with historical greatness" (pp. 50, 51). Yet, according to Pye, "it is remarkable how few specific features of their civilization the Chinese self-consciously value or feel that they must fight to maintain";

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indeed, their "sense of identity is . . . derived less from the content of culture . . . and more from the fact of race" (pp. 54-55).

These and other statements made by Pye on the continuities between past and present force us to realize how difficult it is to generalize about China's long political tradition. While some of the generalizations, such as the statement about the effect of the emphasis on the centrality of politics on the development of autonomous human relationships, undoubtedly command our agreement, others seem to fit one period of Chinese history with more exactitude than they do other periods. Students of the Chinese Communist movement might ask whether, during the period of the civil war and Sino-Japanese War, a basic function of the evolving doctrine of Mao was not in fact to enable the Chinese Communists to confront the realities of their politics directly and successfully. Those historians who consider culturalism rather than nationalism, not to say racism, as a prominent feature of Chinese civilization would probably doubt whether this feature can disappear so completely as to justify Pye's attribution of the source of Chinese identity to the fact of race. Some would point to the unique system of language, the notion of reciprocity, the popular tradition of thrift and industry, and indeed some of the continuities in the political culture described by Pye himself as the specific elements of Chinese culture that serve as a source of identity. Other historians, mentally reviewing the history of the Three Kingdoms, the Southern and Northern Dynasties, the Five Dynasties, the warlord era, and the Kuomintang-CCP civil war, as well as the measures taken by the founders of the Han, Ming, and Ch'ing dynasties to consolidate their rule, would not find it easy to accept Pye's statement that "when one considers what was at stake and the rewards of expanding power, what is striking about Chinese history is how little competition there was [for the throne during the interregnum] and how easily new authorities become enduring imperial dynasties" (p. 87). Still others who study the careers of outstanding emperors and capable ministers would question whether "there has been a direct and firm correlation between the degree of authority and the degree of inactivity" (pp. 130-31).

Raising these questions does not imply that Pye's statements are necessarily wrong. But it does suggest that in view of the long history of China and our still inadequate knowledge, generalizations of the type advanced by Pye are not easy to confirm or refute at this time. The difficulties are further compounded by the fact that some of these generalizations are based on an explicit or implicit comparison of the history of China with that of the West—another formidable task. An

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interpretation of Chinese politics based on such generalizations must be held most tentatively. Indeed, Pye himself urges us to read his book in this spirit when he characterizes his study as "an interpretive and highly speculative essay," and when he warns us that examples and incidents from Chinese history and contemporary Chinese behavior can be "only illustrative of our hypotheses" and should not be taken as "real proof" (p. ix). Within that self-imposed context, this briskly written book by an outstanding political scientist has raised many issues concerning our understanding of China that must be reexamined. In this reexamination, we should be wise to use the research strategy followed by Skinner, Nivison, and Townsend.

Like many other scholars, Professor Pye has detected many discontinuities between traditional political order and contemporary political systems. Again, he finds that these discontinuities are related to some of the worst features of modern politics in China, which he characterizes in highly opprobrious terms. The traditional scholar-official class has been replaced, to quote Pye, by "half-educated rulers and strong-armed bullies" (p. 36). The "dispossessed Westernized intellectuals," who are juxtaposed to the "rooted and unalienated politicians," "have at best only taken over the role that in traditional politics was filled by eunuchs," and "the potency of Chinese intellectuals has been limited almost entirely to the harping, negativistic role of the purveyor of scandals." Few would disagree with Pye's contrast between the role of the traditional scholar and the role of the modern intellectual, or with his description of the displacement of the traditional respect for scholars by the rankest form of anti-intellectualism. But many would wonder whether the phrase "half-educated rulers and strong-armed bullies" describes much more than one facet of the complex of individuals and traits that characterize contemporary Chinese leadership; whether the role of modern Chinese intellectuals is significantly analogous to that of eunuchs (who in some cases exercised tremendous political influence and in other cases were nonentities); and whether or not such men as Hu Shih, Li Ta-chao, Ting Wen-chiang, Feng Yu-lan, and Fei-Hsiao-tung were mere purveyors of scandal.

The complex pattern of continuities and discontinuities between past and present raises the methodological problem of how it can best be characterized and analyzed. The problem finds expression in the following statement by Pye: "The linkage between contemporary Communist practices and historical politics is found less in grand traditions or explicit philosophies of government than in the vulgar but popular traditions of day-to-day Chinese life. Thus when we speak of the per-

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sistence of elements of traditional Chinese culture in both Communist and Nationalist politics we are thinking not of the vestiges of Confucianism but of the spirit in which the Chinese have approached power and the necessity of government" (p. 39). These two statements, together with his discussion of continuity and change in China, actually point to a very complicated set of ideas. To use some basic categories to express these ideas, we should like to suggest the following formulations. While the nature of the political system in China taken as a whole has basically changed, certain parts of the tradition, particularly those "popular" elements that occupied a secondary place in the traditional society, have not only persisted but have been elevated to a central position, thus engendering different implications, entailing different consequences, and making the new system different from the old. While the traditional and the contemporary political systems in China, as well as some of their components, are structurally similar, they are basically different in content. While the goals of the traditional and Communist political systems are poles apart, the methods of the modern Chinese to achieve their goals have been conditioned by the political tradition. While the values espoused by the Chinese Communists are totally modern, the style of leadership is traditional. While the explicit orientations are new, the implicit support for them may be traditional. Finally, while the social institutions have been eroded, the attitudes that have been cultivated by them may persist.[9] It is in the analysis of the persisting Chinese attitude toward authority under entirely new conditions that Professor Pye intends to make his most important and original contribution to our understanding of contemporary China. To this subject we now turn.

III

The major theme of Professor Pye's book is the existence of a profound "authority crisis" in twentieth-century China. This authority crisis has arisen because the attitude toward authority has remained constant whereas the systems of authority have been disrupted. This attitude toward authority has persisted because the earliest socialization process has not changed and the young have still been taught "abiding sentiments and concepts about authority," in spite of the progressive disruption of the traditional family (pp. 6, 107-08). In this persisting socialization process, the personality of the Chinese is shaped by "the

[9] For a more detailed discussion of these ideas, see Tang Tsou, "Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in China," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China's Heritage and the Communist Political System* (Chicago 1968), 288-91.

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three most striking characteristics of the Chinese family: the paramount value of filial piety, the absolute denial of the legitimacy of all forms of aggression, and the vision of a rigidly defined order of role relationships" (p. 91). Parents exert tremendous social pressures and sanctions (particularly through the use of shame) on the child to instill in him strict self-discipline and self-control (pp. 77, 89, 91, 94). The childhood experience of dependency on the parent creates in adults a tendency to expect a great deal from political authority in solving their problems, in giving them a sense of security, and in providing them with a stable social order. Authority is supposed to be "absolute, harsh, and even ruthless"; yet it is also seen as being "subtle, wise, and the source of morality." "It is to be feared and distrusted, yet to be revered and relied upon" (p. 86). When the realities of authority both in his home and in the larger society meet his expectations, the Chinese accepts authority readily, and powerful psychological mechanisms are at work to repress and suppress aggressive impulses "to an extreme degree" (p. 126). These repressed aggressive impulses formerly found sublimation in the cultural achievements of traditional China and in compulsive, ritualized, and routinized action (pp. xvii, 103, 135).

The authority crisis developed when both parental and political authority were shown to be weak and no longer able to meet the high expectations of the individual. Because of the lingering tradition of filial piety, however, the Chinese, instead of openly revolting against his parents, struck out aggressively at other forms of authority (p. 111). The weakening of the mechanism for controlling aggression that accompanies the authority crisis sets the stage for "aggression to become explicitly mobilized in politics" (p. 111). This mobilization of aggression in politics took place in company with the exaltation of hate and hostility as "positive virtues of the political activist" (p. 65). Once this authority crisis had developed, "the problem of controlling aggression complicated the process of establishing new forms of authority." On the one hand, "the release of repressed aggression through more popular forms has complicated the task of arriving at concepts of authority appropriate for more modern politics." On the other hand, "the attempt merely to impose modern versions of traditional forms of authority involves the stifling of powerful emotions released by the overt expression of long-repressed aggression" (p. 32).

Professor Pye's delineation of the authority crisis in China, as summarized above, represents one way of handling psychocultural analysis. Pye has given us a plausible explanation of the distinctive Chinese approach to politics through the application to the data of a universal

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theory about culture and personality. But there is one logical difficulty at a point crucial to the understanding of contemporary Chinese politics that Professor Pye has not fully clarified for us. On the one hand, he assumes that there is a dominant pattern of early socialization practice in the Chinese family and a cultural pattern of attitude toward authority. He further assumes that these two patterns determine or largely condition the political behavior of the Chinese and thus their political programs and their preferred political system. On the other hand, in his central hypothesis and throughout his book he underscores the conflict between two political tendencies in contemporary China. To repeat, one stems from "the release of repressed aggression through more popular forms," and the opposing one finds expression in "the attempt merely to impose modern versions of traditional forms of authority." There is little doubt that Professor Pye's characterization of these two conflicting political attitudes is largely correct. On the macro-societal level, the first tendency may be said to have manifested itself in the various revolutionary movements and the second may be said to have been symbolized by the endeavor of those in power to maintain the *status quo* at any particular moment, i.e., "modern versions of traditional forms of authority." Within a revolutionary movement, e.g., the Kuomintang before 1927 and the CCP up to 1949, these two tendencies existed side by side. The aggressive impulses were released against the *status quo* while "a modern version of traditional forms of authority" was developed within the movement. Even within the personality of a single individual, these two conflicting tendencies may coexist, with the first exerting a strong influence on his behavior at a particular time and the other having a stronger impact under different circumstances. Professor Pye interprets the clash between Mao and the Party apparatus under Liu Shao-ch'i in terms of "two different approaches to the authority crisis in the political culture," with the "romantic, aggressive, irreconcilable spirit of Maoism" pitted against "the regularized orderliness and bureaucratized relations" symbolized by Liu (pp. 234, 242).

If one way to understand the political changes and developments in contemporary China is to view them in terms of the conflict between these two types of persons or two types of attitudes, the central task of psychocultural studies is to undertake a thoroughgoing analysis of the personality development of the two types of persons and the psychogenesis of the two types of attitudes. Given his assumption of the existence of one dominant pattern of early socialization practices, it is incumbent upon Professor Pye to explain more fully and in more

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specific terms the distinct psychological mechanisms that produce these two very different types of men and tendencies from a single pattern of early socialization. How can we explain from the psychocultural viewpoint the very different approaches in recent years of men like Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, when their experiences with authority in the family were quite similar, as Pye himself notes? In a discussion of revolt against parental authority, Pye places side by side P'eng Teh-huai's conflict with his stepmother and Mao's clash with his father. Yet P'eng and Mao symbolize two opposite approaches toward China's problems at least since 1953. Thus, Professor Pye poses a significant problem that remains to be fully investigated.

There is no doubt that Professor Pye adds an important dimension to our understanding of Chinese politics. But our assessment of the validity and extent of the utility of his psychocultural interpretation varies with our agreement or disagreement with his judgments on the objective situation confronting the Chinese in the twentieth century. It also varies with the availability of alternative interpretations that are perhaps less profound but easier to accept. Professor Pye observes that "the emotional content of the Chinese sense of revolution was singular in that it dealt upon the need for a strong and more complete authority" (p. 10). Yet the need for a strong and more complete authority in China was seen by many Americans who had been brought up under very different early socialization practices. In 1915, Frank J. Goodnow, the eminent political scientist who was an adviser to President Yuan Shih-k'ai, published an article on the desirability of China's return to monarchy. In the 1940's, American officials advocated the development of "a strong, united, and democratic China." Indeed, this recognition of the need for strong and more complete authority is not unique to the Chinese but is rather common among outside observers and native politicians in many states in the underdeveloped world. Granted this, Professor Pye's contribution lies in his analysis of the irrational sources of an attitude that can also be explained on rational grounds. This type of analysis is helpful in so far as it enables us to understand the emotional basis underlying and reinforcing a realistic judgment. It is indispensable only in cases where we can clearly show that the subjective need for strong authority has pushed the Chinese to entertain unrealistic expectations from political authority, or that an obsession with maintaining effective political control militates against full recognition of the need for functional specialization, professional autonomy, and individual creativity and spontaneity. We must

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grant that in analyzing some of these problems, Pye has made a signal contribution.

Similarly, Professor Pye correctly underscores the high level of emotionalism and hostility in the political culture of twentieth-century China. But he goes on to observe that this degree of emotionalism and hostility "was out of proportion to the intensity of the political issues involved" (p. 112). It is, of course, difficult to measure accurately either the degree of emotionalism and hostility or the intensity of the political issues, and to determine precisely at what point the former is out of proportion to the latter. But it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Chinese in the twentieth century have been confronted, during a relatively brief span of time, with many of the most serious political issues that the peoples in the West resolved one at a time over a period of centuries. Furthermore, this concentration of hate has found more forceful expression in the words than in the actions of the Chinese. As Professor Pye notes, even on the verbal level it has not been developed into "an exaltation of violence" for its own sake or as a moral virtue (p. 68). Nor has it completely obliterated "the spirit of accommodation" (p. 34). These phenomena require more emphasis and a more adequate explanation than that supplied in Professor Pye's work if we are to have a more balanced view of the Chinese political culture.

Another phenomenon requiring further explanation is this: the concentration of hate has moved to a higher level over the course of the last fifty years, culminating in the words and actions of the adolescent and young Red Guards. This increase in the concentration of hate cannot be completely explained by the displacement of the revolt against parental authority onto political targets, because the concentration of hate and the intensity of parental control have not moved in the same direction over time. There is no doubt that the concept of filial piety has progessively lost its potency. It is also probably true that the control of the parents over the child has decreased. Although the early socialization practice may have remained fundamentally the same, as Professor Pye asserts, one reasonable assumption is that the parent's realization of the weakening of the concept of filial piety, together with his decreased control over the child, has offset, at least to some extent, the failure of the parent to meet the high expectation of the child and thus has moderated or allayed the impulse to revolt against parental authority. We might also wonder whether childhood socialization has continued to be dominated by the theme of filial piety since the Communists came to power in 1949. There are indications that the peer group has become a more and more significant factor in the

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child's early environment.[10] At the same time, the political authority in Communist China can no longer be considered by adolescents and youths to be weak. Yet it is precisely the Red Guards who embody the concentration of hate in twentieth-century Chinese politics since the Boxer Rebellion. It would seem that in so far as the Red Guard generation is concerned, the "authority crisis" and the accompanying concentration of hate cannot be adequately explained by the juxtaposition of persisting early socialization practices and the weakening of political authority. One possible explanation can be inferred from Professor Pye's book: the political culture of hate was created by the generation born at the turn of the century, and the leaders of the older generations can easily manipulate the hostility of the adolescents and youths who have been socialized in the new political culture. This explanation gives precedence to later political socialization over early socialization practices. As Robert Lifton suggests, "the initial anger associated with the Cultural Revolution was part of a command performance." But this is hardly a sufficient explanation. Lifton goes on to point out that there emerged hatreds of a more unfocused nature among both the Maoists and the anti-Maoists, young and old. It is the hostility of people who were suffocating under excessive personal control, psychological manipulation, and demands for moral purity and ideologically inspired action (p. 130).[11] Lifton's explanation is based more upon our knowledge of the relationship between the individual and political authority in Communist China than upon the less thoroughly explored area of early socialization practice since the turn of the century.

In the sphere of foreign relations, the dominant emotions of the Chinese have been correctly characterized by Professor Pye as a sense of having been humiliated by other nations and a resultant hostility toward them. Quite convincingly, Professor Pye finds the dynamic origins of the sentiments about humiliation and its relationship to anger to lie in the frequent and widespread use of shame by the parent in disciplining the child (p. 95). Yet he seems to have dismissed too completely and too readily the objective basis and the clearly understandable reasons for this sense of national humiliation and hostility. He characterizes as "political mythology" the Chinese belief that they "have invariably suffered unjustly at the hands of all nations" (p. 72). Even in the form stated by him, this belief is not as far from the truth as he

[10] Remarks by Ezra Vogel, at the National Seminar on Communist China, held at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on May 5 and 6, 1967.

[11] Lifton has explored these problems methodically in his *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York 1961).

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believes, although in international relations justice or injustice is admittedly not always on one side. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that no other independent nation in modern times has been confronted, so frequently and for such extended periods, with crises in its foreign relations as has China since 1839.

Professor Pye goes on to suggest that the Chinese derive "satisfaction from the injustices that their nation has suffered in modern times" and that they are "wallowing in self-righteous humiliation in politics." This "moral masochism of the Chinese" in the political sphere is then traced to the "narcissistic satisfactions" gained by the child through suffering and humiliation (pp. 72-75). If the Chinese really derive unconscious satisfaction from a sense of suffering humiliation and injustice at the hands of other nations, how can we account for the tremendous efforts and sacrifices made by both the Nationalist and the Communist regimes in trying to improve the international status of China—efforts ranging from the war against the Japanese to the development of nuclear weapons? To this reviewer, what needs equally to be underscored and answered is why the intense sense of national humiliation and hostility toward other nations had not led to irrational acts of aggression and violence toward other nations on a large scale. Perhaps the powerful psychological mechanisms for controlling aggression are still operative, when national survival is at stake. Perhaps the Chinese have sublimated their hostility in their ideological pronouncements, or have displaced it first from one country to another and then to their erstwhile comrades in violent inner-Party struggle. We may wonder how long these mechanisms will continue to deter the Chinese from taking that one disastrous aggressive step that will trigger a large-scale conflict in the Far East, unless the Chinese can have a proper status in the international community.

Here and there in his book Professor Pye has made a series of explicit and implicit assessments of the success and failure of the Chinese in different periods in their attempts to modernize their country and in their resolution of the authority crisis. Looking at the pre-Communist period in the light of our new knowledge of the violence, confusion, and ineffectualness characteristic of developing societies, he sees "significant advances" in China even during the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty and the period of warlord rule, although "the Chinese have been blind to their own positive achievements" (pp. 2-4, 62). These significant advances were made despite the profound authority crisis that, according to his central hypothesis, must have reached its height during the warlord period. Rather casually, Professor Pye tells us

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that "Chinese communism during the 1950's appeared to be achieving a monolithic order that could have meant the resolution of all Chinese problems of authority," a conclusion also logically deducible from his central theme (p. 234). But so little is said about the achievements of the Peking regime and so strong is his emphasis on the obstacles placed by the spirit of Chinese politics on modernization and political stability since 1949, that the period of relative success in the 1950's is almost completely buried. As for current developments, Professor Pye rightly tells us that the Chinese authority crisis was "revived" by the problems posed by the commune movement, and that the trend in the 1950's toward "routinized handling of public problems seems to have produced an inexorable split within the party" (pp. 189, 234). No one will disagree that "the profound upheavals of 1966 and 1967 will inevitably weaken the authority of communism" (p. 235). But the violence, chaos, intrigues, and flagrant breaches of standards of fair play and simple principles of decency ought not obscure the fact that fundamental political issues are at stake, as we shall see. Provided that the Cultural Revolution and the eventual death of Mao will resolve in compromise rather than civil war, the achievements of the Peking regime taken as a whole will remain very impressive when compared with those of the warlord period or of the twenty-year rule of the Kuomintang on the mainland. If Professor Pye's analysis of the nature of the authority crisis is correct, a stable political system could be rebuilt along the general pattern of the 1950's. But history is irreversible. It is likely that, for better or for worse, China after the Cultural Revolution will not be the same.

Notwithstanding the questions, qualifications, and caveats raised in the preceding pages, there is no doubt that Professor Pye has produced a significant and original book on Communist China as well as the most controversial yet to appear. He is one of the very few scholars who foresaw the coming of a political crisis before it erupted. His book is consistently provocative and never bland, and Pye's analyses are invariably penetrating if also controversy-inspiring. He provides us with interesting explanations for the extreme vacillations in Chinese politics between monolithic order and intense political conflict, the inability of the Chinese to manage disagreement and competition without a dramatic rise in tension, Chinese anxieties about disorder and unpredictability, the Chinese search for ritualized behavior, the belief in the potency of willpower, the spontaneous tendency toward organization-building, the considerable contentment of the average organization man despite the lack of upward mobility, and

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

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the Communist success in tapping the Chinese potential for action. For a long period, and particularly since the 1930's, American scholars and observers have tended to see the Chinese and their culture in the best possible light and have perhaps drawn an over-idealized picture of China, however critical their views toward specific governments, individuals, and policies might be. Professor Pye has now applied neo-Freudian psychoanalytic theory to diagnose the ills of an erstwhile friend and present enemy, and has not shrunk from stressing the most unpalatable aspects of Chinese life. Hence the originality and the controversial nature of his book. The issues raised by him cannot be easily solved, for his sweeping hypotheses are difficult to prove or disprove. Moreover, to borrow a sentence from Pye himself but to use it in a different context, "we do not have a solid theoretical basis for determining the appropriate techniques with which to evaluate the sets of hypotheses" (p. viii).

In contrast to Professor Pye's comprehensive hypothesizing about wide-ranging aspects of Chinese personality and culture, and in contrast to his sweeping generalizations about Chinese history, Lifton confines himself to a single central theme and focuses his attention mainly on the Cultural Revolution. Whenever he refers to the Chinese past, he limits himself to those aspects of the tradition about which there is adequate knowledge and general agreement among scholars. He sees the Cultural Revolution as a "quest for revolutionary immortality." By this term he means "a shared sense of participating in permanent revolutionary fermentation, of transcending individual death by 'living on' indefinitely within this continuing revolution" (p. 7). From this point of view, he is able vividly to delineate the intense emotions surrounding the recent crisis, the deep fear of the death of the revolution, and the profound need to affirm a sense of immortality by assuring the endurance of the revolutionary works. Lifton is also able to locate the sources of Mao's political strength and the serious limitations in his approach to the problems of China. He tells us that "a key to the momentum of the Cultural Revolution is the merging of purity and power" that is "likely to dominate any collective quest for transcendence" (pp. 45, 46). Mao's strength derives from the fact that he has "achieved a status within the revolutionary lore as god-like in wisdom and virtue." Mao's identification with revolutionary purity and superior virtue is of utmost importance not only because "ultimate purity requires [and thus justifies] application of ultimate power," but also because "purity as such remains the source of that power—indeed

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is ultimate power—because he who possesses it has conquered death" (p. 52).

This discussion of purity (defined as encompassing such factors as self-denial on behalf of a higher cause, the urge to eliminate evil, and ideological singlemindedness) paves the way to a further understanding of the inspirational character of "the thought of Mao," which is extraordinarily simple and crude when viewed as a disembodied set of intellectual principles. "The thought of Mao," Lifton writes, "becomes not so much an exact blueprint for the future as a 'Way,' a call to a particular mode of being on behalf of a transcendent purpose" (p. 70). During the Cultural Revolution, it "is elevated to an all-consuming prophecy: it nurtures men, predicts their future, and changes the world to accomplish its own prediction; it sets in motion spiritual forces against which nothing can stand" (p. 73). Lifton's discussion of the cult of Mao is balanced by an appreciation of Mao's extraordinary role in the Chinese revolution: "No twentieth-century life has come closer than his to the great myth of the hero—with its "road of trials," or prolonged death encounter, and its mastery of that encounter in a way that enhances the life of one's people. His message of mastery of death anxiety, reinforced by personal example, took on special relevance for a people living through a period in which such anxiety was continuously mobilized by extreme dislocation, violence, and loss" (p. 78).

Lifton sees Mao as a great man who is dissatisfied with his extraordinary accomplishments and who plunges into realms even he cannot conquer. In trying to do the impossible, he loses confidence in his claim to immortality and turns to despotism. This attempt to do the impossible is related to what Lifton calls psychism—the endeavor "to achieve control over one's external environment through internal or psychological manipulation, through behavior determined by intrapsychic needs no longer in touch with the actualities of the world one seeks to influence" (p. 32). One form of this psychism particularly prominent during the Great Leap is "the exaggerated reliance upon will and psychic power to achieve technological goals" that leads to self-defeating policies (pp. xv-xvi). Mao fails to learn that "rather than the psychic state replacing technology, technology profoundly modifies the psychic state" (p. 110). The attempt to do the impossible is also related to Mao's failure to realize that human nature, though highly flexible, does impose limits on how far men's psychic state can be pushed and how long extreme psychic states can be maintained. One of these limits is "the need for a certain amount of harmony between

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the evidence of the senses and socially shared images of self and world" (p. 137). As for the future, Lifton suggests that the psychological and technological limitations to the Maoist approach would be consistent with a pragmatic turn in China.

This brief summary with extensive quotation is intended to bring out the main points and the flavor of a book that, in my opinion, presents a most sophisticated and balanced analysis of Mao and the Cultural Revolution. Lifton is able to do this because he does not merely apply ready-made concepts and theories to China, but evolves his own ideas and generalizations on the basis of them and his knowledge of China. Though especially relevant to China and its recent crisis, these ideas and generalizations deal with the problems of men everywhere and in all times. With Lifton's book, Chinese studies have taken another step toward maturity.

Yet the complexity of the Cultural Revolution obliges us to seek alternative explanations to supplement Lifton's analysis—explanations that are more down-to-earth, lay more stress on the here-and-now, focus more attention on possible structural changes, and gives more prominence to the fact that Mao is groping for a Chinese way to socialism, industrialization, and modernization. One such alternative explanation might emphasize the immediate relevance of the Maoist vision to the contemporary problems of Chinese society, problems that may well reflect universal dilemmas of the human condition and fundamental issues confronting the sociopolitical order in a magnified and easily recognizable form. The Chinese political system prior to the Cultural Revolution can be understood as one of the purest forms in human experience of a type of association in which there is a clear-cut separation between the elite and the masses, a sharp division between domination and subjection. In this perspective, the Maoist vision as it revealed itself in its extreme form during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution can be considered a critique of this type of political organization and, in a certain sense, a critique of all bureaucratized organizations to the extent that they approach the Chinese type. It reflects an attempt to minimize the consequences arising from the division between domination and subjection or from the differential distribution of power. It entails an endeavor to blur the line between domination and subjection, to make the leaders less distinguishable from the led in status and privilege, and to create a new type of relationship between the two groups. It is to be realized by changing the pattern of participation of the dominated in the political process within every single organization, by redefining the role of those in positions of authority, by chang-

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ing their attitudes and values, and by instituting a system of mutual exchange of roles and mutual penetration among men of different statuses and occupations.

Beyond this, the ideal society in Mao's vision is one in which the absolute validity of its basic values and norms are beyond question, total commitment to societal goals is demanded from the individual, and all powers are employed in repeated efforts to realize his vision. In this totally mobilized society everyone is deeply concerned with public affairs. Every act must be relevant to politics. Every person must actively participate in the political system and processes. It is commonplace to say that Mao's vision has its roots in his experience in conducting guerrilla warfare, which requires total commitment and preoccupation with power to achieve a common objective. But in Mao's view, this vision also contains the proper corrective for an increasingly bureaucratized, modernizing society in which the gap between values and practices widens, idealistic pronouncements become empty rhetoric, commitments to societal goals are weak, and power is used to pursue narrowly defined interests. In the Cultural Revolution, the elevation of the cult of Mao's thought to a new height is meant to be, among other things, a reaffirmation of the societal values and goals. The repeated emphasis on "the three constantly read articles" is intended to bring about total commitment. Power is to be recaptured and used to implement his vision.

The course of the Cultural Revolution can then be interpreted from the structural-functional viewpoint as a process in which Mao's vision and his charisma, artificially refurbished and strengthened, have been employed as instruments to legitimize the revolution and destroy the "opposition" that entrenched itself in the bureaucratized party organization and apparatus. In the process, Mao has immeasurably widened the gap between himself and all other men, whom he tries to make as equal to one another as the circumstances permit. The Maoist vision is impossible to realize. But at least for a brief period, it will bring about changes worthy of examination in the direction of a higher degree of political participation and economic equality, even if the former is merely a wider sharing of the high political risks and the latter nothing more than equality in poverty.[12]

[12] For a fuller discussion of these ideas, see Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," *China Quarterly*, No. 38 (April-June 1968).

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